



DRDC Toronto No. CR-2005-204

The Dimensionality of Trust

by:

Barbara D. Adams and Jessica A. Sartori

Humansystems® Incorporated
111 Farquhar St., 2nd floor
Guelph, ON N1H 3N4

Project Manager:
Dr. Barbara Adams
(519) 836 5911

PWGSC Contract No. W7711-017747/001/TOR
Call-Up 7747-20

On behalf of
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

as represented by
Defence Research and Development Canada Toronto
1133 Sheppard Avenue West
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
M3M 3B9

DRDC Scientific Authority
Carol McCann
(416) 635-2180

June 30, 2005



Author

Barbara D. Adams, Ph.D.
Humansystems[®] Incorporated

Approved by


Carol McCann

Head/Command Effectiveness & Behaviour

Approved for release by


K.M. Sutton

Chair, Document Review and Library Committee

The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada

© HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA (2005)
as represented by the Minister of National Defense

© SA MAJESTE LA REINE EN DROIT DU CANADA (2005)
Défense Nationale Canada

Abstract

This report reviews the literature relevant to the dimensionality of trust, and more specifically, considers the relationship between distrust and trust. The concept of distrust is first defined then the two prevailing views about the dimensionality of trust/distrust are considered. This review explores and endorses the view that distrust and trust are two distinct but related constructs, each with bipolar dimension. Following from this, the factors that influence distrust as well as the consequences of distrust are explored. The next section reviews relevant models of distrust and presents a preliminary model of distrust in military teams. Finally, this report offers specific recommendations about how trust dimensionality can be incorporated into our program of research, and provides practical recommendations about how best to manage issues of trust and distrust within the CF.

Résumé

Ce rapport passe en revue la littérature qui traite de la dimension de la confiance (*trust*), et plus précisément, du lien entre la méfiance (*distrust*) et la confiance. Il commence par définir le concept de la méfiance; après quoi, il examine les deux principales visions de la dimension de la confiance/la méfiance. Il explore et appuie l'idée selon laquelle la méfiance et la confiance sont deux notions distinctes mais connexes, comportant chacune une dimension bipolaire. À partir de là, il analyse les facteurs qui influent sur la méfiance ainsi que les conséquences de la méfiance. Il examine ensuite des modèles pertinents de la méfiance et présente un modèle préliminaire de la méfiance appliqué à des équipes de militaires. Enfin, il offre des recommandations sur la façon d'intégrer la dimension de la confiance à notre programme de recherche et des suggestions pragmatiques sur la meilleure façon de gérer les questions de confiance et de méfiance au sein des Forces canadiennes.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Executive Summary

This report reviews the results of a keyword search of the research literature relevant to understanding the dimensionality of trust in relation to military contexts. The goals of this review were to:

- Present empirical and theoretical work in the scientific and military literature relevant to distrust
- Identify factors that affect the development and maintenance of distrust
- Identify the positive and negative consequences of distrust
- Propose a new measure of distrust
- Present a preliminary model of distrust within military contexts
- Provide specific recommendations for incorporating distrust into the current program of trust in military context research

The search yielded approximately 200 titles and abstracts, with more than 35 articles reviewed in detail. These articles were drawn from research in areas such as behavioural science, organizational theory, human relations, as well as military theory and research.

The report contains sections reviewing studies and theory relating to:

- Distrust as a concept
- Factors influencing distrust
- Consequences of distrust
- Existing models of distrust
- Preliminary model of distrust
- Recommendations for incorporating distrust into current program of trust research
- Proposal of a scale to measure distrust
- Pragmatic recommendations for CF to manage trust dimensionality

This review argues that the previously prevailing view of trust and distrust as being a single bipolar construct has little empirical support, and endorses another conceptualization. This view argues that distrust and trust are two distinct but related constructs, each with bipolar dimension. In general, distrust can best be distinguished from trust by the level of intentionality and the ascription of malevolent motivation to another person. The factors likely to influence distrust within military teams include qualities of the distruster, distrustee, situational antecedents, as well as specific contextual factors. Following from this, the consequences of distrust are described in detail, and available models relevant to distrust are briefly summarized before a preliminary model is described. The final chapter provides specific recommendations about how trust dimensionality can best be incorporated into the current program of trust research, explores specific research questions, and provides pragmatic recommendations for the CF for management of trust in its full dimension.

Sommaire

Ce rapport analyse les résultats d'une recherche, faite à l'aide de mots-clés, de documents sur la compréhension de la dimension de la confiance dans un contexte militaire. Cet examen visait les objectifs suivants :

- Présenter les travaux empiriques et théoriques recensés dans la littérature scientifique et militaire sur la méfiance
- Déterminer quels sont les facteurs qui ont une incidence sur l'apparition et le maintien de la méfiance
- Définir les conséquences tant positives que négatives de la méfiance
- Proposer une nouvelle échelle de mesure de la méfiance
- Présenter un modèle préliminaire de la méfiance dans un contexte militaire
- Offrir des recommandations précises sur l'intégration de la notion de méfiance au programme actuel de recherche sur la confiance dans un contexte militaire.

La recherche a permis de repérer 200 titres et résumés, et plus de 35 articles ont été analysés de manière détaillée. Ces articles étaient tirés de recherches réalisées dans des domaines tels que les sciences comportementales, la théorie organisationnelle, les relations humaines, ainsi que les théories et la recherche applicables au milieu militaire.

Les diverses sections du rapport sont consacrées à des études et à des théories qui traitent des sujets suivants :

- Le concept de la méfiance
- Les facteurs qui influent sur la méfiance
- Les conséquences de la méfiance
- Les modèles existants de la méfiance
- Un modèle préliminaire de la méfiance
- Des recommandations en vue de l'intégration de la notion de méfiance au programme actuel de recherche sur la confiance
- Une suggestion d'échelle de mesure de la méfiance
- Des recommandations pragmatiques aux FC concernant la gestion de la dimension de confiance.

D'après l'étude, l'idée, qui a déjà eu cours, selon laquelle la confiance et la méfiance relèvent d'une seule notion bipolaire, n'est étayée que par peu de données empiriques. L'étude souscrit à une autre vision des choses, à savoir que la méfiance et la confiance représentent deux notions distinctes, mais connexes, qui comportent chacune une dimension bipolaire. De manière générale, la méfiance se distingue surtout de la confiance en ce qu'elle prête une intention et une motivation malveillante à une autre personne. Au nombre des facteurs susceptibles d'influer sur la méfiance à l'intérieur des équipes de militaires figurent les qualités de la personne méfiante, la personne qui fait l'objet de la méfiance, les éléments circonstanciels et les facteurs contextuels précis. À partir de là, l'étude décrit de manière détaillée les conséquences de la méfiance et présente succinctement les

modèles de méfiance qui existent avant de décrire un modèle préliminaire. Le dernier chapitre offre des recommandations sur la façon d'intégrer la dimension de la confiance à notre programme de recherche, explore des questions de recherche précises et présente aux FC des recommandations pragmatiques sur la meilleure façon de gérer la confiance dans sa pleine dimension.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	I
RÉSUMÉ.....	I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	III
SOMMAIRE	IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS	VII
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 BACKGROUND.....	1
1.2 PURPOSE	1
1.3 SCOPE	1
1.4 WORK ITEMS.....	2
1.5 DELIVERABLES	2
1.6 ACRONYMS	2
CHAPTER 2 – METHOD.....	3
2.1 KEYWORDS	3
2.2 DATABASES	3
2.3 THE SEARCH	4
2.4 SELECTION OF ARTICLES.....	4
2.5 REVIEW OF ARTICLES	4
CHAPTER 3 – RESULTS.....	5
3.1 DOMAINS OF RESEARCH.....	5
3.2 SECONDARY REFERENCES.....	5
3.3 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT	5
3.4 CHANGES IN THE WORK PLAN	5
CHAPTER 4 – THE CONCEPT OF DISTRUST	7
4.1 DISTRUST AS A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE.....	10
4.1.1 <i>Distrust as a Psychological State</i>	10
4.1.2 <i>Distrust as Choice Behaviour</i>	12
4.2 INTRODUCTION TO TRUST DIMENSIONALITY	13
4.2.1 <i>Distrust and Trust as a Single Bipolar Dimension.</i>	13
4.2.2 <i>Distrust and Trust as Separate Constructs.</i>	15
4.2.3 <i>Our View</i>	19
4.3 THE NEED TO DISTRUST.....	20
4.4 CONCEPTS TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM DISTRUST	21
4.5 PERSON-BASED AND CATEGORY-BASED DISTRUST.....	23
4.6 OVERVIEW AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS	24
CHAPTER 5 – FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE DISTRUST	27
5.1 PROPERTIES OF THE DISTRUSTER	27
5.2 PROPERTIES OF THE DISTRUSTEE	29

5.3	CONTEXTUAL FACTORS	33
5.4	OTHER	37
5.5	SITUATIONAL FACTORS	39
5.6	OVERVIEW AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS	39
CHAPTER 6 - CONSEQUENCES OF DISTRUST.....		41
6.1	INFORMATION PROCESSING	41
6.2	DEFENSIVE MONITORING	47
6.3	DEFENSIVE NON-COOPERATION	48
6.4	CONTROL STRATEGIES	50
6.5	INTERPERSONAL DISTRESS	51
6.6	REVENGE	52
6.7	CONFLICT	53
6.8	OVERVIEW AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS	54
CHAPTER 7 - MODELS OF DISTRUST		57
7.1	MODEL OF TRUST AND SUSPICION (KEE & KNOX, 1970)	57
7.2	MODEL OF PARANOID COGNITION (KRAMER, 1998)	58
7.3	EFFECTS OF LEGALISTIC REMEDIES ON TRUST/DISTRUST (SITKIN AND ROTH, 1993).	60
7.4	PROPOSED MODEL OF DISTRUST IN MILITARY TEAMS	61
7.5	RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS.....	65
CHAPTER 8 – FUTURE RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....		67
8.1	PRIORITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISTRUST RESEARCH	67
8.1.1	<i>Create measures of distrust.....</i>	68
8.1.2	<i>To the extent possible, incorporate distrust into the current program of trust research.....</i>	71
8.2	PROTOTYPICAL STUDY – TRUST VIOLATIONS	78
8.3	PRAGMATIC CF RECOMMENDATIONS	79
PRIMARY REFERENCES.....		85
SECONDARY REFERENCES.....		87

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

FIGURE 1: DISTRUST AND TRUST AS A SINGLE CONSTRUCT	14
FIGURE 2: DISTRUST AND TRUST AS SEPARATE CONSTRUCTS	15
FIGURE 3: CONTRACT VIOLATION FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING EMPLOYEE CYNICISM.	34
FIGURE 4. BASIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TRUST AND SUSPICION (KEE & KNOX, 1970)	57
FIGURE 5: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF PARANOID COGNITION (KRAMER, 1998).....	58
FIGURE 6. MODEL OF THE DETERMINANTS & EFFECTS OF USING LEGALISTIC REMEDIES FOR TRUST/DISTRUST	60
FIGURE 7. DISTRUST IN MILITARY TEAMS.....	63

Tables

TABLE 1: KEYWORDS	3
TABLE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF DISTRUST AND TRUST.....	16
TABLE 3: HYPOTHESIZED EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS OF EXPECTATIONS ON TRUST AND DISTRUST	30
TABLE 4: RESEARCHING THE NATURE OF DISTRUST IN SMALL TEAMS.	76
TABLE 5: RESEARCHING THE FACTORS THAT PROMOTE AND MAINTAIN DISTRUST	76
TABLE 6: RESEARCHING HOW DISTRUST IMPACTS ON TEAM PERFORMANCE.	77



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Background

This review stems from an ongoing program of research being conducted to support the work of the Command Effectiveness and Behaviour (CEB) group at Defence and Research Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto. This program of research has focused on understanding trust within small military teams, and has involved a comprehensive review of the scientific and military literature related to trust, the development of a theoretical model of trust development, and current efforts to measure trust in small military teams, and trust in a team leader. As our efforts have evolved, the necessity of understanding and integrating the concept of distrust into our theory and research have become increasingly important. In order to begin to understand and articulate how distrust impacts within military teams, this review systematically explores research and theory relevant to distrust, and the factors and consequences of distrust. As well, this work also considers how to incorporate distrust into our ongoing program of research.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this literature review is to develop ideas related to the empirical investigation of distrust in military teams. The literature review is intended to:

- Present empirical and theoretical work in the scientific and military literature relevant to distrust in teams;
- Define the concept of distrust and distinguish it from trust and from other related constructs;
- Identify factors that affect the development of distrust;
- Identify the consequences of distrust within small military teams;
- Propose a preliminary model of distrust in small military teams;
- Identify measures for the study of distrust in military teams, and
- Generate recommendations for research relating to the dimensionality of trust, and for incorporating the study of distrust into the current program of research.

1.3 Scope

This literature review focuses on available research relevant to the issue of distrust within the context of military teams. As the research directly addressing distrust in small teams was extremely limited, however, it was necessary to take a wider overview of distrust research and theory from a variety of domains. These domains include distrust in interpersonal relationships, distrust in the workplace, and distrust within and between organizations. Although the major focus was on distrust within military teams, this review considers research addressing distrust in interpersonal, intragroup, intergroup levels, and to a lesser extent, at a systemic and organizational level.

1.4 Work Items

The following work items were performed:

- A search of the literature to identify relevant journal articles, reports, books, etc. pertaining to distrust.
- References to relevant literature were recorded in an Endnote database.
- Approximately 35 primary articles identified in the search were selected and reviewed in detail. In addition, about 40 secondary articles deemed to be relevant to specific topics of interest were also considered, but were not necessarily reviewed in detail.
- A report documenting the results of the literature review.

1.5 Deliverables

The following deliverables were created under this contract:

- An Endnote bibliography of pertinent titles on distrust and related topics, including all articles identified as being of interest,
- Paper copies of the articles reviewed (or microfiche if paper copies were not available), and
- A report on the literature review.

1.6 Acronyms

CEB	Command Effectiveness and Behaviour
DRDC	Defence Research and Development Canada
NTIS	National Technical Information Service
CISTI	Canadian Institute for Scientific and Technical Information
WWW	World Wide Web

Chapter 2 – Method

2.1 Keywords

We developed a set of keywords (see Table 1) for the literature search based on our experience with the pertinent scientific literature on distrust. These keywords were chosen because they focused the search on topics directly related to distrust and were intended to identify any other related theoretical approaches or conceptualizations that might be relevant.

Table 1: Keywords

Category	Keyword	Related Keywords
Core concept	Distrust	Distrust, paranoia, vigilance, suspicion, mistrust, disbelief, suspect, doubt, misgivings, scepticism, cynicism, surveillance, untrustworthy, fear, wariness, watchfulness, dishonest, deception
Team	Team(s)	Group, crew, company, squad, contingent, corps, organization, relationship, connection, alliance, coalition, working (group), association, dyad, unit, section, platoon, company, brigade, diversity
Process		Growth, development, expansion, creation, maintenance, evolution, dissolution, deterioration, diminish, fade, antecedents, correlates, consequences, evolution
Leadership	Leadership	Authority, responsibility, leadership style, experience, ethics, honour
Command	Command	Authority, standard operating procedures, intent, directive, orders
Organization	Organization	Army, navy, air, hierarchical, rank, specialty, civilian, military, lateral, arms (e.g., infantry)
Measurement	Measurement	Trust differentials, scale, questionnaire, inventory, test, indices, indicators, performance indicators

2.2 Databases

Searches were conducted of the following databases and sources:

- PsychInfo
- National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
- Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information (CISTI)
- World Wide Web (WWW)

PsychInfo is a department of the American Psychological Association (APA) that offers products to aid researchers in locating psychological literature. The database is based on Psychological Abstracts and contains non-evaluative summaries of literature in psychology and related fields (e.g., human factors, education, business and social studies). The database contains over one million electronically stored bibliographic references with authors, titles, publication information, and abstracts or content summaries, covering material published in over 45 countries since 1967. References include journal articles, dissertations, reports, and book chapters.

NTIS is an agency of the US Department of Commerce's Technology Administration. It is the official source for government sponsored U.S. and worldwide scientific, technical, engineering, and business related information. The database contains almost three million titles, including 370,000 technical reports from U.S. government research. The information in the database is gathered from U.S. government agencies and government agencies of countries around the world.

CISTI houses a comprehensive collection of publications in science, technology, and medicine. It contains over 50,000 serial titles and 600,000 books, reports, and conference proceedings from around the world.

2.3 The Search

We systematically searched the databases using the keywords specified above. When a keyword yielded an unmanageable number of references, we systematically added additional keywords to refine the search. We also identified articles cited in the reference lists of the articles obtained for the review on the basis of their potential relevance to distrust. In addition, we selected articles from our previous report exploring trust in small teams (Adams, Bryant and Webb, 2001) in which distrust was also relevant.

2.4 Selection of Articles

The initial search of the databases generated approximately 200 titles and abstracts. We reviewed these and prioritized them (high, medium or low) according to their fit with the purpose and scope of the literature review. Priority was based on the extent to which the article seemed to apply to the main categories of keywords developed earlier (Table 2.1). Once titles and abstracts were prioritized, we identified the approximately 55 articles that were rated as highest priority and obtained as many of these as possible. All of these articles were read and screened for their relevance to the issue at hand. In general, however, we found that the quality of articles varied greatly. As the result of this screening process, about 35 articles were deemed appropriate to be used as primary articles.

2.5 Review of Articles

We read and took detailed notes for each of the articles obtained for review. After reviewing approximately 20 articles, we developed a broad outline of the major issues. We used this outline to categorize the applicability of the articles and to further focus our review of the obtained articles.

Chapter 3 – Results

As previously stated, we obtained about 35 primary articles for review. These articles were drawn from published journals, from book chapters and other reports.

3.1 Domains of Research

The articles obtained for review came from a number of research areas:

- Behavioural Science
- Business/Organizational Theory
- Military

Most of the articles were drawn from studies of distrust in the behavioural sciences, as researchers in this domain have devoted the most effort to understanding distrust. Research and theory that explores distrust in workplace settings also comprises a significant portion of this review. Although we searched specifically for articles related to distrust in the military domain, studies in this area appear to be very limited.

3.2 Secondary References

We identified a total of approximately 40 secondary references. These references include journal articles and technical reports from the behavioural sciences, military research, organizational domains, as well as our previous work in this area.

3.3 Structure of the Report

The first section of this report presents a conceptual overview of distrust, as well as two opposing approaches to the issue of the dimensionality of trust. The following section reviews the factors likely to impact on distrust in small teams. Subsequent sections address the consequences of distrust, and explore models that are relevant to understanding distrust within military teams, before presenting a preliminary model of distrust. The last chapter considers possible research avenues for exploring distrust, and culminates with practical suggestions for limiting the negative aspects of distrust and optimising the positive aspects of distrust within military teams.

3.4 Changes in the Work Plan

Before the start of this work, based on our knowledge and experience with the trust literature, we had budgeted and planned to review up to 50 articles. However, during our search of the literature, we found this area to be less developed than the area dealing with trust theory and research, and it was impossible to find 50 primary articles that we believed were worth reviewing in detail. Due to the lack of relevant papers, and after conversations with the Scientific Authority, we decided to add other items to the work plan in order to strengthen our review. Specifically, we have worked to develop a preliminary model of distrust in military teams, as well as extending the future research



section by proposing distrust scale items to be used in the next stage of research. These previously unplanned additions will help to further our program of trust research.

Chapter 4 – The Concept of Distrust

As noted throughout the trust literature, there are many different definitions of both distrust and trust, and there is little agreement on how each should be conceptualised. Some definitions of distrust and trust have simply cast them as opposites. Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998, p. 439) define distrust as “confident negative expectations concerning another’s conduct”, and trust as “confident positive expectations concerning another’s conduct”. “Confident negative expectations”, relate to “a fear of, a propensity to attribute sinister intentions to, and a desire to buffer oneself from the effects of another’s conduct” (Lewicki et al. 1998, p. 439). Distrust, then, differs from trust or a lack of trust because it involves not just the lack of positive expectations, but negative expectations.

This definition has a number of components that are important to examine more closely. First, distrust involves fear of undesired events. Several trust theorists have characterized distrust as that which is feared, and trust as that which is hoped (e.g., Deutsch, 1958). However, a definition of distrust as something that one fears is not satisfactory because not every event that is undesirable or feared will necessarily give rise to distrust. One can imagine many events that are undesired (e.g., failing to win the lottery), but that do not necessarily give rise to distrust. Nonetheless, the relationships between amongst distrust and fear, and trust and hope are important in distinguishing distrust and trust.

The second part of the definition argues that distrust promotes a desire to protect oneself from negative outcomes. This implies that distrust involves both a change in one’s psychological state, as well as in the choices that one makes at a behavioural level. This may involve increases in monitoring other’s behaviours, reluctance to cooperate, or avoidance of the distrusted individual, or, ‘distrustee’ (Bies & Tripp, 1996).

The third and final component of distrust offered in this definition refers to the propensity to attribute sinister intentions to the distrustee. Ascribing intentionality to the actions and/or underlying motivations of the distrusted person is a consistent theme in the literature. Self-identified as the earliest trust theorist, Morton Deutsch (1958, p. 267) defines suspicion (a concept Deutsch has used interchangeably with the distrust concept) as involving:

“...an event whose occurrence is detrimental to the individual’s welfare... a malevolent or undesired event.”

As noted earlier, distrust clearly involves undesired or negative events. The unique contribution of Deutsch’s definition of distrust, however, lies in the word “malevolent”. Distrust is often seen as involving agency on the part of the distrustee. That is, distrust is typically characterized as occurring in response to acts of commission rather than omission on the part of the trustee, resulting in a negative outcome for the distruster. Other definitions of distrust also make this point. For example, Grovier (1994; cited in Kramer, 1999b, p. 587) defines distrust as:

“lack of confidence in the other, a concern that the other may act so as to harm one, that he does not care about one’s welfare or intends to act so as to harm one, that he does not care about one’s welfare or intends to act harmfully, or is hostile”.

Defined as such, distrust does not result simply from a feeling that one has been passively disregarded, but from the perception that the other person deliberately caused harm and/or intentionally showed malevolence. Other theorists have defined distrust as involving harm that is

not only intentional, but unjustified or extreme (Young, 1999; cited in Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). This suggests that distrust is less likely to be invoked if one is justified in creating harm, or if the outcome involves a moderate amount of harm. These fine distinctions, however, are not prominent in the literature. What is clear is that distrust is strongly tied to malevolent intentions, and extreme or unjustified harm.

Another definition of distrust and trust suggests that they can be distinguished by the factors that underlie them. Sitkin and Roth (1993, p. 367-368) distinguish between trust and distrust in the following way:

“...in organizations, trust rests on a foundation of expectations about an employee’s ability to complete task assignments reliably (task reliability), whereas distrust is engendered when expectations about the compatibility of an employee’s beliefs and values with the organization’s cultural values are called into question (generalized value incongruence).”

This definition relates trust to competence in completing tasks, whereas distrust is related to differences in deeper, fundamental values. This distinction is one of the rare examples in the available literature of trust theorists working actively to distinguish the key features of trust vs. distrust. Although we applaud this effort and agree broadly with this distinction, we believe the real distinction between trust and distrust is a bit more subtle than task reliability vs. value incongruence.

It seems clear that trust can be related to task reliability, but we would argue that trust and values are also often linked. For example, Eidelson and Eidelson (2003) argue that one is more likely to trust individuals or groups who hold common attitudes and political and social interests. As such, the argument that trust relates to task reliability but not to beliefs and values seems problematic.

Similarly, distrust does not always involve deeper values and beliefs. In fact, it seems possible that even task reliability can also become linked with distrust under the right circumstances. Some competency-based violations of trust may simply lower trust, or lead to a more conditional form of trust within a specific area of expertise. Such a violation may require relatively little attributional activity to understand – perhaps the teammate has simply not received the training necessarily to perform the skill well. Imagine, however, that this skill deficit is perpetually unaddressed by the teammate. Despite the best efforts of other teammates to offer remedial training, for example, the teammate appears to be genuinely unmotivated to acquire the skill. The impact of this skill deficit on the overall impression of the teammate then has the potential to spread. Rather than seeing the deficit as an unfortunate but isolated skill shortcoming, other teammates may begin to make broader attributions. Perhaps the teammate is simply not smart enough to learn the skill, or he may be inherently unmotivated to do so. The violation could also lead to questioning the broader abilities of the teammate. Perhaps if this teammate is unable to perform this skill, he may also be incompetent at performing other skills. Increased sensemaking and attributional activity may be activated by the severity or number of violations. The perceived lack of motivation to address one’s lack of competence may change the image of one’s teammate as trustworthy into the realm of distrustworthiness. As such, we argue that the simple failure to perform one’s task reliably can lead to lessened trust, and is especially likely to lead to distrust if the meaning of the failure can be interpreted such that the actor can be held responsible for this failure. Observing a simple behaviour, and progressively coming to interpret it as the product of the disposition of the distrustee (rather than attributing the behaviour to characteristics of the situation) does seem to characterize the progression of at least some forms of distrust.

In our view, what distinguishes distrust from trust at a conceptual level (and what actually underlies Sitkin and Roth's description) is not really value incongruence vs. task reliability, but the deeper ascription of intentionality. As values are often seen to be more "core" (i.e. more indicative of a person's true intentions), we agree with Sitkin and Roth that values are likely to have particular power in influencing judgments of distrust. However, in our view, violations of task competency (argued by Sitkin and Roth to be uniquely related to trust) can also promote distrust rather than just lower trust. This progression to distrust, of course, is not necessarily based on value incongruence, but on the deeper attributional processes associated with the relevant event.

As we noted in an earlier review (Adams, Bryant, & Webb, 2001), the trust development process is argued to move from simple observed behaviour understood with little or no extrapolation, to a broader set of attributions about the underlying disposition of the relevant 'actor'. The issue of intentionality is clearly influential in descriptions of both distrust and trust, but plays a more important role in distrust. Distrust can germinate from a single act committed by a [dis]trustee that becomes attributed to more general characteristics about the distrustee. With distrust, then, an actor's intentionality plays an especially important role. As Kasper, Golding and Tuler (1992, p. 169) argue:

"Trust is probably never completely or permanently attained, but rather requires continuous maintenance and reinforcement. Distrust reflects the suspicion that violated expectations in one exchange may generalize to other transactions. To distrust, then, involves an attribution of intentionality that spreads from limited cases through a broader range of interactions or exchanges."

This definition, then, speaks to what we would argue is perhaps the prototypical form of distrust. This form of distrust rests in the distruster's interpretation of the intentions of another person to cause one harm or distress. This form of distrust can result from a gross violation of one's expectations about the other person, and may involve breaking explicit or implicit agreements. Moreover, from the perspective of the distruster, the distrustee is typically seen as either intending to behave as they did, or to have behaved in such a way that he can be held accountable for the negative outcome that occurred.

Distrust and trust can also be distinguished by both the perceived severity and centrality of the violation. In terms of severity, very frequent or strong violations may lead one from judgements of trust to distrust. Violations that challenge our core views about ourselves, others, or our more global world view are more likely to result in distrust than are less serious violations (which may simply lower trust). A violation in which a loved friend is seen to intentionally commit a malevolent act is a more central violation of our core beliefs about who this person is than is a simple failure of task performance. From a calibration perspective, violations that involve malevolent intention simply require more adjustment of one's expectations.

There is a clear sense in the literature that distrust, like trust, has a spiralling quality; that is, like trust, "distrust is circularly reinforced by the actions that it provokes" (Hardin, 2003, p. 3). However, distrust is argued to be more catastrophic in its effects on subsequent interactions (Burt & Knez, 1996) because violations that give rise to issues of distrust are uniquely likely to pre-empt further interaction. Distrust can set the stage for more distrust in several ways. Distrust can lead to a failure to conduct the 'experiments' that test (either incrementally, or as a whole), whether the other individual is trustworthy (Kramer, 1998, 1999b). For example, distrusting can lead to a style in which getting new information that speaks to the true trustworthiness of this person is less likely to occur (Bies & Tripp, 1996). Distrust can also promote non-cooperation and the biased processing of information on the part of the distruster (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Kramer, 1999b). That

is, once one has interpreted the behaviour of another as intentionally harmful or malevolent, one might terminate future interactions with that individual. Ironically, these interactions may have enabled a more forgiving view of the person that violated our trust. As Bigley and Pierce (1998; paraphrasing Hardin, 1993) have noted,

“...those who develop a distrusting predisposition tend to avoid cooperative activities (because they expect to be exploited in such ventures), so are apt to have few positive interactional experiences that can function to adjust somewhat initial distrust levels. By their own actions, these people contribute to perpetuating their distrusting predispositions.” (p. 411).

Similarly, distrust can also lead to self-fulfilling prophecies, wherein people exhibiting an *a priori* stance of distrust elicit the very behaviour from which they seek to protect themselves (Kramer, 1998, 1999b). Moreover, a distrustful interpersonal approach does not allow distrustees to explain or defend their actions. Thus, the impact of the initial distrustful judgement may be long lasting and even fatal to the relationship. As Kramer (1998, p. 268) aptly notes, “presumptive distrust tends to become perpetual distrust”. An important implication of this is that “unwarranted distrust is usually more difficult to falsify than is trust. Distrust inhibits one from engaging in the very behaviour that might disprove it.” (Larson, 2004, p. 35). This suggests that distrust has the potential to be very problematic when it is not properly calibrated to the actual intentions of another person.

Lastly, it is also important to note another key difference between distrust and trust. Within many relationships, trust often represents the default stance toward another person. As McKnight, Cummings and Chervany (1998) argue, people often exhibit surprisingly high levels of trust even in the early stage of relationships, because they assume that trust is warranted in the absence of evidence to the contrary. On average, however, we are typically less likely to make the default assumption that other people are distrustworthy, unless they harm or wrong us in some way. As Gilbert, Taforodi and Malone (1993) have argued about beliefs systems in other contexts,

“belief is first, easy, and inexorable, [whereas]...doubt is retroactive, difficult and only occasionally successful” (p. 231).

Applied to realm of trust dimensionality, this suggests that trusting other people is more likely to be the default stance than is distrusting other people.¹

4.1 Distrust as a Multidimensional Psychological State

Congruent with the trust literature, distrust theorists have conceptualised distrust as a psychological state as well as a choice behaviour. Theorists such as Deutsch (1958) have equated non-cooperative behaviour with distrust or suspicion. As thinking about distrust has evolved, researchers and theorists have identified the need to separate distrust as a psychological state from distrust-related choice behaviour. The following sections describe each of these depictions of distrust in more detail.

4.1.1 Distrust as a Psychological State

Kramer (1998, p. 252) has described distrust from the vantage point of the distruster as:

¹ Of course, individual differences such as propensity to trust or distrust will also influence this.

“an active psychological state characterized by a specific constellation of expectations and beliefs regarding the lack of trustworthiness of other persons, groups or institutions”.

This definition contains a number of key elements. First, distrust is a psychological state. As we have argued in other work, it is important to consider distrust as a psychological state at the forefront, with distrust behaviour as a slightly more secondary element of the conceptualisation of distrust. This is the case because it is impossible to know the underlying cause of behaviours, and what appear on the surface to be distrust relevant behaviours (e.g. non-cooperation) may actually stem from other sources (e.g. one's goals). As such, a person's psychological state is a better indicator than is distrust behaviour.

Second, Kramer's definition argues that distrust is an active psychological state. More specifically, Kramer (1998) has argued that distrust often also involves 'sensemaking', a process during which people focus on their own experience and attempt to integrate the new information into their expectations. In this sense, then, developing distrust is a constructive process. Distrust often requires concentrated energy aimed at understanding the malevolent event. Although trust development can also require sensemaking, distrust is typically associated with more negative events than is trust. As such, the intensity of the sensemaking that is triggered in order to understand the cause of a violation is a key conceptual difference between distrust and trust (Kramer, 1999).

Describing distrust as an active psychological state seems appropriate for many forms of distrust, particularly when distrust is developing, but we disagree that distrust is solely active. Reflecting on the psychological experience of distrust, there are also many cases in which distrust has a more passive quality. A young child, for example, may learn to distrust dogs after a negative encounter. As the child grows older, he or she may continue to be very distrusting of dogs, but this psychological state may take a relatively passive form, because there is no longer a great deal of energy or attention that is devoted to thinking about the incident that caused the distrust of dogs. Once distrust is established, a relatively passive style, with pre-emptive closure and lack of active suspicion or reflection may be enacted. This psychological state is surely distrust as well. Nonetheless, we agree with Kramer's assertion that the development of distrust is often active.

Third, distrust contains a specific set of expectations, beliefs and feelings about individuals, groups, or institutions. Distrust is clearly defined in the literature as a specific kind of attitude, and involves expectations that are cognitive, affective, and motivational. In the process of developing distrust, we form expectations about the actions of others that may harm us, and this advance knowledge may allow us to avoid these potential pitfalls. In this respect, then, distrust has many cognitive aspects. At the same time, however, distrust can also have affective components since our views of and attitudes toward others are also influenced by how we feel about them. Meeting a new person and having an immediate feeling that this person has an ulterior motive or is hiding something is a good example of the role of affect in distrust. Distrust is also motivational and our distrust-relevant views of others can be influenced by our current state, our goals and our needs. Distrust is also affected by our perceptions of the motivations and intentions of another person.

Fourth, distrust is both a rational and relational construct. There are obviously times when distrust is purely a rational decision. When the benefits of distrusting are either higher or more salient than the risks associated with distrusting, distrust may be the best option. In this case, one may use the base rates that they have observed of another person's conduct (or perhaps the conduct of people in general) in order to estimate their likelihood of behaving in a distrustful way. According to this more rational account of distrust, then, there are clearly times when people are basically "intuitive scientists" (Kelley, 1973; cited in Kramer & Messick, 1997), and base their judgements on history

and repeated experiences of distrust. Distrust is more than just rational, however, as it occurs in response to interactions with other people. Distrust can occur within a very relational context, and can be affected by both contextual features, as well as by individual factors (e.g. mood).

A distinction is also made in the literature between rational and irrational distrust (Kramer, 1994). Within the distrust literature, there is ample discussion of the more rational forms of distrust. When one is in co-operative situations with others, for example, distrusting behaviour can clearly follow rational principles. More specifically, Kramer (1994, p. 200) defines rational distrust as:

“a generalized expectancy or belief regarding the lack of trustworthiness of particular individuals, groups or institutions that was established by a specific history of interaction with them”.

Other views of distrust development suggest that less rational processes can also drive these decisions. There are, in fact, recognized styles of relating to others that do not necessarily attend to the features or behaviour of the target, but which seem driven by other motives or needs. Irrational distrust (1994, p. 200) is defined as:

“exaggerated propensity toward distrust, which can arise even in the absence of specific experiences that justify it”.

As such, distrust can be enacted even in the absence of specific reasons for it. As an acute form of distrust, paranoia, is characterized by its tendency to extend beyond the actual features of the target and to focus on more extreme interpretations of behaviour and motivation that are increasingly detached from reality (Kramer, 1999b).

Thus, distrust is multidimensional rather than unidimensional, and can involve thoughts and/or feelings about the distrustworthiness of another person. Distrust can be either rational or irrational, and can stem from both rational and relational sources. Moreover, although distrust literature has typically cast the development and maintenance of distrust as an active process, in our view, distrust can be either active or passive.

4.1.2 Distrust as Choice Behaviour

In addition to being a psychological state, distrust is also expressed in behavioural choices made during interactions with other people. In behavioural decision theory, distrust is equated with non-cooperation, whereas trust is equated with cooperation (Lewicki et al., 1998). After a violation occurs, the injured party may not only experience a change in psychological state, but may also make behavioural choices that signal the existence of distrust.

Distrust is seen as influencing both the kind of choices made in interacting with others as well as whether one interacts or engages with another person at all. In the latter instance, where simply not engaging is not an option, one may make a competitive choice rather than a cooperative choice. For example, in the work environment, Andersson (1996) noted that distrust in a co-worker or in the company in general was associated with non-compliance or a lack of co-operation. In applying equity theory to this phenomenon, Andersson (1996) describes how employees who feel slighted by their company may fail to meet deadlines or fulfil requirements in their job description to balance out the hypothetical scorecard. Similarly, within the military context, armoured vehicle crew members participating in focus groups exploring trust also reported “dragging their feet” with leaders who, in their view, had shown themselves to be unworthy of their respect (Adams and Webb, 2003). Lack of cooperation is one possible behavioural manifestation of distrust.

Conversely, when distrust is activated, one might choose to find a way to work cooperatively, but to self-protect. This could take the form of higher levels of defensive monitoring in order to protect oneself from negative outcomes, (Currall & Judge, 1995; McAllister, 1995; Strickland, 1958). For example, actively distrusting another teammate can make one more likely to double check the teammate's actions, to make statements about information intended to confirm knowledge that the teammate is expected to possess, or to watch the teammate for violations of one's expectations.

It is important to note, however, that behaviour typically associated with distrust is not necessarily linked with the psychological state of distrust. Although distrust can underlie non-cooperation, people fail to cooperate for many different reasons, including time constraints, lack of clarity of one's job requirements, and because one believes that there are more appropriate actions other than the obvious co-operative action. Similarly, simple monitoring behaviour can occur for many reasons other than distrust, such as job demands and/or organizational constraints. Due to this ambiguity, and following an emerging trend that emphasizes the importance of trust as a psychological state (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), we argue that the conceptualisation of distrust as a psychological state should take precedence over that of distrust as choice behaviour.

4.2 Introduction to Trust Dimensionality

Several authors have raised the question about how trust and distrust are related, but many others have failed to address the issue altogether. At a conceptual level, this lack of clarity has perhaps made it easier for trust theorists and researchers alike to escape the task of articulating the relationship between the two. However, the dimensionality of trust and distrust is typically described in accordance with one of two incompatible perspectives. On one hand, some theorists have argued that trust and distrust are the two anchors of one bipolar construct (e.g., Rotter, 1967). Researchers and theorists in this camp have argued that there is no clear empirical basis for measuring trust as distinct from distrust (e.g., Omedei & McLennan, 2000). Conversely, many researchers contend that trust and distrust are two distinct constructs (e.g., Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Kee & Knox, 1970). The actual dimensionality of distrust and trust continues to be a problematic one, with little resolution in sight.

This issue, however, is not simply about semantics, but has important implications for how trust and distrust should be measured and researched. For example, if trust and distrust are the same construct, by definition, a measure of trust is the exact opposite of distrust. As such, it would be redundant to consider two different perspectives when measuring trust and distrust. From a research perspective, if trust and distrust were the same construct, it would be possible to understand the factors that diminish distrust simply by understanding those that positively influence trust. As such, the implications of this conceptual issue are both far-reaching and pervasive. In the long term, failing to resolve this issue is likely to impact on the progression of knowledge related to both concepts. The sections that follow describe the conceptual underpinnings of these two different views of the dimensionality of trust and explore the available empirical research in support of each.

4.2.1 Distrust and Trust as a Single Bipolar Dimension.

One view of the relationship between trust and distrust is that they are polar opposites lying on the same continuum, shown in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1: Distrust and trust as a single construct

According to this definition and the diagrammatic representation above, then, expectations that move one away from trust, by definition, move one closer to distrust. This depiction of trust, for example, is evident in work focused on creating a measure of trust/mistrust presented by Omodei and McLennan (2000). A similar scheme by Jones and George (1998) puts unconditional trust, conditional trust, and distrust on a single trust construct. It is noteworthy that most theorists do not describe what the midpoint of the continuum represents; they do not elucidate whether it represents an equal measure of trust and distrust, whether it represents a lack of either trust or distrust, or whether it means that the concept of trust/distrust is irrelevant. Nonetheless, one can certainly imagine situations in which issues of trust and distrust are not relevant or are at least not salient. For example, when one purchases a tank of gasoline, trust is only a salient or relevant issue if one has a prior reason to worry that the attendant might overcharge for the gas.

Support for the Unidimensional View

There is some empirical evidence purported to support the view that trust and distrust are the same factor. In working to create a measure of trust and mistrust², Omodei and McLennan (2000) compiled 20 interpersonal situations and possible responses that were worded either positively or negatively for mistrust. Using confirmatory factor analysis, the authors extracted one general factor of mistrust relating to 18 of the scale items. Next, the authors investigated the construct validity of the scale by assessing convergent and discriminant validity using self-reports and peer ratings. The authors examined the discriminant validity of their construction of mistrust with neuroticism and extroversion. They tested the convergent validity of mistrust with fearful attachment styles in adults (see Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991, for a review of adult attachment styles). Scores on their mistrust measure were positively correlated with peer-rated interpersonal mistrust and fearful attachment style, and negatively correlated with neuroticism and extraversion. The authors concluded that these results supported the construct validity of their measure.

Lastly, Omodei and McLennan (2000) explored the dimensionality of their measure by using confirmatory factor analysis to test 3 models. These models had the following characteristics:

- Model 1 – single one-factor (trust-mistrust) model,
- Model 2 – two-factor model with correlated factors with positively and negatively worded statements on separate factors,
- Model 3 – three-factor model with a general trust-mistrust factor and two uncorrelated method factors, one with positively worded items and one with negatively worded items.

Model 3, the single factor with positively and negatively worded method factors, provided the best fit for the data. Omodei and McLennan (2000) concluded that trust and mistrust are best regarded

² As we argue in an upcoming section, the term “mistrust” seems conceptually equivalent with distrust.

as a unidimensional measure tapping the same underlying construct, and that there seems to be no advantage in using separate trust-mistrust scales.

There are, however, a number of questions left unanswered by this work. First, the authors indicate that the full set of negatively worded items could not be used, but they do not provide any explanation concerning why this was so. This information is important for the reader to critically analyse the contribution this study makes toward construct validity. Second, as the same method was used for both items, it is unclear why the method factors would be conceptualised as uncorrelated in the successful model (Model 3). Surely items derived from the same method would share method variance. Further, the authors dismiss evidence that items which loaded positively on a trust factor and other items worded negatively on a mistrust factor as simply being explainable by an artefact of method variance, or as the product of an acquiescence response set. However, if it was important to separate out the method variance from Model 3, it is unclear why a model with two distinct trust and distrust factors was not attempted with the same separation of method variance. In general, then, we would argue that this approach to understanding the relationship between trust and distrust is in need of replication. As such, we question whether it successfully resolves the question of the dimensionality of distrust and trust to the extent that the study's authors have claimed. Nonetheless, this kind of approach may be informative for future researchers attempting to understand the underlying dimensionality of distrust/trust.

Despite our reservations about this work, however, it is important to note that this view of trust is accepted as the unquestioned standard by many trust theorists.

4.2.2 Distrust and Trust as Separate Constructs.

In opposition to the line of thought previously described is an equally strong but not widely researched assertion that trust and distrust do not represent the poles of a single bipolar construct but are two distinct constructs (e.g., Jones & George, 1998; Lewicki et al., 1998). For example, Lewicki et al. (1998, p. 440) argue that:

“trust and distrust are not the opposite ends of a single continuum. There are elements that contribute to the growth and decline of trust, and there are elements that contribute to the growth and decline of distrust.”

According to this perspective, then, distrust may be best represented as a construct distinct from trust, with its own continuum ranging from low to high distrust. In this view, trust also ranges from low to high trust.




Figure 2: Distrust and trust as separate constructs

Theorists and researchers who argue that trust and distrust are two separate constructs question several frequent assumptions about trust and distrust. For example, if trust and distrust are the anchors of a single trust construct, by definition, they must have the same influences, correlates and consequences. However, as other authors have argued:

“Being unable to trust someone need not imply active distrust. I may not be able to trust an individual because I know too little to form an opinion. Trust and distrust both require at least some familiarity with the target, a state of knowledge somewhere between total knowledge and ignorance.” (Larson, 2004, p. 35).

The key challenge for theorists arguing for their distinctness is to articulate how distrust and trust differ at a conceptual level. Lewicki et al. (1998) suggest that high and low levels of trust and distrust are characterized by unique characteristics, and as varying along the activity dimension, with relatively passive processes at low levels, and more active processes at high levels.

**Table 2: Characteristics of distrust and trust
(adapted from Lewicki et al., 1998).**

Low Distrust No fear Absence of scepticism Absence of cynicism Low monitoring No vigilance	High Distrust Fear Scepticism Cynicism Wariness and watchfulness Vigilance
Low Trust No hope No faith No confidence Passivity Hesitance	High Trust Hope Faith Confidence Assurance Initiative

As Table 2 shows, Lewicki et al. (1998) argue that relationships with low levels of trust are characterized by hopelessness and passivity, whereas relationships with high distrust are often characterized by active expectations of harm and undesirable consequences, and by fear and the need for vigilance (Lewicki et al., 1998). As such, according to this theoretical perspective, trust and distrust clearly stem from unique constructs and at a psychological level, can be distinguished by the presence or absence of two primary dimensions, hope vs. fear and activity vs. passivity.

Several other related arguments support the need for this conceptual distinction between distrust and trust. Lewicki et al. (1998) argue that these constructs are important to distinguish because of the changing nature of the modern day relationships. More specifically, they argue that the traditional view of relationships emphasizes the emergence and maintenance of balance and consistency. Conventional balance theory (e.g. Heider, 1958) described the relationship between two people and a third external object as requiring balance. For example, if both parties like each other, and have a common attitude toward the external entity, the relationship is said to be balanced. But, if the two parties do not like each other and/or have an inconsistent attitude toward the external object, the relationship is said to be unbalanced. Failure to have this balance and consistency had been posited to be psychologically aversive and/or damaging. Following from this

concern for balance, the conventional view of relationships suggests that having both trust and distrust activated would be undesirable (if not untenable).

However, Lewicki et al. (1998) argue that the traditional view of relationships is outdated, and fails to capture the complexity of the modern interpersonal landscape. Although many of our relationships begin as relatively undifferentiated, these relationships become more specific and more focused over time. Relationships have many facets, and are associated with multiple sources of information. Moreover, people also interact in many different contexts, as family, as friends, as colleagues, as community members. As distrust or trust relevant judgements represent one part of our impressions of others, these judgements themselves are not necessarily consistent either. Considering examples of interactions with a colleague in various public and private spheres (e.g., behaviour during meetings at work, golf expertise, political/social views, and general tardiness), Lewicki et al. (1998, p. 443) argue that:

“My disposition toward my colleague is affected by all of these different encounters that I may have with him. I might combine all of these different experiences and facets into one overall judgement of trust, but to do so would be overly simplistic, moot and highly detrimental to my ability to work with him around specific and compartmentalized dependencies. So, I effectively function with this individual by ‘partitioning’ my trust of my colleague... This type of compartmentalized, segmented relationship is the rule, rather than the exception in much of our professional and personal lives.”

This argues that our impressions of other individuals are not, in fact, always internally consistent, but may be characterized by seemingly disparate impressions and expectations. In fact, people are argued to naturally harbour both trust and distrust attitudes and expectations of another person, and must maintain a workable quasi-equilibrium. More specifically, Lewicki et al. (1998, p. 440) argue that:

“...the old views of relationships are untenable and... a contemporary perspective on social relationships must allow for simultaneous trust and distrust”.

This has clear implications for how trust and distrust should be conceptualised and for understanding the full dimensionality of trust. Simultaneous trust and distrust can only occur if these constructs are seen as two different entities. Just as importantly, it should be noted that both distrust and trust are increasingly seen as important to cultivate within interpersonal relationships.

“We contend that the potential for dysfunction in confidence relationships increases when either trust beliefs are maintained to the exclusion of distrust or distrust beliefs are maintained to the exclusion of trust. We view this dynamic tension of trust and distrust beliefs as productive, in the best interests of confiding parties, and as a source of stability for relationships” (Lewicki et al., 1998).

This quote suggests that dynamic tension between trust and distrust is the rule rather than the exception in our relations with others and that the tension between distrust and trust is not merely viable, but optimal (Lewicki et al., 1998).

The expectations related to both trust and distrust, Lewicki et al. (1998) argue, do not necessarily result in a summary judgement about the individual because this judgement is continuously refined through additional interactions with an individual. Thus, the authors imply that people do not form a single judgement about the general trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of another person, but a shifting and provisional view of their trustworthiness or untrustworthiness in varying contexts. However, from our perspective, Lewicki et al.’s (1998) argument that because people’s views are

not entirely consistent, they do not make summary judgements of other people's trustworthiness (or distrustworthiness) seems a bit premature. Even in relationships with broad bandwidth and with highly inconsistent "segments" being active, we would argue that summary judgements can still be made, but that the outcome of these judgements may vary widely over time and across situations. Indeed, the extent to which summary judgements are even relevant is likely to vary, depending on the kind of relationship in which one is involved. In highly interdependent and active relationships requiring consistent contact, for example, summary judgements are one clear means by which to streamline one's social decision-making processes. In relationships that are sporadic or time limited, a more constrained set of expectations is required, and may not necessitate a true summary judgement.

From a slightly different perspective, whatever summary judgement that does exist may be less integrative and elaborative. Features of the situation, of one's internal state at the moment that a trust or distrust decision is required, and even the discreteness of the trust or distrust decision are all likely to influence whether or not one acts in a way that is consistent with the active and overriding summary judgement. This does not mean that there is not a summary judgement, but simply that there are factors that mitigate the form that this judgment takes and the extent to which this summary judgement is actually used. Conceptualizing trust and distrust as multidimensional and multi-determined makes an important contribution to understanding the nature of interpersonal relationships, and more specifically, the nature of distrust and trust within team contexts.

Support for Trust and Distrust as Two Distinct Constructs

At an empirical level, little work relevant to the issue of the dimensionality of distrust and trust has been conducted. There is some empirical evidence that trust is distinct from suspicion (a construct closely related to distrust). Lagace and Gassenheimer (1989) found trust and suspicion to be measuring opposing constructs. In a study with 242 adults, four items purported to measure trust and four related to suspicion were administered. A confirmatory factor analysis showed these items to fit the two construct solution. That is, the model depicting trust and suspicion as two distinct constructs provided a good fit to the data, with the correlation between them of $r = -.17$.

Unfortunately, however, simply showing that the data fit the model well does not necessarily provide the strongest possible argument that distrust and trust are two distinct constructs, as the value of any model is always relative to other competing models. As such, because no competing models (e.g. a one factor model) were assessed, the value of this work is questionable.

There is some support for the assertion that two different constructs are likely to have different antecedents and consequences (Lewicki et al., 1998). A study by Wells and Kipnis (2001) provides evidence that the factors that influence distrust in co-workers are somewhat different than those that influence trust. In their study, Wells and Kipnis (2001) asked managers to consider one employee that they trusted and one that they distrusted. Then, both employees and managers were asked to rate the levels of trust they had in their manager, and the reasons for this level of trust. The authors were particularly interested in whether participants would cite personal characteristics or work-related behaviours of the target person.

As predicted, managers offered more work-related reasons (e.g., competence) for trusting than did employees, but employees offered more personal reasons for trusting their managers. However, most managers and employees focused on the personality of trustees when describing reasons for not trusting each other (e.g., unreliable). Thus, managers and employees used different reasons for trusting each other, but similar reasons for distrusting. It is noteworthy that personality attributes rather than work related behaviours were most often cited as the reason for distrusting. This implies that the factors that influence trust may be different from those that influence distrust. When

distrust comes into play, it is often related to perceived enduring personality characteristics as opposed to context-situated behaviour. This suggests that trust and distrust are two different constructs that have different antecedents. This also supports our view that attributions about the underlying motivation of another person play a key role in distrust, and provides some empirical support for the distinction between distrust and trust.

A considerable amount of theory in related areas seems consistent with the depiction of trust and distrust as separate constructs. In the absence of clear empirical research, the challenges of establishing the true dimensionality of trust may be informed by analogous work in related domains. Questions related to the underlying dimensionality of trust and distrust, for example, parallel another long-standing debate within the field of psychology. That is, researchers have also been working to determine whether positive and negative affect should be conceptualised as one bipolar factor or two distinct and separate constructs. One program of research has been able to show that positive and negative affect are two distinct constructs, as well as empirically distinguishing high positive affectivity (e.g., active, strong, enthusiastic) from low negative affectivity (e.g., relaxed, calm, placid) and low positive affectivity (e.g., sleepy, dull, drowsy) from high negative affectivity (e.g., distressed, scornful, hostile) (Watson and Tellegen, 1985; 1988). By analogy, then, trust researchers have argued that, by completing the necessary empirical research, trust researchers of the future will also show trust and distrust to have a similar two-factor structure (Lewicki et al., 1998, p. 448).

One of the persistent arguments anticipated by Lewicki et al. (1998) is that trust and distrust cannot exist with respect to the same relationship. This objection is countered from several different perspectives. For example, a substantial body of work has explored issues related to attitude ambivalence, in which people can have clearly contrasting and incompatible attitudes toward the same object (e.g., Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995). One way to understand these contrasting and incompatible attitudes is to argue that they derive from separate sources, such as from two distinct attitudes. Theorists as early as Freud (1918; cited in Lewicki et al., 1998) have recognized that it is possible to love someone in one way, and to hate them in another. Furthermore, empirical evidence has shown that it is possible for people to simultaneously endorse both pro-Black and anti-Black statements (Katz & Hass, 1988), for people who are trying to quit smoking to have simultaneously positive and negative beliefs about cigarettes (Petty & Cacioppo, 1996), and to be both satisfied and dissatisfied with their jobs (King, 1970; cited in Lewicki et al., 1998). This work supports the Lewicki et al. (1998) argument that order, balance, and homeostasis within both the natural world and the interpersonal world may be less critical than previously imagined, and supports the assertion that people can have attitudes about others implicating both trust and distrust.

At both the empirical and theoretical level, then, although the empirical relationship between distrust and trust is still inconclusive, work in other areas may have potential to inform debates about their true structure.

4.2.3 Our View

We have argued in previous work (Adams et al., 2001) that in order for this area to develop, researchers and theorists must make explicit reference to their underlying assumptions about the dimensionality of trust and distrust. As the previous sections attest, there is no conclusive evidence that shows the true dimensionality of the trust construct. There are some theorists who clearly argue that trust and distrust are the same construct (e.g., Omedei & MacLennan, 2000). More typically, however, acceptance of trust as a unidimensional construct seems to stem more from

acceptance of the ‘default’ position than a conscious commitment on the part of researchers to a unidimensional trust construct.

Following other theorists (Lewicki et al., 1998, Sitkin & Roth, 1993), we argue that distrust and trust are separate but related constructs, and each form a continuum with high and low levels. Moreover, in our view, trust and distrust can be distinguished by the addition of intentionality to judgements of distrust. Coming to believe that another person is distrustworthy requires much more than simply not finding him trustworthy; it requires the addition of malevolent intentionality.

“When I lack the belief that you intend to act in my best interests with respect to a given matter, I do not trust you. I begin to distrust you when I am in a position to form the actual belief that you do not intend to act in my best interests in that matter. My distrust in you increases when I become suspicious of your intentions, and it increases still further when I come to form the belief that you actually intend to act against my interests in the matter at hand.” (Ullmann-Margalit, 2004, p. 67).

As we noted earlier, what distinguishes an event that stimulates distrust from that which merely lessens trust is the kind of violation, the centrality of the violation, and the attributional activity that the violation invokes. This suggests that understanding trust violation processes will require also understanding the ascription of intentionality in more detail.

This depiction of trust and distrust as two distinct constructs seems especially relevant within military teams. In our ongoing program of research, trust and distrust have often been reported to be both active and simultaneously influential on judgements about fellow teammates. Military team members have been very unambiguous in saying that they need to simultaneously trust their teammates even while maintaining a somewhat distrustful stance toward them. This suggests that trust and distrust are used as two distinct constructs, with trust applicable to some aspects of teammates’ performance, and distrust relevant to others. It is important to both directly and indirectly find ways to establish the dimensionality of trust and distrust empirically, and to devise ways to disentangle this issue. Our belief is that trust and distrust have at least some distinct antecedents and consequences, but it will be important to stay open to the information gained from the empirical research as it evolves within the field.

4.3 The Need to Distrust

It is clear in the literature that trust is widely recognized as an important and even indispensable part of social life and convention, and that it is related to the general performance of organizations (Kramer, 2002). Furthermore, Collins and Jacobs (2002, p. 40) stated that “while trust is not highly regarded in commerce or politics, a high level of trust is critical to military life”. As such, trust is widely acknowledged to be both important and necessary within military teams.

On the other hand, distrust is often seen as a negative and undesirable construct that limits the ability to work cooperatively. Andersson (1996) has compared distrust to cynicism and has described how violations of implied contracts can have a devastating impact on employee relations. Resulting effects can include decreased productivity, physical or verbal aggression, retribution, and even lawsuits.

On the other hand, distrust is also seen as important and even adaptive. More simply, from a functional perspective, distrust is necessary because, like trust, it works to simplify complex environments in our activities with other people and things. Luhmann (1979; cited in Lewicki et al., 1998, p. 444) argues that “distrust functions to reduce complexity by allowing undesirable

conduct to be seen as likely – even certain”, and he refers to this distrust as “the positive expectation of injurious action”. As such, like trust, distrust also moves people closer to certainty and simplifies their decision-making processes. Having made a decision that someone should be inherently distrusted, then, it may be easier to focus one’s attention on the task at hand. This has the potential to free up cognitive resources, and to allow more efficient adaptation to one’s environment. This is presumed to have benefits on performance. Kramer (2002) cites the example of the former Intel CEO, Andrew Grove, who reminded his employees that, “Only the paranoid survive”.

Other theorists have noted that distrust can have direct and positive benefits on one’s relationships. That is, an ethos of distrust may be self-protective as it might accurately indicate a history of negative interactions that is likely to be repeated (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). Other theorists have argued that distrust can be adaptive because it enables groups to act more decisively and in their own interests (Bar-Tal, 1990). If accurate, distrust has the potential to raise one’s awareness and protect one from negative outcomes (Kee & Knox, 1970).

This suggests that both trust and distrust should be actively cultivated in order to promote optimal performance at the individual, team and even organizational level (Kramer, 2002). In fact, to be either wholly trusting or wholly distrusting seems to be a less adaptive state than to simultaneously experience both distrust and trust.

4.4 Concepts To Be Distinguished from Distrust

Within the distrust literature, several concepts are often used in conjunction with (or in place of) the term ‘distrust’. In order to understand the construct of distrust, it is critical to explore how these concepts are related to and distinguishable from distrust.

Suspicion – The term ‘suspicion’ has been used interchangeably with the term ‘distrust’ at many different points in the literature. In his 1958 paper, Deutsch juxtaposes the terms trust and suspicion. Although Deutsch does not use the term ‘distrust’, this work clearly conceptualises suspicion as the opposite of trust.

Other work casts suspicion as only part of distrust. Fein and Hilton (1994), for example, have characterized suspicion as a cognitive component of distrust, and define it as:

“a psychological state in which perceivers actively entertain multiple, possibly rival, hypotheses about the motives or genuineness of a person’s behaviour. Moreover, suspicion involves the belief that the actor’s behaviour may reflect a motive that the actor wants hidden from the target of his or her behaviour”.

When suspicion is activated, more complex attributional processes are set into play, and people become motivated to protect themselves, and to make sense of their disparate sets of expectations. Suspicion about others can arise from several sources (Fein, 1996), occurring when:

- Forewarnings from others that a person might be untrustworthy,
- When our expectations about a person are violated, and
- When situational cues or contextual information suggest a person may have ulterior motives.

In essence, when we attend critically to other people’s motives, intentions and dispositions, we often make attributions that subsequently impact on distrust (Kramer, 1998). This process is very

similar to what happens when our interactions with another person lead us to consider the need for distrusting this person. Distrust and suspicion are obviously similar psychological states.

We would argue, however, that although distrust and suspicion are closely related, they can be distinguished by two features. First, suspicion seems to be primarily an active process in which evidence related to the motives behind others' behaviour is sought and analysed. Distrust is not always an active process. As we have argued earlier, distrust can be conceptualised as both an active and a passive construct, involving expenditure of energy at some times, but not at others. Secondly, although distrust can involve the active interpretation of behaviour and intentions, it can also stem from simple processing of categorical information. In category-based distrust, for example, simply encountering a member of a group that is *a priori* distrusted can give rise to attributions of distrust toward individuals who belong to the group. In this case, then, it is possible to have distrust without active suspicion of an individual. As such, although suspicion is related to distrust, distrust carries implications that suspicion does not. At a conceptual level, then, suspicion is related to distrust, and represents one aspect of distrust, but is not wholly interchangeable with it.

Paranoia or Paranoid Cognition – Another term with which distrust has been linked is 'paranoia'. There are at least two different ways of thinking about paranoia. Clinical perspectives have long understood paranoia as a pathological construct related to dispositional variables. Paranoid personality disorder is defined, in part, as

"beginning in early adult life and involving distrustful and suspicious beliefs or cognitions of others whose motives are seen as malevolent" and involving "unfounded suspicion that others are deceiving, exploiting, or harming" oneself (DSM-IV, 1994, p. 634).

In contrast, work by Kramer (1998, 2002) has promoted a more general use of the term 'paranoia', which shifts the conceptualization of paranoia from a primarily clinical condition to one that is common within the general population as well. Kramer (2002, p. 6) has discussed the usefulness of prudent paranoia, "a form of constructive suspicion regarding the intentions and actions of people and organizations". That is,

"by awakening a sense of present or future danger, prudent paranoia serves as part of the mind's early warning system, prompting people to search out and appraise more information about their situations" (Kramer, 2002, p. 6).

For example, supervisors and managers may adopt a cautious stance toward employees in order to anticipate when and where their power is being threatened. Many of the same processes that underlie the development of paranoid cognition (even if they vary in degree) also seem to initiate the development of distrust. Both can involve active monitoring of the external environment, and both can serve self-protective functions. Paranoid cognition and distrust are closely related constructs, and they share many of the same qualities and features.

On the other hand, we argue that they are not wholly conceptually equivalent. True clinical paranoia requires not only that one monitor the external environment, but also typically carries the implication that this behaviour is in some way detached from what is necessary given the actual threat in the environment. Other theorists have argued that paranoia is the extreme version of distrust,

"At the extreme, the distrust core belief is transformed from a predisposition toward suspicion into outright paranoia with delusions of persecution (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003, p. 187).

In this sense, distrust and paranoia may be thought of as a continuum, with most forms of distrust being at the lower levels, but true paranoia being at a much higher level of intensity. As we argued earlier, distrust can be both active and passive. Although related to distrust, it is important to note the subtle conceptual distinctions between distrust and paranoia in both theory and research.

Cynicism – Cynicism has been defined from several different perspectives. A definition from Andersson (1996, p. 1395), for example, argues that cynicism

“...can be defined best as both a general and specific attitude, characterized by frustration, hopelessness, and disillusionment, as well as contempt toward and distrust of a person, group, ideology, social convention or institution.”

This definition makes an important contribution to distinguishing distrust from cynicism, as it defines several factors that show the conceptual similarities and differences between distrust and cynicism. Consistent with our previous analyses, both cynicism and distrust are associated with a lack of hope. But, although cynicism clearly overlaps with distrust, cynicism also requires the addition of dislike or contempt of others as well as frustration and disillusionment. These are important distinction, as it is possible to distrust a teammate without necessarily being frustrated and disillusioned with him.

Similarly, trust, distrust and cynicism have also been distinguished with reference to the cognitive versus affective components in each:

“...whereas trust is a belief (or expectancy), cynicism is an attitude consisting of an affective component (hopelessness and disillusionment), as well as a belief (distrust)”
(Andersson, 1996, p. 1398).

We disagree with this distinction. In our view, trust and distrust can include both expectancies and beliefs as well as affective components. Cynicism, on the other hand, is specifically defined as involving both cognitive and affective components, and as involving not only distrust but also has a specific affective quality, contempt. As such, distrust is one component of the larger construct of cynicism, but is not wholly overlapping with it.

Mistrust – Mistrust is a term that has been used in place of distrust (e.g. Llinas et al., 1998; Omedei & McLennan, 2000). Unfortunately, these theorists do not make any reference to how mistrust differs from distrust, or why this term is used rather than its generally accepted counterpart. As there is no obvious distinction between distrust and mistrust made in the interpersonal trust literature, parsimony dictates either clearly articulating the proposed difference between these two constructs or using the more common term, namely distrust, consistently.

4.5 Person-Based and Category-Based Distrust

In the trust literature, a distinction is sometimes made between trust in individual people versus trusting people based on the categories and groups to which they belong (e.g. Kramer, 1999). Although somewhat less prominent, this distinction is also relevant to distrust.

Person-Based Distrust

In the trust literature, trust that is based on interactions and experiences with a person, or, ‘person-based trust’, receives the most attention. Overall, Rempel et al. (1985) argue that trust in a significant other is based on the accumulation of types of information about that person. Trust is based on a history of interactions that results in a summary judgement of an individual’s trustworthiness.

Similarly, if a target has a proven history of behaviour that indicates malevolent intent or blatant disregard, person-based distrust is also likely to develop. Again, however, we would argue that mere incompetence or unpredictable behaviour is typically unlikely to develop into paradigmatic distrust, but that the inclusion of intention and even the attribution of malevolent motivation are more likely to initiate movement from lowered trust to actual distrust. Nonetheless, distrust that is based on actual experience and contact with other people is an important part of interpersonal relationships.

Category-Based Distrust

Even in the absence of direct and personal contact and experience with the distrusted agent, distrust is possible. This form of distrust can stem from attitudes and expectations toward members of specific categories when these categories have been previously linked with distrust. Many other category-based factors also allow one to make assumptions that an individual is inherently malevolent or distrustworthy even in the absence of direct and individuating information. The role of reputation, for example, has been given a prominent role in distrust within an organizational setting (Burt & Knez, 1996). Theorists have argued that some category-based influences, such as reputation, are likely to be more influential on distrust over time than on trust (Breton & Wintrobe, 1982; cited in Hardin, 2003), in part, because trust and distrust have different implications for future contact. In the case of trust, for example, if category-based indicators work to initially promote trust, once further interaction occurs, trust expectations will be more influenced by the interactions, and less by the initial reputation. In the case of distrust, on the other hand, when categorical indicators suggest distrustworthiness, interaction and cooperation may never occur, providing no opportunity for changing the focus of distrust expectations. This may make the impact of the initial category-based distrust judgement long lasting or even fatal to the relationship.

There is also good evidence that mere categorization can give rise to presumptive distrust between members of opposing groups. An article by Eidelson and Eidelson (2003), for example, argues that outsiders to one's own group are often judged as less trustworthy based on the simple perception that they are outsiders. Racial biases have been shown to activate negative stereotypes, even without the individual being aware that this was occurring (e.g. Devine, 1989). Brewer (1981) states that category-based trust can be conferred simply on the basis of shared membership in a group. This effect may be due to in-group bias (e.g., Brewer, 1981), stereotypes (e.g., Orbell, Dawes, & Schwartz-Shea, 1994; Devine, 1989), or prescribed roles associated with such categories as occupation (e.g., Meyerson et al., 1996). If one perceives an individual as belonging to an out-group, one might distrust them based on the assumption that they have competing values or attitudes. This analysis suggests that category-based factors are likely to influence the emergence of distrust. Moreover, because the nature of distrust is to lessen the probability of future interactions, once these a priori expectations are established, they may well be more difficult to change.

4.6 Overview and Research Implications

Distrust involves expectations of negative outcomes from which one feels the need to self-protect, whereas trust can be said to involve expectations of a positive outcome. This chapter has introduced our position that trust and distrust are distinct constructs. We argue that distrust and trust can be distinguished by the kind of violation, the centrality of the violation, the ascription of intent to the target, as well as by the intensity of the 'sensemaking' or attributional process concerning the cause of the violation. Two key differences between distrust and trust are the attribution of malevolent intent to the individual in question (i.e., the distrustee) and the potential for pre-emptive closure in distrust.

The information reviewed in this chapter has several potential implications for the ongoing program of research on trust in military teams, as follows:

1. The literature often suggests that distrust may hinder the ability to work interdependently, particularly because of its often pre-emptive quality. This suggests that military teams in which distrust has been activated may be particularly likely to fail to recalibrate their expectations. Because of the importance of ongoing cooperation, this issue will be important to understand in detail.
2. In understanding distrust within small military teams, it will be important to articulate the interaction between distrust and the uniqueness of the military context. The military domain has unique levels of risk, vulnerability and uncertainty, and although the prototypic form of distrust is not likely to be desirable, military members may have a distinct need for the promulgation of some forms of distrust. It will be important to understand whether distrust is critical within the military and the relative costs and benefits of distrust within military teams.
3. It will be important to distinguish distrust from suspicion, paranoid cognition, cynicism, and mistrust in future research.
4. Distrust that is both person-based and category-based must be considered in any program of research.
5. An important focus of this program of research should be to understand the nature of summary judgements vs. contextualized judgements related to trust and distrust. This issue more than any other appears to underlie much of the conceptual confusion around trust dimensionality. In future research, an important conceptual question is how these disparate views of others are actually combined. Is this combination done algebraically? Is it weighted by the factors that are most important to us as individuals?
6. Our conceptualisation of distrust argues that it can be distinguished from low trust by high levels of sensemaking and by the ascription of intentionality. This, of course, is an important empirical question that needs to be explored in more detail.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Chapter 5 – Factors that Influence Distrust³

Many factors are likely to influence distrust within small teams. These include properties of the distruster, properties of the distrustee, and relational or contextual factors. Each of these sets of factors is described in the sections that follow.

5.1 Properties of the Distruster

Propensity to Distrust – Just as the propensity to trust is argued to be a relatively stable individual difference (e.g., Jones & George, 1998), the same is true of distrust. The generalized propensity to distrust other people is a factor influencing perceptions of others. Erikson (1968) has described the first stage of psychosocial development (occurring at about 1 to 2 years of age) as requiring resolution of the ‘Trust-Distrust’ conflict. In this stage, children become able to express trust for and feel security from their caregiver. Failing to resolve this stage successfully, children are likely to become insecure and distrustful toward others, a characteristic that may perpetuate into adulthood.

Hardin (2003) argues that those who develop distrusting dispositions tend to avoid cooperative activities because they expect to be exploited. Consequently, they are likely to have fewer positive interactional experiences that may help adjust initial distrust levels. Thus, these people may further perpetuate their propensity to distrust through their own actions.

There is empirical evidence that propensity to distrust may be self-perpetuating because it affects information that is attended to in the interpersonal environment. Work by Gurtman (1992) addresses the relationship between trust/distrust and person perception. To test this relation empirically, this research studied the ability of people either high or low in propensity to trust (as measured by Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale, 1967) to recognize trust related words. Participants were shown personality descriptor words differing in their connotative levels of trustworthiness (trustworthy, neutral or untrustworthy) for varying but controlled durations (measured in milliseconds). In addition, a suspicion manipulation was also used. Half of the participants were told that the experimenter had been shown to be untrustworthy in the past, and participants in the control condition received only neutral information about the experimenter.

Participants were then tested for their recognition memory of words related to trust, distrust and neutral concepts. As predicted, participants with a low propensity to trust others recognised words descriptive of untrustworthiness significantly faster than they recognized neutral or trustworthiness descriptors. They were also able to recognise negative words related to untrustworthiness significantly faster than were people high in trust. This suggests that people low in trust may be more perceptually vigilant for signs of untrustworthiness in others than are people high in trust.

³ The distinction between the factors that influence distrust, and those which are a consequence of distrust is not an easy one to make. In the case of an activity such as defensive non-cooperation (described in Chapter 6 as a consequence of distrust), for example, it is clear that this is more likely to occur when one sees a reason to be distrustful. As such, it can be argued to be a consequence of distrust. On the other hand, defensive non-cooperation could also be framed as a factor that precedes the development of distrust. We have chosen to organize the following two chapters by labeling the more discrete concepts as factors, and by depicting activities or processes that evolve more over time (such as defensive non-cooperation) as consequences. But, it should be noted that whether a given construct is described as a factor influencing distrust or as a consequence of distrust is somewhat arbitrary.

Contrary to what was predicted, however, relative to the control group, low trust people in the suspicion condition took longer to recognize all words. High trusters, however, were not affected by the suspicion manipulation. The suspicion manipulation may have distracted low trusters from concentrating on the recognition task, and this may have reduced their general attentiveness to the words. It is difficult to judge whether low scores on the Interpersonal Trust Scale indicate propensity to distrust, or simply low propensity to trust others. Nonetheless, this work does suggest that distrust or low trust can make one more attentive to negative information in the interpersonal environment. This suggests that the propensity to distrust other people may be an important factor in understanding distrust within military teams, and more investigation of proper measures of propensity to distrust will be important.

Current Goals – There is some evidence in the literature that goals can influence the distrust development process. Empirical research does suggest that one way to overcome distrust between parties is to share common interests or superordinate goals. Early social psychological research, for example, showed that rampant distrust between two separate teams in a boy's camp was overcome when the teams were forced to work toward a common goal (Sherif, 1958). Having a superordinate goal requiring cooperation allows exposure to the true motives and intentions of other teammates, and gives insight into the influences on their behaviour. This suggests that active superordinate goals have the potential to diminish existing distrust.

From a slightly different perspective, a person's active goals will influence several dimensions relevant to distrust, including expectations of others, information that is attended to, and both the construal and encoding of interactions in memory (Kramer & Messick, 1997). Indeed, our goals in approaching interactions with other people may vary widely. In some situations, we may strive to develop an accurate understanding of the qualities of another person (Kelley, 1973), or we may simply work to reduce the uncertainty that we have about this relationship. Of course, active goals that become related to distrust can influence not only the information that is attended to but also the very interpretation of new information. For example, in highly independent combat teams, having heard that another teammate may behave in a distrustworthy way, one may be more motivated to protect oneself around this person and look for information that confirms the expectation. This may involve watching the teammate more closely or being more likely to interpret his behaviour as hostile and malevolent. Ironically, this behaviour on the part of the distruster has the potential to raise the suspicion of the distrustee, and may even elicit behaviour that confirms the initial uncertainty or questions about his distrustworthiness. A soldier in our interview study (Adams & Webb, 2003, p. 64) indicated the following:

"Sometimes people will come into the squad or something, and they'll be a bit of problem child somewhere else... the reason they're coming here is... well, let's give him a fresh start somewhere else. That problem will carry over...you know that guy doesn't get a chance."

This suggests the real possibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy occurring, in that presumed incompetence in a teammate might lead to distrust even in the absence of actual experience with this person. This cycle, arising from directional goals (e.g., my teammate is likely to be distrustworthy), may be self-confirming, and can influence attentiveness to and the interpretation of incoming information about this person. From another perspective, however, maintaining consistency in our views of others may pre-empt us from considering their intentions as truly malevolent even after a violation indicates malevolent intent has occurred. As such, having a goal to maintain consistency in our views of others may lessen the probability of distrust even being

activated. This suggests that goals can influence whether distrust even starts to develop, as well as what its course is once it becomes active.

Human Errors and Biases – Several human errors and biases may impact on the growth and perpetuation of distrust. By its very nature, distrust seems inevitable because of several features of cognitive processing. First, negative or undesired events are more salient and more noticeable than positive events (Slovic, 1993) and carry more weight in making judgements about other people (Kramer & Messick, 1997). Similarly, sources of negative news tend to be seen as more credible than sources of good news (Slovic, 1993). Theorists also agree that negative events are associated with more sensemaking or attributional activity. As Taylor (1991; cited in Kramer & Messick, 1997, p. 244) argues, “negative events produce more causal attribution activity than positive events, controlling for expectedness”. The implication of this, of course, is that incidents related to distrust (e.g., negative violations) are given more attention than are confirmations of trust. As distrust, by definition, is the expectation of negative events or outcomes, these fundamental cognitive asymmetries suggest that distrust may be difficult to avoid.

Judgements also can be skewed by attribution errors about a target’s true motives or enduring personality characteristics (Fein and Hilton, 1994). In fact, there is a well-researched tendency for people to overestimate the impact of dispositional factors on behaviour and to underestimate the importance of situational factors. This, of course, has been called the fundamental attribution error (Kelley, 1973). For example, if one assumes that situation-specific malevolent behaviour is actually a stable, dispositional trait of the individual, one would be more likely to distrust this person. Again, this is particularly problematic because this view might pre-empt future interactions with this person.

Taken together, the literature reviewed above indicates that several properties of a distruster could influence the summary judgement of a distrustee. These include the propensity to distrust, current goals of the distruster, and the biases and errors such as the fundamental attribution error. Each has the potential to influence distrust within small military teams.

5.2 Properties of the Distrustee

In keeping with our conceptualisation of distrust, several properties of the distrustee are likely to be relevant to the development of distrust. First and foremost, attributions about a person’s true intentions are the primary antecedent of distrust. A person’s values and attitudes, insofar as they provide indirect information about the distrustee’s probable intentions are also a key determinant of distrust within small military teams. Each of these factors is described in more detail below.

Attributions of Intentionality - We have argued that when violations occur, perceived intent to harm is a deciding factor in whether one’s decision to place trust in another person is likely to lead to distrust, or to simply lessen trust. Prototypical distrust hinges on the ascription of malevolent intentionality or at least blatant disregard to the distrustee. The key issue in making a judgement of malevolence is that behaviour is seen to have been intentional, either through acts of commission (direct and deliberate action) or of omission (direct and deliberate inaction/negligence).

Attributions about intentionality can stem from both direct and indirect sources. We can observe behaviour that we clearly label as intentionally malevolent, and this is likely to lead to distrust expectations. From a more indirect route, however, even the core characteristics of competence, benevolence and integrity seen to be critical in the development of trust may also be implicated in the development of distrust when they become associated with intentionality. As we noted earlier, simply showing low levels of competence is typically not enough to garner distrust as we have

defined it. However, interacting with someone who is highly incompetent and who can be held accountable for this is more likely to give rise to distrust rather than lessen trust. Similarly, we can forgive a teammate who fails to be attentive to our needs in a given situation, but consistent lack of attentiveness may make us question their true motives toward us. The perceived intentionality and the ability to assign responsibility to a distrustee are likely to play an important role in distrust development within military teams.

Values and Attitudes – The literature suggests that values and attitudes are important factors in distrust (Jones & George, 1998; Sitkin & Roth, 1983). Theoretical work by Sitkin and Roth (1983) argues that distrust is created when generalized violations that involve value incongruence occur. More specifically, they argue that

“When a person challenges an organization’s fundamental assumptions and values, that person may be perceived as operating under values so different from the group’s that the violator’s underlying world view becomes suspect, and the threat of future violations of expectations arises because the person is now seen as a cultural outsider...” (Sitkin and Roth, 1993, p. 371).

As Table 3 shows, when the type of violation and its perceived pervasiveness are consistent (i.e., cells 2 and 3 in the table below), the effect on trust is predictable. That is, in cell 2, when one perceives another person’s values as different from one’s own (e.g., political or social conservatism versus liberalism), distrust is set into play. On the other hand, when one sees another person simply as lacking the skills or reliability to perform a specific task (cell 3), trust is simply reduced.

Table 3: Hypothesized effect of violations of expectations on trust and distrust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993)

		Perceived Pervasiveness of Violation	
		Context-specific	Generalized
Type of Violated Expectations	Value congruence	Cell 1 – Value violations rarely perceived as localized (indeterminate effects)	Cell 2 – Distrust engendered
	Task reliability	Cell 3 – Trust reduced	Cell 4 – Multi-domain task reliability rarely perceived as generalized (indeterminate effects)

The authors further posit that when value incongruence is specific to a certain context, the effects on trust are indeterminate (cell 1). Likewise, when task unreliability is generalized, the effects on trust are indeterminate (cell 4). The authors suggest that this is because the type of violation and perceived pervasiveness of the violation do not coincide. This analysis, then, suggests that distrust

occurs as the result of a pervasive and generalized violation that elucidates fundamental value incongruence.

It is important to note the close relationship between core values and attitudes and the ascription of intentionality. To the extent that another's values and attitudes are seen as a core part of their being (e.g. the closer to the actual core of who this person is), indicators of frequent or deliberate malevolent intentions arising from these values and attitudes are more likely to engender distrust. For a teammate to fail to be competent in a given domain could clearly impact on other teammates' judgements of trustworthiness. It is very different, however, for this teammate to deliberately act in a way that is clearly contradictory to the values espoused by Canadian Forces, for example, by torturing a prisoner of war. In the context of a team, this kind of violation indicates the direct and intentional breach of shared values and attitudes, and is likely to give rise to immediate distrust of one's teammate. This suggests that values and attitudes can be important factors in the development of distrust.

Reputation - Reputation is one category-based process that can impact on the emergence of distrust. Even in the absence of personal experience and interaction with another person, expectations of distrust are a very real possibility. These expectations can develop when individuals are seen as belonging to categories or groups that are related to distrust, or when indirect information is used to form one's expectations about another person (or other people).

Work conducted by Burt and Knez (1996) in an organizational setting implicates reputation in judgements of distrust. Specifically, this study was conducted in the context of a large technology firm, and concerned the relationship between the structure of the organizational network and manager success. More than 3000 managers performing different corporate functions were asked to describe their networks of key contacts in and beyond the firm. The strength of the relationship based on frequency of contact, length of the relationship, and perceived emotional closeness as well as distrust were measured. The indicator of distrust was the following question "Who has made it the most difficult for you to carry out your job responsibilities?"⁴ Content analyses suggested that the most frequent references deemed to be indicative of distrust occurred when others were viewed as routinely uncooperative. Results showed that distrust was greater in relationships with less emotional closeness but was less in close relationships. Moreover, in relationships with more than two parties, having a third party amplified both trust and distrust, but had a much stronger impact on distrust than on trust. In fact, indirect connections seemed to amplify the distrust in weak relationships more than they amplified trust within strong relations. This may be the case because indirect connections play a greater role in propagating negative information (thus, promoting distrust) than in promoting positive information, perhaps because negative information is more salient and is more likely to receive attention. This work, if replicated with a tighter methodology, has potentially important ramifications for thinking about distrust as it suggests that weaker relationships, on average, are more amenable to developing distrust than are strong relationships, as well as the fact that the development and progression of distrust may be difficult to control because of the strength of reputation.

In the context of small military teams, reputation is likely to play a critical role in the development of distrust. As we noted in developing a model of trust in small teams, the dispersion of information is extremely efficient in the military, and is a way of promoting both information and

⁴ It is important to note our serious reservations with this conceptualisation of distrust. It is not entirely clear that every example of non-cooperation with co-workers can meaningfully be described as distrust. Nonetheless, this work does explore distrust in a unique context.

identity (Adams & Webb, 2003). In this environment, a person's reputation often precedes them. Word of mouth is a pervasive form of disseminating reputation in the military and it often speaks to an individual's performance during courses. Indeed, the relative abilities of incoming personnel are often discussed and known even before they arrive in a crew based on their previous reported performance. Once the seeds of doubt about a person have been sown (whether accurate or inaccurate), the cycle of increased scrutiny and increased negative interpretation of behaviour and motives is in danger of starting. Teammates are more likely to jump to conclusions about the character of a fellow leader or teammate much more readily than would otherwise be the case. This, of course, may limit the targeted person's opportunities to escape this label. Because of the salience and propagation of reputation within military contexts, reputation is likely to be particularly influential to distrust.

Group Membership - Membership in a given group has been argued to influence distrust from several perspectives. First, whether one is interacting with a collective or an individual can influence the growth of distrust. Work by Insko and Schopler (1997) and Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, and Graertz (1990) found that groups are significantly more distrustful and competitive toward other groups than individuals are toward each other. This implies that people in collectives approach interactions with other collectives differently than they approach interactions with individuals. Kramer (1994) suggests that distrust is more likely when competing values or interests are at stake than when they are not. Competing values and interests might be more salient between groups as opposed to between individuals because, often, these attributes are the precise factors or conditions that make the collective a collective.

"In contrast to core beliefs an individual holds about his or her personal world, collective core beliefs or group worldviews are the templates through which group members interpret their shared experience" (Eidelman & Eidelman, 2003, p. 183).

Thus, it is possible that distrust is more readily activated with respect to groups of people rather than individuals, simply because group membership can signal values and attitudes.

Secondly, as noted earlier ingroup/outgroup issues, such as seeing others as being outside of one's own group, can also influence distrust. In the stereotype literature, for example, it is clear that simply seeing another person as a member of a negatively stereotyped group can lead to expectations that this person is dishonest and untrustworthy (Brewer, 1981). Eidelman and Eidelman (2003) describe how groups can be formed based on latent or manifest beliefs that they have significant and legitimate grievances against another group. Furthermore, shared perceptions of persecution often serve to strengthen identification and allegiance of individuals belonging to the collective. Group grievances are often based on the belief that ingroup members receive undeserved substandard outcomes because an outgroup has created a biased system that awards disproportionate benefits to their own group (Horowitz, 1985; cited in Eidelman & Eidelman, 2003). This attribution can lead to distrust of the outgroup, particularly when the ingroup perceives the intentions of the outgroup as malignant (Eidelman & Eidelman, 2003).

Within the small military team system, then, it may be possible to consider the different levels of group membership, and how these distinctions may impact on the emergence of distrust. One obvious form of categorization lies in rank. In fact, previous interviews did suggest that differences in rank might underlie negative relationships with other previously trusted team members:

"...it seems like, and not all of them mind you, but there are individuals which like we said as individuals, as soon as they get in a position of power, boy that's it. Watch out... all of a sudden he gets master corporal, he gets sergeant, watch out. I'm telling you. You know,

sure he's got the rank, but don't use that as push comes to shove, because you had the same rank as me once.... So I think that...when they get promoted and should be able to handle the stresses and responsibilities of that promotion. You start walking around yelling and screaming at people, because all of a sudden you have power" (Adams & Webb, 2003).

On the other hand, simple group membership does not always promote distrust. Membership in a higher rank did not have the effects on trust that we expected in our interviews (Adams & Webb, 2003). One soldier stated,

"..rank doesn't have trust in it...you might have a warrant who have 25 years in, but in your mind he's a complete moron...so just because he's a warrant or a sergeant or a lieutenant doesn't mean squat in the Army... it depends on the individual, not the rank" (Adams & Webb, 2003).

This analysis suggests that although group membership within small military teams can affect the growth of distrust, but this will not always be the case.

Of course, many other forms of group membership are likely to play a role within today's military teams. In an increasingly multicultural Canadian Forces, negative cultural stereotypes about other teams may well promote distrust. Divisions between regular versus reserve forces are also extremely important, and are likely to play a role in the overtaxed military system as it struggles to provide personnel by combining regular and reserve forces on operations. Issues of group membership and how best to counter negative attitudes such as distrust (and related behaviours) are important areas of future CF research.

5.3 Contextual Factors

Organizational influences – There is good evidence that distrust is an issue not just at an interpersonal level, but also within the organizational context. For example, a specific form of trust violations relate to breaches of a psychological contract within organizational settings (Kramer, 1999). Psychological contract breach can be defined as

"a subjective experience based on employees' perceptions that the organization had failed to fulfil its perceived obligations" (Robinson, 1996; cited in Kramer, 1999).

A longitudinal study with newly hired managers measured their initial trust in the organization, as well as their levels of trust at the 1.5-year and 2.5-year anniversaries of their jobs (Robinson, 1996; in Kramer, 1999). Results showed that initial trust in the employer was significantly negatively related to subsequent perceptions of a psychological breach. More importantly, prior trust moderated the relationship between psychological breach and subsequent ratings of trust. Employees with low initial trust showed a bigger decline in trust after a breach than did those with high initial trust. As well, employee contributions to the organization (e.g., extra-role behaviour and intentions to stay) were also negatively correlated with psychological breaches. Again, it is unclear from the report whether this work speaks to the lessening of trust, or the growth of distrust. What is clear is that breaches of the psychological contract within a larger organization or system have the potential to impact most negatively on contributions to this system.

As noted earlier, distrust and cynical are closely conceptually related, but distrust is a somewhat narrower construct and comprises only one aspect of cynicism. Nonetheless, understanding how the broader construct of cynicism develops in organizational contexts may shed light on the emergence of distrust. A theoretical paper by Andersson (1996) addresses the development of

cynicism within a framework of contract violation. As shown in Figure 3, this model argues that the growth of cynicism is influenced by contract violations and is promoted by factors related to the business environment, to organizational practices, as well as to job and role factors. Such contract violations lead to perceptions related to justice and equality, which are moderated by several individual and contextual factors, and can conspire to promote employee cynicism.




Figure 3: Contract violation framework for studying employee cynicism (Andersson, 1996).

At the level of organizational practices, it is interesting to note that many of the same issues that influence the development of cynicism are also implicated indirectly in the emergence of distrust. Aspects of the business environment, including harsh layoffs and irresponsibility can join with perceptions of justice to promote employee cynicism. Similarly, at the organizational level, issues of poor communication and managerial incompetence can combine with contract violations to influence employee cynicism. Lastly, ambiguity around roles and work overload, combined with issues of justice motives can also influence cynicism. It is important to note, however, that the factors proposed to influence cynicism do so indirectly, through attributions of fairness and perceived contract violations. Similar to our thinking about distrust, the mere presence of negatives within the work environment (e.g. perceived incompetence) is not enough to trigger the prototypic form of distrust (and in this case cynicism), without perceptions of intentionality that arise from contract violation. Also in keeping with our views of trust and distrust, it is worth noting that this model also argues that individual personality factors (e.g. self-esteem and locus of control) as well as contextual factors (e.g. group norms) moderate the extent to which contract violations and perceptions of justice motives relate to employee cynicism. Distrust seems especially predicated on the violation of an implicit or explicit agreement to behave a certain way within a relationship. As such, psychological contracts are very relevant to distrust.

This framework is helpful in conceptualizing issues of distrust within small military teams, as it contains several features that appear readily applicable to the military environment. These include

the ‘organizational’ and ‘job and role’ factors of workplace characteristics, the perceptual factors, and the moderating role of distributive and procedural justice. Of course, the factors that underlie the business environment may be very different from those that underlie the military one, but many of the same dynamics are likely to impact on the growth of distrust.

Other work also suggests that distrust at the organizational level can be problematic. Kramer (1994) suggested that organizations in which collective paranoia is high might be particularly vulnerable to disruptions in effectiveness and cooperation amongst its constituents. Collective paranoia might adversely affect an individual’s commitment to the organization and its goals. Thus, individuals might find it difficult to initiate cooperative acts when they lack the confidence that this goodwill might be reciprocated. Furthermore, collective paranoia might heighten the potential for conflict between discrete organizations. This again suggests that understanding distrust at the organizational level may be important for understanding distrust within military teams.

Hierarchical Relationships – A specific factor arising from organizational structure is hierarchical relationships. Hierarchical relationships are argued to be more susceptible to distrust (Hardin, 2003). As Hardin (2003, p. 11) argues, in the context of hierarchical relationships, power has the potential to change the dynamics of trust.

“In an iterated exchange between two relatively equal partners, both stand to lose more or less equally from the default of the other. If a very much more powerful partner defaults, however, she might be able to exact benefits without reciprocating.”

In short, the reciprocity that often characterizes equal power relationships does not necessarily hold within hierarchical relationships, making it possible for the person with the upper hand to gain benefits without equally compensating the other person. Even more critically, subordinates within hierarchical relationships do not necessarily have the same opportunity for defection. Moreover, the unequal distribution of power and control within relationships can lead to differences in both mental accounting, as well as in how social information is processed (Kramer, 1998). Subordinates may see themselves as being constantly being monitored for competence and compliance, and they may expect that if they do not meet standards, they will be punished. They may begin to feel self-conscious and become hypervigilant social information processors, and distrust is more likely to occur as a result (e.g. Kramer, 1998).

Within such relationships, unequal power has the potential to not only activate distrust, but also exacerbate negative attributions that arise from focusing on the motivations of another party. This is evidenced in research by Kramer (1999b) that describes issues of distrust within the advisor-student relationship in an MBA program, a social context that clearly embodies high levels of perceived evaluative scrutiny on the part of the student. Kramer (1999b) generated autobiographical narratives by asking students and their academic advisors to recall and describe significant events from their relationship that influenced their trust or distrust in the other person. The data were then analyzed in terms of the frequency of behaviours that participants identified as having particularly strong influences on the relationship. Overall, students reported more events that influenced their trust in their advisors than their advisors reported influenced trust in their students. Furthermore, both parties tended to report remembering more events that had resulted in decreased trust than those that had resulted in increased trust. Moreover, acts of omission (e.g., failure to send a letter of reference) were cited more often than acts of commission (e.g., making inaccurate comments about a student), but this was true especially for students. That is, students were more offended by an advisors’ failure to behave than they were by explicit distrustworthy behaviour. Kramer (1999b) notes that acts of omission may be particularly salient to those in more dependent and less powerful positions, and therefore, subject to increased evaluative scrutiny.

A hierarchical structure is likely to play a key role in the context of small military teams. Infantry sections, for example, are clearly hierarchical structures (e.g., section commander, 2IC), as well as also being embedded within a larger military system. In our interviews with reconnaissance crews (Adams et al., 2003), we found some evidence of the hierarchical nature of the relationship having impacted on the loss of trust and possibly even the growth of distrust within a given unit. Soldiers felt that their direct leaders could not be trusted because personal confidences were betrayed. For example, one soldier stated,

“Okay, for instance if... uh... you had a personal problem and you were talking to your senior about it... and then you wanted to keep it just between the two of you... and he runs off and tells all his seniors... next thing you know, you’re up on some kind of charge... yeah, that would be a personal issue”.

Moreover, subordinates are strongly contingent on leaders on issues ranging from participation in required courses, career development more generally, and within combat teams, for their very lives. Because of the predominance of hierarchical relationships within them, then, small military teams will be particularly vulnerable to issues of distrust from the follower to the leader. As we noted in previous work (Adams & Webb, 2003), leaders within the military system are also in a particularly difficult position, as they face constant scrutiny from their followers. In situations where their behaviours and actions are known to all (and because the interpretation of their very behaviour may be more of a team activity rather than an individual activity), interpretations that are less than positive may prevail. The result is that leaders may have trouble getting a fair shake, even when they do behave in trustworthy ways. Followers are more likely not only to make negative (and unjust) attributions about the intentions of their leaders, but are inherently likely to find support in their faulty hypotheses in the course of interactions with them.

Despite the influence of hierarchical structure, however, our conceptualisation of distrust argues that it may be possible to minimize the adverse effects of this cycle. In some sense, this problem is one of transparency. When teammates’ and leaders’ motives and intentions are known at a broader level, distrust is likely to play a less damaging role.

Team and Military Influences – Unfortunately, our literature search suggests that there is little discussion of the team milieu and team norms around distrust, and that the distrust-relevant implications of moving from an individual level to a team level have not been explored in great detail. In small military teams, the team context itself is also likely to impact on distrust. Certainly at the level of an individual, the initiation of processes such as rumination or hypervigilance may be problematic. However, taken to the team level (especially within teams that are highly interdependent), cognitions and emotions relevant to distrust are likely to be passed around, and to be both altered and even perpetuated. As noted earlier, many military teams function in close quarters with high levels of interdependence and prolonged contact. Once activated, distrust has the potential be particularly problematic, because of its potential to spiral out of control.

Teams also have norms that provide information and guidance for new group members as to what is acceptable and what is not acceptable within the team. In a very real way, these norms articulate the “rules” of group membership. It is also likely that different teams will have different norms around distrust (and trust). Within infantry teams, for example, distrust of other teammates is an explicitly stated and accepted norm, but this may well be very different within other kinds of military teams. For example, an administrative team may be very resistant to open discussion of the need to actively show distrusting behaviour toward other teammates. As such, team norms around distrust are a factor that will be important to understand better.

The environments in which small military combat teams must perform present specific challenges that are likely to promote both the growth and maintenance of distrust. The costs of making a wrong decision about another teammate can be critical. High levels of stress, time pressure and ambiguity make issues of distrust within the military context particularly important. Military environments demand constant vigilance and, perhaps, for members of small combat teams to be inherently distrustful of even their teammates. In our work developing a measure of trust in small teams, we were struck by the extent to which soldiers were accustomed of being wary of other teammates and held this to be an important value. In some ways, this is perhaps not entirely surprising. Military personnel must function in highly risky and uncertain environments, and must constantly be aware of the fact that even the most competent and well-intended teammate may be at risk of “cracking” given the right set of circumstances.

Moreover, many teams also face additional challenges in that many function in broader organizational contexts often characterized by low trust or even distrust. Within the CF, for example, there is some evidence of cynicism and distrust associated with both past problems (e.g. the Somalia enquiry), as well as a perceived chasm between the ideal and the actual CF environment (Catano, V., Kelloway, E.K., Adams-Roy, J.E.M., 2000). In an environment where systemic distrust is already activated, an organization’s behaviour and intentions are likely to be subject to the most negative possible interpretations. Once activated, without clear remedial action, lessening the spread of distrust may well be a difficult if not impossible goal to achieve. This suggests that understanding the status of organizational distrust will be critical to understanding the challenges that members of military teams face.

5.4 Other

Violations – Violations occur when expectations about others are not met or reciprocated (Jones & George, 1998). Such violations can take many forms, and may include acting in opposition to one’s stated values, breaking contracts, or lying. They can occur at a single point in time, or can occur as a gradual and progressive set of violations that accumulate over time (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995). Either form of violation can seriously damage existing trust. Trust has been depicted as an ‘equilibrium’, and trust violations pose a threat to this equilibrium (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995). Re-establishing the balance of trust requires reassessment of the assumptions upon which trust was based. This reassessment occurs at both the cognitive level (e.g., trying to understand the violation) and the emotional level (e.g., dealing with the anger and/or hurt).

Of course, the shift from trust as a unidimensional construct to trust and distrust as two distinct constructs requires some consideration about how violations are likely to impact on trust and distrust. As noted earlier, a minor violation of trust is unlikely to activate the distrust construct, and may simply lessen trust somewhat. With more serious violations, however, distrust is more likely to come into play.

As we have noted in earlier work (Adams et al., 2001), several other factors are posited to play a role in determining the outcome of a trust violation (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996). First, the violator’s response to the victim plays a role. If the violator engages in restorative actions quickly, such as an apology or denial, this will increase the likelihood that the victim will re-engage the relationship (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2003). Conversely, if the violator is not quick to act or is unresponsive altogether, this will increase the probability of a more negative outcome.

Second, the form and intensity of the violation will influence the outcome (Jones & George, 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996). Some violations are more detrimental to relationships than others.

For example, discovering that a trusted employee has been embezzling money from one's company will be far more influential on the level of trust than finding that the employee has occasionally taken office supplies home. Specifically, the former might involve dismissal, whereas the latter might involve a verbal or written reprimand. That is, the former involves complete disengagement, but the latter allows further interaction with the individual in question.

The form of the trust violation is also likely to impact on the outcome of the violation depending on whether the violation is cognitively or affectively based. In general, relationships vary in the extent to which they are based on cognitive or affective dimensions of trust (McAllister, 1995). An affective trust violation is likely to impact more on a relationship that is emotionally based than on a relationship that is more cognitively oriented (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995). The extent to which the basis of the violation and the basis of the relationship match each other may determine the amount of damage that is evidenced from the violation. This is also likely to be true of distrust.

Last, the breadth of a relationship when a violation occurs will influence the impact of the violation. Relationships that have formed a broader basis of trust are generally argued to be more resilient to violations than are relationships that have been based more on instrumental or exchange-based properties (Jones & George, 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995). This is true partly because of the investment of time and energy needed to develop deeper relationships. In general, people with greater investments in their relationships may be more motivated to maintain them, and will have more emotional bonds within the relationship (Holmes & Rempel, 1989).

The literature is clearer about how violations will impact within trusting relationships than in those specifically characterized by distrust. Thinking about violations with respect to distrust as a summary judgement is somewhat more difficult, as it is unlikely that one would develop a strong and interdependent relationship with someone that one distrusted at the core. Distrust judgements are anchored to some degree by one's *a priori* expectations about how other people are likely to behave (Kramer, 1998). Fein (1996) argues that suspicion can be triggered by trust violations and situations that give information speaking to distrustworthiness or ulterior motives. Moreover, as Kramer and Messick (1997) have noted, violations of trust are more influential than confirmations of trust.

Innovative work by Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, and Rockwell (1994) suggests that the type of deception used when violations occur affects perceptions of a target's trustworthiness. This work identified three different classes of deception: falsification (providing completely untrue information), equivocation (providing vague, indirect, or unclear information), and concealment (omitting relevant information), and explored which form of deception was most effective in convincing others.

Burgoon et al. (1994) recruited participants considered 'non-experts' from a southwestern community in the United States, and expert individuals from a military human intelligence school. Half of the dyads of non-experts were strangers and the other half were acquaintances. For the expert dyads, just over half were unacquainted. The participants were told that they would be involved in a videotaped interview. Within each dyad, one person was given the role of the interviewer, and the other, the interviewee. The interviewees were instructed to answer the first three interview questions truthfully, and the remaining nine questions were to be answered deceptively. The interviewees were instructed to give three classes of deceptive responses: falsification, equivocal answers, and concealed answers.

Suspicion was also manipulated, as half of the interviewers were told that if their interviewee gave a deceitful answer, they would be given a signal by the experimenter. This signal was given just

after the 1st deception question. Half of the participants were not made suspicious in this way. Interviewers estimated the interviewee's truthfulness on each of the questions asked in the interview, and these estimates of interviewee truthfulness served as the primary dependent variable in this study.

Results showed that equivocal answers allowed the greatest accuracy in detecting deception especially if the interviewer was suspicious, that falsification produced the greatest inaccuracy of the deception detection, and that concealment also produced inaccuracy, but only if the interviewer was suspicious. Moreover, suspicious interviewers ascribed less honesty to strangers and more honesty to acquaintances, with the net result being underestimates of truth in strangers and overestimates of truth in acquaintances. Finally, expert and non-expert interviewers were less accurate when judging deception than they were judging truth.

These findings have several interesting implications. First, not all forms of deception are equally detectable. Second, when already suspicious, people are more likely to believe acquaintances who are not being truthful than strangers who are trying to deceive them. This has interesting implications within the context of small military teams, as it suggests that to the extent other teammates are known, team relationships may be resilient to some forms of distrust. Of course, this is only likely to be of benefit when the actor actually has positive rather than negative intentions.

5.5 Situational Factors

The same situational factors that give rise to issues of trust, namely risk, vulnerability, uncertainty (Jones & George, 1998), and the need for interdependence are also relevant to issues of distrust. For example, Kee and Knox (1970) describe suspicion or distrust as hinging on betrayal and loss, in their statement that "one of the most distinguishing aspects of trust and suspicion is that something is at stake" (p. 362). This suggests that distrust will only become an issue in environments with risk, vulnerability and uncertainty. From another perspective, this also suggests that issues of distrust are likely to play an important role in the relationships of members of small military teams, precisely because of the high levels of risk and uncertainty that these teams must face.

5.6 Overview and Research Implications

Future research on distrust in small teams in the military must consider properties of the distruster (propensity to distrust), properties of the distrustee (attributions about intentionality, values and attitudes), contextual variables (organizational factors (e.g. hierarchical relationships), team history and norms, situational variables (risk, vulnerability, uncertainty and need for interdependence), as well as the impact of other factors such as violations. Taken together, these factors will have a strong influence on judgements of distrust in small military teams.

This chapter suggests several research implications for the ongoing program of research on distrust in small teams. These include the following:

1. Measures of distrust will be important to develop and refine as the trust program of research progresses. Just as trust and distrust are argued to be two distinct factors, it will be important to be able to measure propensity to distrust distinctly from the obverse of propensity to trust.

2. Future research must recognize that some factors that contribute to distrust in the general population might differ in kind and degree from those that contribute to distrust in the military. For example, propensity to distrust might be particularly important in the military context due to high rates of turnover between teams, as this propensity is more likely to be influential at the early stages of relationships. Reputation is likely very salient in the military as was indicated in our previous interview study (Adams & Webb, 2003).
3. The highly hierarchical nature of the military has the potential to activate evaluative scrutiny and to make people more hypervigilant, both of which have the potential to heighten distrust.
4. The assertion that weaker relationships are likely to be more amenable to developing distrust than are strong relationships is an important one, and one that suggests building the strongest possible relationships within the military system may be one way of minimizing the potentially negative impacts of interpersonal distrust.
5. The issue of transparency in motives and intentions is critically important in judgements of distrust. In this sense, good communication about both one's ongoing intentions, as well as communications about perceived violations that occur during any working relationship are critical, particularly at the early stages (before distrust develops).

Chapter 6 - Consequences of Distrust

This chapter argues that distrust has the potential to be both maladaptive and adaptive for military teams. Unfortunately, there is currently more information addressing the maladaptive consequences of distrust than the adaptive consequences. Cognitive, affective and behavioural consequences of distrust are described in the sections that follow.

6.1 Information Processing

Distrust impacts on several related aspects of information processing. Many of these processes are very closely related, and it would be impossible to totally separate them. In the interest of conceptual clarity, however, these processes are described as discrete entities in the sections that follow.

Self Focus – We use the term “self-focus” to describe a specific form of self-consciousness,⁵ during which people are more likely to interpret the actions of others in a self-referential and negative way. When people see themselves as being ‘in the spotlight’, there is an increased tendency to see social interaction from an inaccurately personal perspective. Moreover, when one is self-focused, although both positive and negative attributions can be drawn from the available evidence, negative messages and malevolent interpretations of others’ behaviour are more likely to be given weight (Kramer, 1998). Self-focus contributes to paranoid social cognition (Kramer, 1998), and is also likely to contribute to and perpetuate distrust.

Self-focus is especially common when people are in some way categorized as being distinct from others. Self-focus may occur when people are token members of groups, or when they see themselves as being under “evaluative scrutiny”. These situations are sometimes predicated on an unequal distribution of power, for example, when one expects to be evaluated by one’s superiors (Andersson, 1996). One’s tenure within a group can also give rise to self-focus (Kramer, 1998). Although motivated to adhere to them, new group members do not know the norms and implicit rules within new groups. In these situations, people are more likely than usual to be vigilant in seeking and processing information relevant to their status within a group, in order to determine whether they are successfully fitting in. Again, although situations can have multiple interpretations, self-focus makes one more likely to give more weight to negative information and less to positive information.

There is good empirical evidence that self-focus is likely to promote an overly personalistic construal of social interaction, and that it is associated with higher levels of suspicion of others’ motives and behaviours. Research by Kramer (1994) has explored self-consciousness and paranoid cognition within hierarchical structures. First and second-year MBA students were asked to read a series of vignettes that described a hypothetical interaction between them and another MBA. In each vignette, participants were the target of a potential violation of trust committed by either a 1st or 2nd year MBA student. For each vignette, two attributions for the perpetrators’ behaviour were provided: one that suggested a personalistic (target-relevant) explanation, implying the perpetrator’s behaviour was intentional and directed at the target, and one that suggested a

⁵ Although Kramer calls this phenomenon “self-consciousness”, we use the term “self-focus”, as we believe this term better parallels the actual psychological process that is relevant to distrust.

nonpersonalistic explanation. The participants evaluated the plausibility of the two explanations that were provided for the perpetrator's behaviour.

As expected, participants lowest in the hierarchical system (1st year students) reported higher levels of self focus in their interactions compared to second year students. More importantly, they were significantly more likely to make personalistic attributions regarding a perpetrator's behaviour than were 2nd year students. And, they were also more likely to see themselves as being in the spotlight when the perpetrator was a 2nd year student than a 1st year student. Individuals who tended to make personalistic attributions also tended to be more suspicious of the perpetrator's motives and intentions, and possessed lower levels of trust in other MBA students. This work suggests that when people see themselves as distinct and separate and when they believe their behaviour is likely to be evaluated by others, they are more likely to find negative linkages between their behaviour and the behaviour of others. In this study, relative newcomers to an organization were more likely to be self focused. However, any number of distinctions between self and other (e.g. membership in a different group, being under evaluative scrutiny) have the potential to give rise to self-focus, and to result in more paranoid or distrustful attributions about other people. Of course, the opposite is also true; once the "seeds of doubt" about another person have been planted, it may be very difficult to see their actions and intentions as anything but negative, and it may be easy to find support for this negative interpretation in their actions.

This research has a number of implications for distrust in small military teams. It suggests, first, that distrust is more likely to be perpetuated in situations in which people see themselves as being under "evaluative scrutiny", as this is likely to be a breeding ground for self-focus. This is a particular problem in the military because of the hierarchical nature of the system. Evaluative scrutiny, for example, is an important part of the military hierarchy. In order to progress, one must be noticed and promoted throughout one's career. At each level of progression, then, managing self-focus without promoting negative distrust processes has the potential to be a challenge.

Social Information Processing – A good deal of research has explored the relationship between distrust and how information about other people is processed. In general, there is good evidence that distrust can lead to both adaptive and maladaptive information processing. *Hypervigilant social information processing* is typically described as a problematic rather than adaptive form of social information processing. This form of processing involves focus on the nature of a perceived threat and responses that might be taken to reduce it (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; cited in Kramer & Messick, 1997). This kind of processing is initiated in response to doubt or fear about one's own outcomes, and this doubt and fear increases hypervigilance. Once this vigilance is activated, information is evaluated more critically and with a high level of elaboration and detail. The granularity with which information is considered can lead to the misinterpretation of information in the social environment. Any incoming information is likely to have both positive and negative implications, but a hypervigilant style of information processing focuses more on avoiding negatives than on the accruing positives. As such, people are more likely to focus on negatives rather than positives, and hence, to see what they fear. A closely related but distinct process is *rumination*, wherein people perseverate on negative information and promulgate negative interpretations of their environment. In a ruminative state, people are focused on the wrongs that others have perpetuated toward them, and replay these events in their minds (rather than dismissing them).

It is clear that people with generally negative expectations about the trustworthiness of others are more likely to attend to negative information about trustworthiness. Work by Gurtman (1992), for example, provides good evidence that, relative to high trust people, low trust people recognize

connotatively negative words faster than they recognize connotatively positive ones. High trust people respond equally to both positive and negative words. This work provides evidence that active hypervigilance, one of the hallmarks of paranoid cognition, is a process also implicated in distrust.

Hypervigilant social information processing is likely to play a role in small military teams as well. Once distrust is activated, a teammate may well show increased sensitivity in all subsequent interactions with another teammate, preferring to see negative intentions in behaviour, finding hidden meaning in innocent conversation, or attending to aspects of the teammates' behaviour that previously went unnoticed. Clearly, hypervigilant information processing can be a problem if the teammate actually has positive intentions and consistent motivations. On the other hand, it is also clear that hypervigilant social information processing can be very adaptive in situations where the intentions of another person actually are negative, as it might be possible to recognize negative intentions sooner.

Indeed, although some forms of information processing that stem from distrust have the potential to be maladaptive, there is some evidence that such information processing can also be adaptive. Research by Schul, Mayo and Burnstein (2004) suggests that when distrust is active, people are more likely to generate incongruent associations, perhaps in a way that promotes the generation of counter-scenarios. In one of three closely related experiments, participants viewed faces with features shown in pretesting to prime either trust (round faces) or distrust (narrow faces). Participants were shown each of these faces at the same time they were shown a single word prime, and they were asked to generate a free association with the word that they had been shown.

Results showed that when presented with a face that primed distrust, participants were significantly more likely to generate incongruent word associations (e.g. 'active' in response to 'passive'), whereas they were more likely to generate congruent pairs (e.g. 'neat' in response to 'clean') when presented with a trustworthy face. An additional memory task was presented after a short break to test memory for the single word primes presented and the elicited associate words. This recognition test included words already seen as well as new incongruent primes. Participants in the distrust condition were more likely to rate the old primes as less old, but the new incongruent probes were more likely to be rated as having been seen before. This finding again supports the argument that when distrust is active, message incongruent associations are more likely to be activated, but when trust is active, message congruent associations are more likely to be active. This finding is explained as follows:

"When they believe a source, receivers tend to concentrate on message-congruent associations. However, if the source is suspected of being untrustworthy, receivers spontaneously activate message-incongruent associations, as if they are considering what might happen if the message is invalid" (Schul et al., 2004, p. 677).

This research suggests that when distrust is high, information processing efforts may be directed toward incongruencies rather than congruencies, perhaps as a way of coping with the uncertainty of one's position. When listening to the message of a distrusted person, then, this work suggests that one might be actively analysing alternative scenarios that might occur if the person's message does not turn out to be true. This generation, presumably, could serve an adaptive function in that it makes one more prepared for the negative and unexpected.

Interestingly, this account of what can happen when distrust is activated was also consistent with a process described during interviews with armoured vehicle reconnaissance teams. In talking about

what qualities he looks for in deciding whether to trust or distrust fellow teammates, one of the soldiers explained:

"I'm always looking at the 'what-ifs'. What if I get shot in the guts, or I get my leg taken off, and there's still, there's rounds coming in ... Is he going to be able to bug me out? Is he going to throw me over his shoulder? Is he going to be able to take me out of there?"
(Adams & Webb, 2003, p. 63).

This suggests that the military environment may be one in which the need to cultivate at least some level of distrust is particularly high and salient. If this is the case, then looking at the "what-ifs" would seem to be an adaptive strategy.

Unfortunately, existing research does not provide an answer to questions related to the relative costs of taking time to consider alternatives when distrust is activated. However adaptive, the generation of counter alternatives is likely to have a negative impact on some aspects of performance. Respondents asked to read several messages about a hypothetical person took more time to read and integrate these messages when they were suspicious than did people who were not suspicious (Schul, Burnstein, & Bardi, 1996). This was argued to be the case because suspicious people take longer to settle into a single "interpretative frame", because of the active construction and availability of alternative explanations. In contrast, people who were in a more trusting mindset seemed to accept messages as valid unless they were given a reason to think otherwise. This line of research has very important implications for understanding both trust and distrust within military teams. The search for alternative explanations and the generation of counterfactuals has the potential to increase survivability in many situations, but the adaptive value of this form of information processing will need to be compared against the relative costs of taking more time and effort to generate these alternative scenarios. The links between distrust, information processing and actual performance will be important to explore in more detail.

Attributional Strategies – To this point, we have discussed two concepts (e.g. self-focus and social information processing) that are consequences of distrust. Both of these processes relate to how information is handled. The literature also suggests that the specific attributional strategies enacted when distrust is activated are distinct as well.

Fundamental Attribution Error - Typically, there is good evidence that people tend to overestimate the importance of dispositional factors when evaluating other's behaviour, and to underemphasize the importance of situational explanations for this behaviour. When a fellow teammate does something particularly kind, then, a fellow teammate would more likely make the attribution that the teammate is a nice person than he would be to make a situational attribution (e.g. "he's in a good mood"). This reliance on dispositional rather than situational explanations is called the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977).

Distrust does seem to change the nature of attributions. There is very good evidence that suspicion about the true motives of another person leads to more complex and active attributional processing, and that distrust even undermines this tendency to make dispositional attributions about other people. The implication of this is that when people distrust, they are more likely to focus on situational attributes than on dispositional ones. There are at least two reasons that this could occur (Fein, 1996). One possibility is that activating suspicion could lead people to adopt a more conservative attributional style, and increase their threshold for accepting behavioural information as indicative of one's true intentions rather than behaviour that is influenced by the situation. In essence, Fein (1996) argues, this account suggests that behavioural information is simply not accepted at face value. The other possible account is that suspicion increases attributional

processes, making them more sophisticated and more complex. If perceivers actively undertake a more intense level of attributional thinking when they are suspicious, this actively may remind them that behaviour can be affected by many different motives and causes, and may lead them to explanations that are more situational than dispositional. Several studies have been conducted to explore how suspicion undermines the use of dispositional information (Fein & Hilton, 1994; Fein, 1996).

In one set of experiments, participants received information about a student who had written a persuasive essay regarding controversial university academic requirements (Fein, 1996). Participants were told either that the student had completed the essay as a free choice (i.e., no limits were imposed on the student), that the student had no choice in completing the paper (i.e., this student and all others had to write in support of the academic requirements), or, in the suspicion condition, that the student had ulterior motives (i.e., the student was influenced by an instructor to write an essay that supported the instructor's view). Participants completed open-ended questionnaires regarding the perceived motives of the student and rated the extent to which they saw the student as motivated by ulterior motives.

Results showed that participants in the ulterior motive condition were significantly more likely to have undertaken unprompted negative attributional thinking about students' motivations than were those in the free choice or no choice conditions. This supports the argument that suspicion triggers more complex attributional thinking. Moreover, participants who were suspicious about the target's ulterior motives were also more likely to ascribe situational motivations to the student's essay than participants who were not told the student had an ulterior motive. When participants believed that the student had an ulterior motive, they were less likely to infer that the student's essay was congruent with his true attitude toward academic requirements. This suggests that suspicion can make one less willing to make dispositional attributions about the behaviour of others. Moreover, it also argues that suspicion triggers more active and sophisticated attributional thinking. That is, people who are suspicious about another person's motives are more likely to link this person's behaviour to a distinct situation, as opposed to linking the behaviour to an enduring characteristic or personality trait. Even more disturbing, perhaps, is the related finding that this attributional state carries over to people who are encountered in close temporal proximity to the original target of suspicion and one is unlikely to make dispositional inferences about this person as well (Fein, 1996). This suggests that distrust, once activated, has the potential to have a more widespread impact within a team context.

Although it is unclear how well the experimental paradigm is likely to generalize to issues of distrust in small military teams, this work has potentially important implications. It suggests that when we have reason to believe that others are driven by ulterior motives, we are less likely to see their behaviour as a product of their true internal qualities. In many ways, this is a good thing – when we are more suspicious, we may be more likely to explain negative behaviours by making situational rather than dispositional attributions. On the other hand, once activated, suspicion can give rise to more complex and elaborated attributions. These more elaborated attributions may well be harder to change, and may also distract people from more urgent or important tasks. Moreover, the finding that this more complex attributional processing also carries over to how the behaviour of another person (encountered immediately after) is interpreted is potentially problematic. In the context of small military teams, close physical proximity within these teams may increase the probability that these attributions, once activated, will spill over to other people in close temporal proximity to the original target. As well, with such efficient systems of relaying both information and gossip both within and between military teams evident in the reconnaissance crews that we

interviewed (Adams & Webb, 2003), it is also clear that once activated, suspicion and distrust have the potential to spiral out of control relatively quickly.

Another attributional error noted in the distrust literature is the 'sinister attribution error' (Kramer, 1994). This refers to the tendency for people in some situations to overattribute a lack of trustworthiness to others (Kramer, 1994). This error, then, relates not only to increased scrutiny, but also to increased tendency to settle on malevolent and negative attributions about others' behaviours and motivations. It differs from the mere active consideration of the behaviour and motivation of others because it involves the tendency to be overly suspicious, and to read too much into the behaviours of others. Of course, this is also likely to happen more when one is self-focused and ruminating on the wrongs committed by others.

An experiment by Kramer (1994) explored both the causes and the consequences of the sinister attribution error within an experimental context. Groups of six participants were recruited for a study on interdependent decision making. Participants could not see each other. They were each seated at a workstation with a joystick in front of a black screen reflecting a single point of light. They were told that each participant could control the movement of the light with their joysticks, and that without joystick movement, the light would show only random fluctuations generated by the computer. Participants were further told that when the dot was stationary, they would all accumulate \$.01 per second. When the dot was off centre, the person controlling it would accumulate \$.015 per second, and the others would get only \$.005 per second. Although participants were told that they each had the potential to control the movement of the dot, this was not the case. Instead, the movement of the light was due to the perceptual illusion known as the autokinetic effect in which an observer staring at a fixed point of light perceives slight movements in the light.

There were also two experimental manipulations. The first manipulation involved participants' level of self-consciousness. In the high self focus condition, participants were told they would be videotaped. Those in the low self focus condition were simply told that they would be debriefed. The second manipulation involved their level of social rumination. Participants in the high-rumination condition were asked to "try to imagine the motives, intention, and strategies" (Kramer, 1994, p. 216) of the five other people with whom they were interacting and to write them down, in essence making them focused on others (other-focused). Those in the low-rumination condition were asked to write about a neutral previous experience (i.e. using a personal computer).

Results showed that when participants were other-focused and high in self focus, they were more distrustful and suspicious of others, and believed that the dot was off centre for a significantly longer amount of time than did those who were low in self focus and not ruminating. Moreover, participants given the opportunity to socially ruminate were more likely to think that the other people participating in the experiment were cheating. This suggests that high rumination combined with self-focus can lead to people making more "sinister attributions" about innocent others. As such, both the sinister attribution error and rumination (Kramer, 1998, 1999) are consequences of distrust set into motion.

Prudent Paranoia – To this point, the majority of research and theory exploring distrust and information processing can be argued to be more negative than positive. To counteract this assumption, Kramer (2002) has worked to point out the obvious merits of cultivating what he calls "prudent paranoia". In a post-9/11 world, Kramer argues that the value of strategic paranoia should not be underemphasized. Paranoia about another person can be adaptive because it causes one to gather data relentlessly, question one's interpretations, track those who might not always have one's best interests in mind, to be unpredictable, and to disregard obligatory rules of engagement

until a judgement is made (Kramer, 2002). Prudent paranoia, then, requires that information (even about familiar others) continues to be processed with a high level of detail and elaboration rather than simply blindly trusting or distrusting another person. Clearly, distrust can actually be adaptive if helps one avoid the potentially negative outcomes from interacting with someone who is actually distrustworthy (e.g., Kramer, 2002; Kramer & Messick, 1997).

The implications of adopting a stance of prudent paranoia have yet to be explored fully in the available literature. In the team context, committing oneself to constant vigilance has the potential to simplify the interpersonal landscape, as it makes deliberate decisions about whether to trust other teammates (or not) somewhat redundant. If one's stance is simply to question relentlessly, there is little need to deliberate on whether a new teammate should be trusted or not; one simply distrusts. This has the potential to free up cognitive resources for the purpose of actually monitoring and gathering data about other teammates. This simplification of decision processes, of course, has a potentially adaptive function. On the other hand, it is also clear that there are limits to human information processing, but the interpersonal costs of being constantly "paranoid" and the performance implications of maintaining constant vigilance still need to be better understood. In the context of military teams, prudent paranoia is an extremely important construct that needs to be understood in more detail.

Information Processing Summary

Clearly, distrust may exert considerable influence on information processing activities. A potential problem with some of these processes, however, is that they promote a style of processing social information that further perpetuates distrust. Kramer (1998) notes that difficulty learning from experience (due to biased reliance on information, as well as difficulties in generating diagnostic experiences) are two further problems associated with distrust and paranoia. Difficulties in generating diagnostic experience are caused by the fact that distrusting someone leads to a style in which getting new information that speaks to the true trustworthiness of this person (i.e. accurately updating and calibrating trust judgements) is less likely to occur. At a broader level, having adopted a consistent interpersonal style also limits one's abilities to even see that the strategy is not working, as the alternative is never available. We would argue, then, that the potential for the self-perpetuation of distrust is likely to be a significant problem.

From the perspective of this work, one of the problems of interacting with others is that it can set processes in motion that focus attention on others' behaviours and intentions. This focus is likely to give rise to active distrust. The fact that small military team members work in close quarters often for an extended period of time suggests the military is an environment which might be particularly open to the development of distrust and even paranoia. On the other hand, it is important to note that paranoia can also be prudent in some cases. This suggests that the impact of distrust on information processing is not uniform. Hopefully, future research will attend more to the possible positive implications of distrust in military settings.

6.2 Defensive Monitoring

Defensive monitoring can be described both as a strategy when distrust is active, as well as a factor that can promote the emergence of distrust (Kruglanski, 1970). In the trust literature, defensive monitoring (e.g. McAllister, 1995) has been described as related to increased or atypical monitoring of other people specifically in order to guard oneself from the impact of negative outcomes if trust expectations are violated. As distrust has been related to "confident negative

expectations”, defensive monitoring is a reasonable strategy when distrust is an issue, because it has the potential to alert one to negative outcomes.

In studies of surveillance and trust (Strickland, 1958; Strickland, Barefoot, & Hockenstein, 1976), participants were asked to play the role of a supervisor and to monitor one “problem” worker more frequently than another worker. In fact, workers were confederates who actually performed equally. Results indicated that even though both workers’ behaviour did not differ, supervisors showed more distrust for the worker that they had monitored more frequently. Supervisors attributed the increased level of distrust for the frequently monitored worker to either the external pressure of the surveillance, or to the internal disposition of the worker. It is also important to note that even when supervisors were no longer required to monitor differentially, they continued to monitor the “problem” worker more frequently (Strickland, 1958, Strickland et. al., 1976). This might have been the case because the supervisor either implicitly or explicitly arrived at the conclusion that someone who is monitored is more likely to be distrustworthy than someone who is not monitored. Perhaps more insidiously, this research also suggests that frequent monitoring can promote distrust as well as interfere with our ability to recalibrate of our impressions of others.

This work has interesting implications in the context of military teams that are highly interdependent. It suggests that even relatively benign monitoring has the potential to influence distrust, and that once established, distrust may be very difficult to change. Based on our previous conceptualisation of distrust, it seems likely that defensive monitoring will be more likely within small military teams when issues that speak directly to intentionality are prominent, when particularly high stakes make a violation more threatening and when there is a historical reason to be sceptical about the actions of fellow teammates. However, when properly calibrated, defensive monitoring also has the potential to protect people from intentional malevolence.

6.3 Defensive Non-Cooperation

Trust is typically argued to facilitate cooperation and coordination (e.g. Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, 1996). Conversely, distrust is argued to have the opposite effect; to push one away from the other person and make one less likely to engage with this person. Kee and Knox (1970, p. 358), for example, argue that,

“It is tempting to regard trust and suspicion as polar opposites; but in terms of function, this is not so easily the case. Ordinarily trust is regarded as having positive desirable consequences, while suspicion is depicted as having disruptive, dysfunctional effects.”

Defensive non-cooperation is another potential consequence of distrust. Distrust is argued to impact negatively on group processes because it takes energy away from the task at hand, and makes efficiency and task automaticity more difficult to achieve. In situations in which one distrusts another person, one way to protect oneself is to refrain from becoming engaged in a way that is likely to lead to negative outcomes. As Hardin (2003) notes,

“In a group or society in which people are trustworthy, trust enables mutually beneficial cooperative endeavours and complementary competitive endeavours. Distrust blocks both of these”.

Thus, defensive non-cooperation, which may involve a strategic decision not to cooperate (Hardin, 2003; Kramer, 2002; Kramer & Messick, 1997), may be a consequence of distrust. Work by

Heretick (1984), has explored the relationship between distrust and cooperation.⁶ Both men and women participated in a game in which they had to choose whether to work either competitively or cooperatively with a game partner. Results showed that men high in suspicion were more likely to choose to work competitively, and men high in trust were more likely to work cooperatively. Interestingly, women did not evidence a similar pattern. Although this work shows some evidence of a relationship between distrust and non-cooperation, the poor design of this study does not present the best possible test of these ideas.

Other research suggests that distrust can impact on a group's efforts to work cooperatively with other groups (Insko et al., 1990). A common difference noted between individual and group behaviour is that relations between groups tend to be more competitive or less cooperative than relations between individuals. This is known as the discontinuity effect (Insko & Schopler, 1998). Two studies explored these ideas. In the first study, university undergraduates participated in groups of three (two other members unseen in adjacent room), in which the primary participant had been appointed to represent the views of the group. Participants were asked to examine a prisoner's dilemma game matrix, and to make a decision about whether to choose to cooperate or not. The primary dependent variable, then, was the number of cooperative choices that the group made. In addition, two ratings of distrust were taken. First, judges observed participants as they made their choices and rated the extent to which the within-group discussion showed no evidence of distrust, slight evidence of distrust, or strong evidence of distrust. Second, the content of conversation was recorded and content analysed for distrust. As expected, groups that showed the highest levels of distrust for other groups showed the lowest levels of cooperative behaviour.

A variation of this study tested the schema-based distrust hypothesis, which argues that intergroup relationships are less cooperative than relationships between individuals because groups are generally seen as more competitive, more unfriendly and less trustworthy than are individuals. In essence, perhaps the schema that people have of groups makes them less likely to want to cooperate with them. These ideas were tested using a three choice matrix, in which competitive, cooperative or withdrawal choices were possible. Results indicated that groups made more withdrawal choices than did individuals, but still competed more than individuals did. Moreover, in support of the schema-based distrust hypothesis, results showed that groups were also more motivated by fear in choosing noncombative withdrawal behaviour. This work supports the common notion that for both individuals and groups, distrust increases defensive non-cooperation.

Again, within small military teams, defensive non-cooperation is also likely to be a consequence of distrust. While failing to cooperate can be adaptive because it lessens the risk of being harmed, it can also decrease the likelihood of positive influences within relationships. Simply not engaging with others can not only incorrectly colour relationships with other people, but it may also limit the ability to change one's perceptions, as there is little opportunity to learn that one's perceptions are not necessarily correct. In our study of trust in small teams in the military, defensive non-cooperation as the result of violation was evident. One soldier indicated feeling slighted after a senior took full credit for a job well done. The gunner indicated that "when that happens, you know, guys start shutting down, asking 'why', you know – why should I make him look good". In this context, "shutting down" clearly connotes withholding of cooperation, or defensive non-cooperation, as the distrustworthy behaviour of the leader seemed to have promoted defensive non-cooperation. This suggests that working to stem the emergence of distrust within military teams may be an important strategy to optimise the ability of teams to work together.

⁶ Many other variables (e.g. locus of control) were used in this study, but are not relevant here.

6.4 Control Strategies

As described earlier, the theoretical work of Sitkin and Roth (1993) argues that legalistic approaches or formal control systems can undermine trust, and generalized value discrepancies can even cause distrust. This section explores the issue from the opposite route of causality, and argues that distrust can change perceptions about and alter the use of control strategies.

In the trust literature, it is clear that one of the functions of trust is that it reduces the need for controls in working with other people. When trust is in place within a relationship, many of the processes used to exert control and to ensure that people will perform as expected are less likely to be necessary. Similarly, in relationships characterized by distrust, high levels of control may help to protect oneself from negative outcomes.

There is some empirical evidence that higher levels of distrust can necessitate the use of stronger control strategies. In a study involving managers and employees, both parties were asked to rate their actual levels of trust in their partner, the reasons behind trusting or not trusting, self-reported dependency on one's partner, and control tactics used within the relationship (Wells and Kipnis, 2001). Strong strategies consisted of appeals to higher authority, assertiveness, and use of sanctions, whereas weak strategies tended to rely on friendliness.

Results showed that when managers distrusted subordinates, they used strong tactics of influence with them, interacted with them less often, reported less dependency on the employee, and used personal characteristics of the employee to explain their distrust. Similarly, employees with high distrust in their managers also showed more extensive use of strong tactics. This work argues for a powerful relationship between the use of strong control strategies and levels of distrust within a hierarchical relationship. This work also suggests that when distrust grows, it may spread beyond job performance factors, and generalize to how the target is seen as a person.

Sitkin and Stickel (1996) have studied the mechanisms by which distrust can occur within an organizational context. Distrust can cause problems when employees perceive a discrepancy between what they are being asked to do and management's control systems. More specifically, when task requirements are highly ambiguous, and when professional judgement is critical, control systems (such as Total Quality Management or TQM) may have a negative impact and lead to distrust. This may occur because employees begin to see control systems as not only undermining their autonomy, but as evidence of a lack of confidence in their professional skills and abilities. This can lead to an increased level of self-focus and negative attributions about otherwise neutral or ambiguous events. This suggests that control systems can prime distrust.

Within small military teams, there are many different forms of control systems that seem likely to impact on the development of distrust. Within such a rigorous system of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP's) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's), for example, these control systems may undermine an individual's sense of being trusted, and promote a less personally invested way of responding. In our interviews with members of armoured reconnaissance teams (Adams & Webb, 2003), for example, there was clear evidence of the need to double check required tasks as part of standard operating procedures. Because of the high stakes involved, there is a high level of monitoring and double checking that needs to occur in order to keep errors to a minimum. This might inadvertently prime distrust.

An example from the military literature provides an excellent account of the potential impact of control strategies. In a military case study described by Lt. Col. R.G. Davis (2000), for example, the experience of the Dutch contingent in 1994-95 shows how control strategies can also be misinterpreted as a lack of trust. The Dutch contingent was comprised of an infantry battalion

(Dutchbat) and a logistic support battalion (Logbat). Although the Dutch operation was intended to function under a decentralized mission command structure, constant turnover of the Logbat personnel (at the rate of one third of the personnel every 2 months) meant that senior Dutchbat command did not have the opportunity to get to know the Logbat platoon and company commanders. Even though the operation was expected to function under relatively decentralized mission command, senior commanders gave more detailed and precise orders because of this lack of familiarity with the logistics commanders. For the logistics commanders, this appeared to have signalled that senior commanders distrusted their skill and judgement (Davis, 2000). Admittedly, it is difficult to know whether low trust or actual distrust underlies this example. But, it is clear that factors related to the context of the military operation (e.g. personnel turnover) may well have promoted distrust or at least lowered trust, quite independently of direct negative experience and violations. It is clear, then, that distrust can signal the need for control strategies, and that control strategies can also promote distrust.

6.5 Interpersonal Distress

A frequent assumption about trust is that it lessens interpersonal problems and concerns. Luhmann (1988) noted that trust is assumed to reduce complexity, and to make chaotic environments easier to manage. Trust also requires expenditure of less energy and attention because it provides preemptive answers to future questions and allays fear.

By definition, distrust is often said to consist of “confident negative expectations”. Consistently having negative expectations about others may make management of one’s environment more difficult. Distrust requires increased vigilance and self-protection and a constantly wary state. This may exact a toll as this level of attentiveness may be difficult to maintain. As such, distrust may lead to interpersonal distress.

Indeed, there is some evidence that people who experience high levels of distrust in their relationships with others experience psychological distress at a broader level. Gurtman (1992) asked people who varied in their propensity to trust other people, as measured by Rotter’s (1967) Interpersonal Trust Scale, to complete measures indicating their levels of interpersonal distress. Gurtman (1992) argued that people who are high in trust are likely to be relatively free of interpersonal problems, but that people with low levels of trust will be more likely to experience such issues.⁷ Results showed that people with low propensity to trust reported significantly higher amounts of interpersonal distress, and reported problems in competitiveness, envy, resentfulness, vindictiveness, and lack of feelings toward others. Additional analyses showed that these problems were centred in hostility and dominance. As an individual difference variable, then, there is some evidence that being distrustful of other people exacts a toll on interpersonal well-being. This work also considered the relative accessibility of positive, negative and neutral trust constructs, and found that greater trust accessibility was related to less interpersonal distress and lower Machiavellianism. Furthermore, high trustors did not show a high degree of vigilance for information concerning trust, whereas low trustors showed a high degree of vigilance for information indicating distrust. This suggests that generalized trust may require less perceptual processing than does distrust, and supports the notion that trust requires less expenditure of cognitive energy than does distrust.

⁷ Again, it is impossible to ascertain whether participants were low in trust or inherently distrustful.

Despite the difficulty with ascertaining whether low trust or distrust are implicated in this work, this research does raise interesting questions about the role of distrust within small military teams. Are members of combat teams likely to experience a higher level of interpersonal distress because of their need to maintain constant vigilance with respect to other teammates? As was discussed in the previous chapter, the influence of team norms and military ethos cannot be trivialized within this context. During the interviews, soldiers reported no reservations about the need to distrust other teammates within limited domains, and it seemed clear that this norm was widely held and strongly endorsed. As such, this norm might override any interpersonal distress stemming from maintaining such a stance. As well, it is also important to remember that inconsistency between a summary judgement and more circumscribed view of another teammate was also the norm. Teammates reported generally positive views about the trustworthiness of fellow teammates, at the same time that they argued the need to maintain a healthy form of distrust toward them in some areas. How these two views of how seemingly incompatible perceptions of one's teammates are likely impact on psychological well-being and on team cohesion and ability to work together is an important question for future research to explore.

6.6 Revenge

Another consequence of distrust is the motivation to get revenge. This is typically seen as a response to discrete violations. Work by Bies and Tripp (1996) explored revenge specifically in response to an implicit or explicit trust violation⁸. MBA students were asked to describe a specific incident that occurred "on the job" when they wanted to "get even" or to seek revenge from others. These incidents were then content analyzed in terms of the incident that violated trust, associated cognitions and attributions as well as responses to the violation.

In terms of the actions that violated trust, the two main categories were a damaged sense of civic order and a damaged identity. Damage to civic order related to violation of rules, violation of one's own honour through dishonesty or failures of integrity, and the abuse of authority. Damage to one's identity was indicated in public or unfair criticism and discrete insults to one's self or valued group.

In terms of attributions about the trust violation, attributions made about the violation appeared to play a very important role in how revenge was manifested. More specifically, information was processed in terms of both initial cognitions and retrospective cognitions. Interestingly, attributions of responsibility played an important role in revenge outcomes, and results of the content analysis showed three different types of responsibility, including act, role and system responsibility.

Responsibility for the act was interpreted as either personalistic (where the perpetrator was seen as culpable) or nonpersonalistic (where the perpetrator's behaviour was seen as explainable by other forces). When nonpersonalistic, revenge was not necessary. Perceived malevolence also influenced the need for revenge. When a perpetrator's actions were seen as intentionally malicious, there was more need for rumination. Role responsibility relates to the individual violating expectations by failing to act in accordance with the role that he occupies. System responsibility is assigned at more of an organizational level.

⁸ It is important to note here that the actions that violate trust are not necessarily indicative of distrust, but can be.

Content analysis also showed that in terms of information processing, the initial cognitions when a violation occurred were “hot”, and involved a high level of intensity, combined with sensemaking efforts related to the betrayal. Once in retrospective stage of thinking about the violation, rumination was common. This often involved revisiting the “scene” of the violation and working to understand it. This process was both cognitive, in the sense of seeking information, but also affective, as there were very intense emotions attached to these attempts to understand. Lastly, ruminating on the violation was sometimes also social, as other people were often used as “sounding boards” during the sensemaking process.

Further exploration of participants’ responses showed that there were many different ways to respond to trust violations, and these responses fell into seven different categories as follows: revenge fantasies, doing nothing, privately confronting the individual who breached one’s trust, seeking restoration of the goodness of one’s identity, social withdrawal, feuding, or even forgiving the perpetrator.

Bies and Tripp (1996) summarize a number of interesting themes that emerged in the course of their analysis. There was a clear sense in which the desire for revenge that emerged was rational and controlled. Moreover, the response of the victim seemed to be related to the kind of violation that had occurred. When identity was threatened, for example, the desire for revenge appeared to be somewhat stronger. More specifically, when individuals saw the trust violation as damaging or threatening their personal sense of self, they were more likely to want to seek revenge. There was also some evidence that some violations are simply irreversible, and likely to have a long term impact on the relationship. This analysis of peoples’ responses to trust violations is the most elaborate evidence in the literature that we have reviewed and shows that trust violations (and the responses to them) are not unitary.

This work shows that a desire for revenge is a potential consequence of distrust, but that the relationship between these two constructs varies depending on the type of violation, on the assignment of blame for the violating act, and on the sensemaking process that is undertaken. This is consistent with our conceptualisation of the distrust process as one that is context-dependent. This work also supports our argument that the difference between trust and distrust is in the ascription of intentionality and responsibility. In cases where a logical explanation for a trust violation exists, one might be able to discount the behaviour as having been influenced by situational factors rather than by one’s intention to harm. Moreover, also consistent with our conceptualization of distrust, it is also clear that the need for revenge is more prominent when a distruster has hit closer to the core of one’s identity. This supports our notion of the centrality of the violation being an important predictor of the responses to perceived violations. As such, although a somewhat extreme consequence of distrust, revenge is an important construct to understand in more detail within the context of military teams.

6.7 Conflict

Trust is commonly seen as reducing conflict and friction in both interpersonal and work relationships (e.g., Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1997). Similarly, distrust is also frequently argued to give rise to conflict.

In a recent article exploring five primary beliefs that lead groups into conflict, distrust is argued to play a primary role in perpetuating conflict at both the individual and group level (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). At the individual level, as described earlier, people with high levels of distrust may be at risk of negative outcomes and may experience negative subjective states because

distrust, by nature, involves focusing on negatives rather than on positives. Moreover, distrust also keeps individuals from updating the information they hold about the individual that may overturn their distrust. At the group level, distrust can perpetuate conflict because it gives rise to suspicion and feelings of persecution and increases the likelihood of interpreting other groups' actions with more intention than is accurate, and raises the potential for behaving in more distrusting ways (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). All of these processes, of course, promote conflict and dissention.

Within the military team context, conflict is likely to play an even more important role. As information about others (and emotions) about other teammates have such potential to be shared, the sheer number of potential conflict areas (particularly in highly interdependent relationships) suggest that conflict as a consequence of distrust having been primed may pose serious problems for the functioning of military teams.

6.8 Overview and Research Implications

It is important to note that although the consequences of distrust are somewhat similar to the consequences of trust (e.g. both give rise to conflict, defensive monitoring and enacting of control strategies), the intensity of these activities in relation to distrust seems considerably stronger and more intense. Moreover, distrust also has distinct consequences, and can signal biased information processing and promote self focus, hypervigilance, and rumination. Many of these effects of distrust have the potential to be problematic within military contexts.

In general, although there are many different consequences of distrust that could be perceived as negative in many contexts, we would argue that within the military context, there is a good deal of adaptiveness in the cultivation of lesser forms of distrust (e.g. defensive monitoring). Although negative expectations about other people may be problematic when people can actually be counted on to behave consistently, they are helpful in environments in which negative intentions and malevolence have a higher chance of occurring. From the perspective of small military teams, then, it seems likely that the optimal situation might be that both elements of trust and distrust are active and shape judgments, but that at the summary level, trust is the dominant feature. From another perspective, behaviours associated with distrust could be viewed as situational rather than a response to fears about a fellow teammates' disposition. The ideal would be to have enough trust (in either summary judgement or relevant domains) to enable cooperation and coordination, but enough distrust to ensure that behaviours such as defensive monitoring and double checking were not excluded.

Surprisingly, in research and theory related to distrust, the consequences of distrust focus mainly on the experience of the distruster. By contrast, there is little (if any) work that directly addresses the impact of distrust from the perspective of the person actually being distrusted. The closest correlate is a body of work that explores the effect of negative stereotypes on stereotyped individuals. More specifically, work in the area of "stereotype threat" (Steele, Spencer, Aronson, 2002) has shown a wide range of effects attributable to the perceived negative attitudes of others (Spencer, Steele and Quinn, 1999). We would argue that knowing one is distrusted by one's own teammates is also likely to give rise to potentially problematic interactions or behaviours within the team setting. In the long term, this area is likely to be an important one for trust and distrust researchers to explore.

Research Implications

1. It will important for future research to consider both the maladaptive and adaptive consequences of distrust. Research by Schul et al. (2004) suggests that active distrust is

likely to involve the generation of counter-scenarios, or ‘what-if’s’, perhaps as a way of coping with uncertainty. This is a fascinating finding, and one which should be explored more as it helps to elucidate the mechanism by which distrust is likely to impact on team process and performance. Moreover, the adaptive implications of the generation of counter-scenarios also need to be understood in more detail.

2. The relative costs and benefits of this increased cognitive activity associated with maintaining a distrustful stance, as well as the potential psychological impact on the individual (e.g. interpersonal distress) will also be important to consider.
3. Within the available literature, the impact of distrust on information processing is currently the best researched. The impact of attributional processes, however, is particularly germane to the concept of distrust that we have promoted. This stands as an important area of future research.
4. The relationship between distrust and defensive monitoring, defensive non-cooperation, the enactment of control strategies, interpersonal distress, revenge and conflict are all areas in which empirical research directly relevant to military teams seems to be lacking. This research will require realistic studies with military personnel.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Chapter 7 - Models of Distrust


There appear to be no fully developed models that speak directly to the development of distrust within a small team context. However, several generic models of distrust (and closely related concepts) are relevant to understanding distrust in military teams. These are reviewed below. Following this review, we describe our proposed preliminary model of distrust in small military teams.

7.1 Model of Trust or Suspicion (Kee & Knox, 1970)

Kee and Knox's (1970) model of trust or suspicion was developed within the Prisoner's Dilemma Game paradigm. It argues implicitly that trust and suspicion lie on a single bipolar continuum. According to this model of trust and suspicion (see Figure 4 below), previous experience, structural or situational factors, and dispositional factors all impact on perceptions of another person's competence and motives. These, in turn, lead to subjective trust or suspicion and then to behavioural trust or suspicion.

Independent Variables

Hypothetical Intervening States



Basic conceptualization of trust and suspicion. (The factors represented above pertain to P's trust of suspicion vis-a-vis the other player O.)

Figure 4. Basic Conceptualization of Trust or Suspicion (Kee & Knox, 1970)

This model makes a number of contributions. First, it is useful in its parsimony and generality. Despite the lack of elaboration in describing the model, the model does depict both personality factors as well as situational factors as influencing the trust/distrust development process. In addition, this model also makes an important explicit distinction between “subjective trust and suspicion” as a psychological state and “behavioural trust or suspicion” as an action, and argues that trust stems from competence as well as perceived motivation.

Although it helps to describe the very broad process of trust development, this model is predicated on the assumption that trust and distrust are a single bipolar construct. In addition, the lack of a feedback loop indicates that trust is not considered to be an iterative process. Furthermore, the model considers only person-based factors, and fails to account for the impact of contextual factors in trust and distrust judgements. As our review has shown, these factors are likely to play an important role. Because of these limitations, it is likely to be of limited value in modelling distrust within military teams.

7.2 Model of Paranoid Cognition (Kramer, 1998)

Roderick Kramer, an influential social psychologist and trust theorist, has given perhaps the most attention to paranoid cognition. As noted earlier, many of the features of paranoid cognition and distrust are common. This model is particularly important because it integrates many of the ideas and processes relevant to distrust already described throughout this report.

In general, Kramer (1998) has argued that both social and self categorization have the potential to activate paranoid social cognition processes. According to the model, when people’s membership in a specific group or category is particularly salient (e.g., they are token members belonging to an underrepresented group), there is a tendency for individuals to feel personally scrutinized as a member of this category, and to explain behaviour and motives in light of this activated category. In the presence of these situational antecedents, people’s increasing attentiveness to the scrutiny of others makes it even more likely that they will interpret the behaviours and expectations in more personalistic and self-referential terms (Kramer, 1998). This state has been called dysphoric self-consciousness (Kramer, 1998), as indicated in Figure 5.




Figure 5: A social psychological model of paranoid cognition (Kramer, 1998).

Dysphoric self-consciousness is argued to be an aversive and arousing state, characterized by the feeling that one is under intense evaluative scrutiny (Kramer, 1995; in Kramer, 1998). In this state, people actively work to make sense of their situation in order to lessen this state of arousal.

In this state, two processes are likely to be activated. These include hypervigilance and rumination. In a hypervigilant state, people may engage in an active search of their environment and they tend to be more attentive in interpreting their interactions in order to understand this dysphoria. This sensemaking can be problematic, as many situations allow for both positive and negative interpretations and attributions. Hypervigilance can also prime nonadaptive strategies, including overprocessing of ambiguous stimuli, perceptual narrowing, and elevated levels of arousal (Kramer, 1996). With continued focus on these stimuli (i.e. when one is in a ruminative state), it is difficult to get closure on these issues, and one perseverates on issues that bring hurt or discomfort, while necessarily directing attention away from positive aspects of their experience. This style of processing is argued to lead to several biases of judgement, including overly personalistic construal, sinister attribution error, and perceptions of conspiracy. These biases promote the tendency to infer that excessive and negative attention is being directed at oneself, or, that others are watching and criticizing. By focusing on negative qualities of situations or people, the cycle of hypervigilance and rumination is perpetuated, and there is sustained scrutiny of the behaviour and motives of others.

It is important to note, however, that these judgements are not necessarily entirely detached from reality. On one hand, token members of groups do often receive extra attention from other group members; in this sense, their perceptions are realistic. However, research clearly suggests that people do tend to make self-centred attributions about the underlying causes of events (e.g. Vorauer & Ross, 1993) even when other interpretations are also available. These judgements are also given too much attention and weight, and lead to distorted evaluations of information that would typically be seen as benign by those at a lower state of arousal. These somewhat distorted judgements can lead to paranoid behaviour. It is important to note that this model also shows paranoid behaviour as “feeding back” to promote the situational antecedents of evaluative scrutiny etc., thus perpetuating the paranoia even further.

Although created to understand paranoid cognition, this model makes a very important contribution to thinking about how distrust can develop in the midst of military teams. At a psychological level, the defining features of token membership (e.g. uncertainty about social standing, perceived distinctiveness and being under evaluative scrutiny) parallel many of the antecedents likely to influence distrust development within military teams. High levels of risk, vulnerability and uncertainty, combined with the hierarchical nature of military environments are likely to lead to a higher level of evaluative scrutiny, as well as the need to constantly be vigilant in order to protect one’s own interests. In highly interdependent military teams, there are naturally many reasons for conflict and much potential for questioning other teammates’ abilities and intentions. Moreover, the risk of being too trustworthy is simply much higher than in most other relationships. This heightened risk on its own can lead to heightened self-consciousness and rumination, and might make military team members more likely to activate distrust in teammates, or even in the leaders of their teams. Issues such as continual turnover are also likely to set the stage for new team members to feel “under the microscope” and to initiate hypervigilance and sensitivity to negative messages from other teammates.

It is also possible to imagine cases in which the distrust development process is activated even without direct and personal contact with a new teammate or even a new leader. In such a situation, negative word-of-mouth might reach the team even before the new leader ‘hits the ground’, and

initiate a bias toward interpreting his actions with suspicion. A leader's inability to show up on time at a welcome party may be interpreted as indicating perceived superiority and aloofness, rather than simply being tired from having resettled into a new home and life. The fact that many perceptions within highly interdependent military teams are shared, combined with the fact that negative information is likely to carry more weight than positive information suggests that the processes described in Kramer's model have the potential to play an important role within military contexts.

Unfortunately, this model addresses primarily the process of distrust development, but does not articulate many other factors that are likely to impact (e.g. propensity, contextual factors) on distrust. Nonetheless, the finely grained articulation of the psychological processes that start and perpetuate the growth of distrust makes a very important contribution to thinking about distrust within military teams.

7.3 Effects of Legalistic Remedies on Trust/Distrust (Sitkin and Roth, 1993).

Another modelling effort depicts the factors that influence the use of legalistic remedies in addressing issues of trust and distrust in an organization. In essence, Sitkin and Roth (1993) argue that using legalistic remedies to deal with events related to trust and distrust is likely to have paradoxical effects. This model is depicted in Figure 6 below:




Figure 6. Model of the determinants and effects of using legalistic remedies for trust/distrust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993).

This model argues that distrust is activated by perceived value incongruencies. Once distrust is activated and legalistic responses occur in response, there are different effects. When a violation is

constrained to a task-specific violation (e.g., a failure of competence), even though trust has been violated, legalistic remedies are likely to be effective. As these violations are associated with more contextual specificity, it will be easier to enact rules and procedures to remedy the problem. On the other hand, when distrust is looming due to a generalized difference in values, legalistic remedies are unlikely to be effective. Indeed, this approach is likely to further increase distrust, rather than alleviate it. Sitkin and Roth (1993) provide three primary reasons that this is the case. First, these remedies are impersonal, and replace reliance on the goodwill of others with formal controls. Second, these remedies impose rules and procedures that undermine the implicit agreements that govern social interaction, thus increasing interpersonal distance. Third, legalistic remedies (by their very nature) attempt to address specific issues. By their very nature, then, these remedies do not address generalized value congruence at the deeper level where it needs to be addressed. Sitkin and Roth (1993) suggest that additional research is necessary to determine the types of remedies suitable to a variety of violations of trust. This model is an important contribution to the organizational literature as it shows that legalistic remedies are not always effective or desirable.

Although likely to be helpful within the organizational domain, however, this model has limited usefulness in understanding distrust within military teams, as it focuses too narrowly on the use of legalistic remedies. In addition, it does not include the possibility that repeated context-specific violations may come to be seen as personalistic. Its strongest points are that it makes an important contribution toward thinking about trust dimensionality and that its feedback loops indicate that trust and distrust development processes are iterative.

7.4 Proposed Model of Distrust in Military Teams

As the three existing models of distrust are not likely to be very helpful in depicting this phenomenon in small military teams, it is important to create a model to meet this challenge. This model is intended to be very preliminary, and to start to articulate the factors that influence the distrust development process and its perpetuation. As in our trust model (Adams & Webb, 2003), this model considers distrust at both an interpersonal level when distrust is set into motion (e.g. between two teammates), as well as contextual issues that influence distrust (e.g. team culture and norms, etc.).

Scope and Assumptions of the Model - In creating a model of distrust, it is important to make a distinction between the core or summary judgement and the many other more specific judgements relevant to distrust and/or trust. As people interact and are interdependent in a variety of domains, asking how much one trusts or distrusts another person can either relate to one's overall summary judgment of this individual or to how much this person is trusted or distrusted within a very specific and constrained domain. Unfortunately, as we have noted throughout this review, much of the trust literature fails to speak clearly enough to this distinction. One may have many different and even conflicting views about the distrustworthiness of a fellow teammate depending on the specific domain that is active. The model offered here relates to the summary judgement of distrust. It addresses the factors that influence distrust, but does not consider the consequences of it. In an earlier chapter, we have argued that distrust is rarely the "default" apriori stance toward another person, but that it typically arises when trust is lowered as much as it can be before switching to the domain of distrust. This, we have argued, is likely to occur when one's view that another person has positive intentions toward oneself is violated. This attribution of malevolent intentionality marks the move from the domain of trust to the domain of distrust. As such, this model depicts the factors that influence distrust when trust can no longer be sustained.

An important assumption of our model (arising out of our review of the literature), however, is that at the contextualized level, distrust can be either adaptive or maladaptive. As noted throughout this review, albeit somewhat underemphasized in the current literature, being suspicious of one's teammates can serve a very important protective function, in that if actual threat does exist, it may be identified more quickly, and cause less damage if compensations are made. Deutsch (1973) has made a very important distinction between pathological and non-pathological forms of trust and distrust, with the optimal state being one that is flexible and responsive to changing situations. Distrust can be maladaptive and even pathological when it develops without checks on reality, without constant updating and conforming one's expectations to the "data" received from the other person. This can lead to "exaggerated perceptual and judgemental propensities, which can arise and may be sustained even in the absence of specific experiences that justify or warrant them." (Kramer, 1998). On the other hand, distrust can be very valuable when it is frequently updated, for example, when data showing unexpected positive motivation is allowed to change one's view of another teammate. Whether distrust is adaptive or maladaptive, then, relates to the extent to which expectations are properly calibrated to conditions within the relevant interaction with others.⁹

In considering distrust within the context of military teams, we would argue that some elements of distrust may be functional to some degree because of the changing nature of the environment and of the situation. However, the optimal combination of trust and distrust may depend on the level of interdependence required within a specific relationship. With a teammate (e.g. one's fire team partner) where the relationship is based on a very specific and defined set of tasks and behaviours, simultaneous distrust and trust may not have a huge cost, because the number of contexts in which interests overlap is fairly limited. Imagine, however, a relationship with another teammate in which there is a much higher level of interdependence, and the sheer number of task and interpersonal intersections between oneself and one's teammate is higher. In this case, continually cultivating distrust (as well as trust) has the potential to disrupt the flow of events in non-productive way, as one's attention must be continually split. In this case, distrust may make it too difficult to maintain one's focus on the task at hand. Put another way, when a broader range of interdependence is required, it may be very difficult to actively maintain an inconsistent summary judgement of the teammate, and it may be more adaptive to simply commit to a unified summary judgement. As we noted earlier, however, although it is not necessarily negative to have both trust and distrust within one's summary judgement of another teammate, it is likely optimal to have an overall positive trust summary judgement that enables the maximal possible level of cooperation, while maintaining pockets of distrust in specific areas. This way, vigilance but not unconditional acceptance is the rule. At a summary judgement level, however, the actual empirical relationship between adaptability and distrust is still an open question, as the necessary research has simply not been done. However, it seems reasonable to speculate that the curve representing the optimal relationship between distrust and adaptability may have an inverted U-shape. At the highest levels of distrust, one is likely to disengage altogether, limiting the ability to adapt to and to change the situation. At the low and more passive levels of distrust, on the other hand, proper adaptability is likely to be problematic, because one is simply not attentive enough to the changing circumstances. This suggests that distrust may be more adaptive when occurring at moderate levels within military teams.

⁹ The process of distrust calibration as the result of experience with others is also depicted very simplistically here, but is described in more detail in the short trust/distrust calibration paper (Adams, 2005) that is a part of the trust dimensionality statement of work.

Situational Antecedents – This model argues that risk, uncertainty, vulnerability and the need for interdependence are the situational antecedents underlying the development of distrust. This model shows uncertainty, vulnerability and the need for interdependence as all merging into a person's perception of risk. Without these basic situational antecedents, there is no need for distrust to be an active issue. Specific situational antecedents noted by Kramer (1999b) to be more relevant in distrust include uncertainty around social standing, and social distinctiveness, which are merged here into a broader category of evaluative scrutiny.

Contextual factors – Within military teams, it is clear that the need to distrust others will also depend in part on the context in which these decisions are made. Two issues that are likely to be most influential on distrust within small military teams are organizational factors and team culture and norms around distrust. At an organizational level, our review suggests that military teams are particularly likely to face the challenge of distrust because the hierarchical nature of this context is likely to prime evaluative scrutiny and uncertainty around one's status. These, of course, have the potential to promote distrust. As noted earlier, once activated, distrust also has the potential to promulgate throughout an organization because the ascription of malevolent intentionality, left unaddressed, has the potential to grow as expectations are shared with other members of the organization. In such a highly interdependent environment in which cognitions and expectations are literally 'shared', problems of distrust may quickly propagate. Team history and culture around distrust also has the potential to influence the distrust development process. Team members who feel they have been constantly wronged by their teammates, or by the "system" are likely to promulgate this view throughout the team. Similarly, team norms around distrust might also be influential. In teams with very strict standards for true team inclusion, for example, distrust of a new team member may well be the prescribed team standard until team members have had an opportunity to test the mettle of this new team member. Other teams may ascribe importance to showing a positive and accepting attitude toward new team members until given a reason to believe differently. This suggests that organizational and team factors will influence the emergence of distrust.

The Process of Distrust Development – The process by which distrust develops, although influenced by unique factors, is likely similar to the process by which trust develops. As Figure 7 depicts, this process starts with a decision at the intersection of perceived risk (influenced by perceived trustworthiness and situational antecedents) and some need to make a decision, for example, to commit resources or invest energy in the relationship. For such a decision point to occur, the distruster must be in some way interdependent on the distrustee. Within a military team, the need to make such a decision is influenced by both the contextual factors in play (e.g. team culture and norms and organizational factors) as well as by violations that occur. Caught between the relative costs and benefits of a distrust-relevant decision on the one hand and the need to make a decision on the other hand, the individual must decide whether the costs outweigh the benefits and make a decision about whether to enact distrust. This may involve a change in one's psychological state or result in a behaviour that signals their decision (e.g. choosing to cooperate or not). When (and if) it occurs, the outcome of this decision can set the distrust calibration process into motion. This calibration process is described in more detail in the companion paper to this report entitled "The Calibration of Trust/Distrust" (Adams, 2005). In short, however, the outcome of this calibration process feeds back to change the perceived distrustworthiness of the actor, the perceived risk inherent in the situation and the very need to enact distrust processes for the future. If a decision to trust someone, for example, is violated, this can initiate rumination and hypervigilance and change how subsequent interactions occur. Although the proposed model

focuses on the factors that influence distrust, a model that speaks more clearly to the processes relevant during distrust development will also be necessary for a full explanation of this process.

7.5 Research Implications

1. This preliminary model, developed in conjunction with our review of the literature, and based on our experience within the military domain, represents a start at conceptualizing how distrust develops and the factors that influence it within the military context. Of course, it will be important to validate this model both directly and indirectly with members of military teams.
2. The actual empirical relationship between distrust and adaptability remains an important issue since our ideas here are speculative.
3. Our model notes the importance of organizational factors on judgements of distrust that occur within military teams. As distrust is predicated on hypervigilance and rumination, environments that promote distrust at a broad level are likely to be a “breeding ground” for distrust at the team level. This suggests that understanding the status of distrust/trust at an organizational level will be very important.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Chapter 8 – Future Research and Recommendations

Introduction – This review suggests that research aiming to understand distrust could proceed in several ways. The possibilities range from working to understand the dimensionality of trust very specifically to working to understand distrust better within the current program of trust research. Of course, there are pros and cons to both approaches, and these are discussed in more detail in the sections that follow.

8.1 Priorities and Recommendations for Distrust Research

Clearly, it would be possible to devote discrete attention to the dimensionality of trust in the current program of trust research. The extent to which the trust dimensionality issue should be directly addressed in the context of the current program of research is more a pragmatic than an academic one. On one hand, working to disentangle trust dimensionality within the context of small military teams has the potential to make an important contribution to the literature. On the other hand, there is also an increasing need to provide practical advice and practical solutions to the challenges that the CF currently faces. Considering the many challenges faced by the CF, devoting concerted and direct attention to this more esoteric conceptual issue may detract attention and resources from more critical issues related to trust and distrust.

Even without certainty about their “actual” relationship at a conceptual level, it may be prudent to accept the lack of clarity in the research and literature and to work instead to incorporate trust and distrust into our current program of research. In this case, we would incorporate questions relevant to trust dimensionality as much as possible into the current program of research such that the answer may evolve as other more important questions are addressed. As long as we can find or develop adequate measures of team distrust and are comfortable with the lack of definitive answers as to trust dimensionality, other issues within the current program of research may be of more importance and practical usefulness. And, as our research proceeds, it may be possible to provide some insight into the dimensionality issue. In short, then, we advocate working to incorporate the dimensionality issue into our current program of research without giving it discrete and specific attention, as there are more pressing and pragmatic issues.

With the knowledge gained in this review, it will be possible to begin to incorporate distrust into our work in the following ways:

- Create measures of distrust and incorporate these measures into existing efforts to measure trust in small military teams
- Incorporate consideration of distrust into future studies and experiments
- Refine and test the model of distrust in small military teams in parallel with the model of trust in small teams
- Work toward understanding trust dimensionality to the extent possible within the current program of trust research.

Each of these recommendations is addressed in more detail below.

8.1.1 Create measures of distrust

This recommendation speaks to creating measures of distrust and incorporating them into our ongoing efforts to measure trust within small military teams. This will require assessing the suitability of existing measures, considering what is required for new measures, and creating some new scale items. Each of these tasks is considered in the following sections.

Existing Distrust Measures - A full review of all existing distrust measures was not possible within the scope of this work, but a provisional review (combined with previous efforts exploring measures of trust) did provide an adequate overview of the few distrust measures that are available. There appears to be a deficit of measures that directly explore distrust in a way that would be transportable to the small military team domain.

One of the problems with existing measures, of course, is that dimensionality is often assumed but neither empirically established nor explicit. For example, Rotter's (1967) Interpersonal Trust Scale is a 25-item scale intended to tap trust in a variety of people and situations (e.g. politicians, parents, institutions). A high score represents high trust, and in keeping with trust as a bipolar, unidimensional construct, a low score represents distrust. As we have noted elsewhere, however, this scale has been widely criticized and is likely not a useful measure of either trust or distrust as we have defined them. Heretick (1981; cited in Heretick, 1984) has developed a 6-item scale measuring generalized expectancies about others' behaviours and motives, as either uncertain, deceitful, and exploitative (suspicion), or benign and helpful (trust). Again, this measure appears to be predicated on trust/distrust as a unidimensional construct.

Other measures of distrust focus specifically on related constructs such as paranoia and suspicion. For example, the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI p-scale) (Kreiner, Simonsen, & Mogensen, 1990) and the MMPI paranoia subscale both assess clinical paranoia. None of these measures are appropriate for measuring distrust within small military teams.

Work by Omedei and McLennan (2000) examines the creation of a scale of mistrust/trust within dyadic relationships. This work proposes a mainly motivational definition of interpersonal mistrust, conceptualizing it as "*mistrust of the motives of others in situations involving one's well being.*" Each scale item includes a description of a situation and participants indicate their agreement with a related interpretation of the situation. For example, the following situational description "*You are having trouble with an automatic banking machine and the next person in the queue offers to help*" is matched with the interpretation "*He or she plans to read your secret number*". Although these exact scenarios are not appropriate for the military domain, a similar approach using scenarios could be undertaken for measuring distrust. We have, however, noted elsewhere that this questionnaire focuses too heavily on interpretations of others' behaviour, rather than on actual expectations of others; nonetheless, a similar questionnaire could be adapted to assess distrust-relevant attributions.

Although we applaud Omedei and McLennan's (2000) creative scenario-based measure, we have questioned their data analytic strategies and the apparent certainty of the conclusions reached by these researchers and have indicated ways in which this work may not speak conclusively to the dimensionality of trust (Adams, Bruyn and Chung-Yan, 2004). However, although the content of the scale items is obviously not relevant, the use of situational descriptions allows for the tailoring of items to the infantry team context. Scale items could include descriptions of distrust-relevant situations most likely to be encountered by infantry teams.

In general, then, there is no evidence of a published distrust measure that might be applicable to accessing distrust within military teams. Most of the available measures obfuscate the issue of

dimensionality, subscribe to the increasingly challenged view that trust and distrust are a single bipolar construct, or have been created to assess related concepts in clinical domains. It seems important to create a measure that would be free of these limitations at the outset.

Considerations for Creating Distrust Measures - After concluding that it was unlikely that suitable measures existed that might assist in the measurement of distrust within military contexts, we developed some self-report items that would tap distrust within this domain. Before starting this process, we reviewed the existing items in the trust in team (and trust in leader) scales (Adams, Bruyn, & Chung-Yan, 2004), in order to ensure that they relate only to trust (as we have defined it) and not to distrust. This was an important step as these measures were created before our thinking about distrust fully evolved. We concluded that our existing reverse-scored trust items (Adams et al., 2003) did seem to tap trust rather than distrust. After this screen, we set about creating some distrust items that we could use in future scale validation efforts exploring both trust and distrust.

At this point, we considered several conceptual issues related to the measurement of distrust. As we noted in our earlier work, it was important to make a deliberate decision about how best to conceptualize distrust at a team level that was ideally consistent with our previous efforts (Adams et al., 2003). Of course, the ethical problems associated with studying distrust within the military context are perhaps even more potentially problematic than those of studying trust. To ask soldiers about the extent to which they distrust specific fellow teammates or leaders could be construed as intrusive. More dangerous, however, is the possibility that asking about distrust with respect to specific relationships might damage existing relationships within intact teams. Simply enquiring about their levels of distrust or their notions about distrust might cause them to recall situations that they had put behind them and fuel renewed tension. Alternatively, it could cause them to re-evaluate previously neutral events and re-label them as trust violations. As such, it would make sense to represent team distrust as related to attitudes toward the team as a whole, rather than to assess distrust toward individuals.

This review has helped to identify the dimensions of distrust that are most relevant in the context of infantry teams. Based on this conceptual review, we believe that distrust will be best captured by measuring the attribution of intentionality on the part of other team members. More specifically, distrust has been argued to be the expectation of negative events and/or behaviours on the part of a fellow teammate or leader, with a particular emphasis on the development of negative attributions about intentions and motivations. In creating distrust measures, we chose to focus specifically on the factors implicated in the distrust development process and on the consequences of distrust. These include rumination, hypervigilance, and the need to defensively monitor other teammates and leaders. Adequately capturing distrust required writing items to meet these requirements.

Creating items to tap both cognitive (e.g. “I think”) and affective (e.g. “I fear”) components of distrust as a psychological state (McAllister, 1995) also seemed necessary. In addition, the relationship between distrust as a psychological state and distrust as choice behaviour also needed to be considered. The problem with this way of conceptualizing either trust or distrust, as we have argued previously (e.g. Adams and Webb, 2003), is that it is possible to emit what appears to be trust-relevant behaviour without the psychological state being in play. At the same time, it will also be important to ensure that distrust measures are as adaptable as possible to be used within the military domain at varying intraorganizational levels. In keeping with our analysis in this paper, we worked to create items that captured generalized distrust summary judgements because even though these kinds of judgements may be more rare, at a pragmatic level, they are also likely to be the most problematic. If the generalized distrust items appear capable of capturing distrust as a summary judgement, it will be possible to refine and contextualize items for the future.

Of course, any efforts to measure distrust will ideally capture the entire spectrum of distrust, from high to low distrust. This requirement, however, could prove problematic because the paradigmatic forms of distrust and trust seem to both be best encapsulated by the high rather than the low end of each construct's scale. A similar issue has also been noted in the affect literature, wherein theorists argue that although positive and negative affect both have high and low bipolar structure, these terms are best defined by the high ends of the poles (Watson & Tellegen, 1999). From a scale development point of view, however, it would be ideal to be able to represent both trust and distrust as having bipolar dimension. This suggests the need to make an important but difficult conceptual decision when designing scale items. If distrust and trust are best represented by the high ends of the construct, items written at the low end of the scale (i.e. more passive and less negative forms of distrust) may not perform well. On the other hand, writing items that primarily capture the higher ends may perform well, but fail to capture the entire spectrum. From our perspective, although it is ideal to capture the whole spectrum, we have reasoned that distrust at the high end of the scale is likely to be more problematic. As such, our inclination is to work to measure these levels as proficiently as possible, even if it means compromising somewhat on measurement of the lower levels of each.

With these requirements in mind, we developed the following distrust items in order to assess distrust within teams.

Item	Factor
I need to watch my back around my teammates.	Defensive monitoring
I think my team members have bad intentions.	Intentions
I suspect my teammates say one thing, but do another.	Intentions
I need to defend myself around my teammates.	Defensive monitoring
I distrust my teammates.	Summary
My team members are motivated to lie.	Intentions
In order to protect myself, I have to watch my teammates.	Defensive monitoring
I need to double check what other teammates do.	Defensive monitoring
I constantly need to watch my back around my teammates.	Hypervigilance
I don't believe what my team members tell me.	Intentions
I can't forget all the times that my teammates have screwed me.	Rumination
My teammates are always looking for ways to screw me.	Hypervigilance
I fear that my teammates would knife me to benefit themselves.	Intentions
My team members would do anything to protect their own butts.	Intentions
I am wary when my teammates want to help me.	Intentions
My teammates are distrustworthy.	Summary
My teammates' motives are suspicious.	Intentions
I am wary about what my teammates are likely to do.	Hypervigilance

With these measures of distrust created, it will be important to incorporate them into existing trust work, described in the next section. This will include testing these items during the next stages of trust scale validation (i.e. trust scale validation trial, scheduled for March, 2005 in Petawawa).

8.1.2 To the extent possible, incorporate distrust into the current program of trust research

As we noted earlier, pursuing the dimensionality of trust discretely is not an urgent recommendation for our current program of trust research. However, we do advocate incorporating distrust as much as possible into the current program. There are many different ways in which this could occur.

It might be helpful to explore our ideas about distrust in focus groups. Our current thinking about distrust has been shaped and informed by our previous efforts to understand trust within teams, but it seems important to ensure that our ideas about distrust can be benchmarked to those of military team members. This informal validation of the preliminary distrust model would ensure that we are on the right track before proceeding down an unestablished path.

From our review of the relevant literature, it is clear that there are many different avenues for future work exploring the nature of distrust. For example, in keeping with the preliminary model of distrust that we have proposed, it would be possible to explore the factors that might influence distrust within a military context. As such, experimentally varying a person's perceived intentionality and observing the impact on both perceptions of trust and distrust would be of considerable interest. Our model of distrust development argues that distrust is distinct from trust, in part, because of the centrality of the perceived violation on judgments about oneself. Research ideas related to the centrality of a violation as well as the perceived intentionality of an action could be explored. It would be possible to vary the kind of violation and show the increased impact as one gets closer to the core on judgments of distrust. In keeping with research by Kim, Ferrin, Cooper and Dirks (2003), for example, it would also be possible to target violations toward specific areas of one's perception of another person. For a person who holds integrity as a very important value, for example, an integrity violation may be more likely to bring distrust to the fore, and to result in a change in a summary judgement more than a predictability violation. This, we would argue might be the case simply because integrity is a more core construct for this person than is predictability. On the other, the opposite might be true for a person who is highly invested in predictability.

Within the military, however, it is not enough to consider only the impact of conventional person-based factors, as issues as one's role or military rank are also likely to play a prominent role in judgements of distrust. As such, category-based distrust will need to be considered in more detail. This suggests that the distrust relevant implications of rank, and the implications of many forms of group membership will be important to understand in more detail. It would also be interesting to explore the relationship between the growth of distrust and the erosion of trust over time within team relationships. According to our review, the evolution of distrust and the erosion of trust (although commonly associated in the literature) should have two separate (albeit related) processes. The growth of distrust should be associated with violations that impact on attributions about intentionality, or which spread and come to be associated with a broader set of negative attributes. The erosion of trust, on the other hand, would typically involve a gradual lessening of positive expectations and attributions. This kind of research would ideally be conducted using a longitudinal design, where the dynamics of trust and distrust could be tracked discretely over time within a team. It might be possible to identify situations in which teams are inherently at risk of facing problems of distrust, perhaps due to organizational changes (e.g. downsizing), or teams that function in environments in which levels of distrust are particularly likely to increase over time (e.g. as the result of systemic trust being very low).

Having created measures of both trust and distrust within military teams, we may also be in a position to address the question of trust dimensionality directly in the future, as long as this does not limit our ability to address more pragmatic questions. From a research perspective, the critical question is whether trust and distrust are opposite poles of the same construct, or of two related but distinct constructs. As preparation for addressing this kind of question, one possible approach is to look at work that has faced similar challenges in understanding the dimensionality of two related constructs. Facing a similar conceptual problem about the dimensionality of the affect construct, researchers progressively teased out the relationship between positive and negative affect, long argued to be a unidimensional construct (Watson and Tellegen, 1988). This was done by refining each of the concepts at a conceptual level (i.e. positive and negative affect) and creating measures aiming to capture their distinct qualities. In attempting to create an affect scale, Watson and Tellegen aimed to create “terms that were relatively pure markers of either PA or NA; that is, terms that had a substantial loading on one factor but a near zero loading on the other.”(1988). Through successive iteration and using confirmatory factor analyses, Watson and his colleagues were able to provide a strong argument that positive and negative affect are much more than reversed mirror images, but that they each have distinct antecedents and correlates. In the process, they were also able to present and subsequently validate a relatively well established and accepted measure of affect (Watson and Tellegen, 1988). It is important that although there is still considerable debate within the affect field, this work does appear to have helped to push the affect literature and theory forward in a way that would not likely have been the case without this conceptual clarification. Although we are not interested in affect *per se*, the various debates and the methodologies used to answer some of these lingering questions with respect to other similarly multidimensional concepts may be informative to our understanding the dimensionality of trust. For the very long term, then, one of the ways to disentangle the trust dimensionality would be through the creation of scales that measure both trust and distrust and working to understand the underlying dimensionality of them.

Although it would be ideal to understand the conceptual relationship between distrust and trust, however, our review suggests that the available literature and theory relevant to distrust is still at a relatively primitive stage, and is certainly much less developed than the trust literature (which is still relatively new with respect to small military teams). This factor on its own suggests that it may be difficult to solve the problem of the dimensionality of trust/distrust conclusively. Since we see trust as inherently affected by the contexts in which decisions to trust occur, it seems reasonable to argue that the same is also true of distrust. In this sense, then, there is no guarantee that the relationship between the two constructs will be the same in varying contexts.

As noted earlier in this chapter, however, the choice of which research questions deserve the most focus should perhaps be driven by the pragmatic needs of the CF most generally. Our focus groups with members of armoured crews suggested that distrust has the potential to be very problematic when it impacts on the ability to take risks in the context of working together. This may suggest a need to focus on trust/distrust as a precursor to behavioural choices, as these choices represent a most important aspect of military performance.

The next section addresses several specific questions that should be addressed in future distrust research. Promoting a better understanding of distrust should revolve around three main questions, as described below:

What is the nature of distrust in small infantry teams?

The relationship between person-based and category-based distrust will be important to explore further. Of course, the true relationship between trust and distrust, and whether they are actually one construct or two is one issue that could be explored. However, understanding the nature of

distrust also requires answering several other questions. It is clear, for example, that personal contact with another teammate that violates one's expectations and shows evidence of deliberate malevolence is likely to give rise to distrust, but the conditions under which category-based distrust is likely to dominate one's impressions are less clear. What conditions are necessary for this to occur, even in the absence of direct and personal experience? How is category-based distrust maintained?

Another important issue relates to the cognitive versus affective determinants of distrust. Again, the available literature seems to focus primarily on distrust as a phenomenon in which one's beliefs and expectations about another teammate are violated. This, we have argued, might promote distrust if these violations are perceived to have intentionality attached. Unfortunately, the affective determinants of distrust seem somewhat less articulated; the personal sense of betrayal, the anger and the pain of being personally attacked. As such, the relationship between cognitions and feelings in the formation of distrust is important to explore in the future.

As both trust and distrust are argued to reduce complexity, and as we have argued that they represent two logically possible and simultaneous alternatives, the impact of such inconsistent views of one's teammates remains an important question to explore. How are these two dimensions of trust and distrust combined to form a summary judgement about the overall trustworthiness of a fellow teammate? Is there a cost to a lack of coherence? What are the relative costs and benefits of distrust and trust both being active? How these disparate views get combined into summary judgements, and how they are enacted in the course of working with a fellow teammate seem important issues for future research.

What factors promote distrust?

Our preliminary model of distrust argues that situational, contextual and both person and category-based factors are likely to promote distrust. The majority of the available literature addresses violations that promote distrust, and some authors have argued that both the generality and type of violation impact on distrust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Sitkin and Roth (1993), for example, maintain that the factors that distinguish distrust from trust can be stated such that distrust is generalized and relates to value discrepancies, whereas trust is task-violation centred and specific. We have argued that what distinguishes distrust is the ascription of intentionality. As values are seen to be more "core" (i.e. more indicative of generality, stability, and intent), they are likely to have more power in promoting judgements of distrust. However, it is also possible that violations of task competency (argued by Sitkin & Roth, 1993 to be uniquely related to trust) in some circumstances can promote distrust rather than just lowered trust. For example, we have argued that failing to perform a task competently may simply lower trust until this lack of competency is perpetually unaddressed, and one's teammate can be held personally culpable for this failure. It will be important to consider the impact of two types of trust violations, similar in every way but designed such that one has clear implications for intentionality and one does not.

In addition, within military teams, an important influence on both trust and distrust is group membership. Many different distinctions between team members have the potential to negatively impact on distrust within a team. For example, an important distinction between team members with considerable research potential is cultural background, as stereotypes have clearly been shown to influence both judgements about the trustworthiness and distrustworthiness of other people. Moreover, group membership issues (e.g. stereotypes, team identity and ingroup/outgroup distinctions) have been shown in the literature to have influenced distrust (e.g. Eidelson and Eidelson, 2003), as well as being increasingly likely to impact on military operations. With military operations becoming increasingly multinational, and involving joint operations, alliances, and

coalitions, issues of group membership (and the implications for distrust) are more important than ever to understand.

More generally, it will be important to understand the many levels at which organizational context is likely to impact. Research will need to focus on the uniqueness of the military team domain and recognize the unique factors within the military environment that make paranoia more powerful and likely at both the individual and systemic level. The military is a very unique domain with a unique function, and the implications of these demands (in terms of both trust and distrust) need to be better understood.

How does distrust impact on individual and team process and performance?

As noted earlier, we believe that research exploring trust within military contexts in its full dimensionality could have many different foci. The first is the nature of the relationship between trust and distrust in terms of team process and performance. As we have argued that both trust and distrust are important to cultivate in military teams, understanding the costs and benefits of these on both individual and team performance will be critical. The focus of our attention should be on the relative adaptability of each as both are important within the military domain. This notion of adaptability can be conceptualized in many different ways, including:

- Attentional resources;
- Psychological health; and
- Behaviour and performance at individual and/or team level.

At the individual level, then, a key issue relates to the relationship between trust and distrust. In keeping with the dual conceptualization of trust and distrust, within the context of a small military team, it is possible to have attitudes and expectations of other teammates that are both positive (trust-relevant), and negative (distrust-relevant). As noted earlier, one important issue relates to how our judgements in diverse areas are combined into an overall summary judgement. Another concerns the relative costs of this form of attitudinal ambivalence on cognitions, affect, motivations and behaviours. From a cognitive perspective, for example, believing that my teammate is likely to protect me in one domain, but that this person is distrustworthy in another presents potential problems for how my attention should be allocated. Should I let my guard down or should I maintain constant vigilance? Similarly, it is also unclear how these kinds of attitudes are likely to impact on our psychological well-being and how we are able to manage potentially very negative affect (related to the things that we fear our teammate might do), while simultaneously maintaining a positive stance toward this person. This suggests that there may be potential for overlap between understanding the psychological state of individuals and their stress and coping. For example, research reviewed in Chapter 5 clearly suggests that psychological health can be adversely affected when distrust is active.

In the context of military teams, it will also be important to consider the impact of distrust on issues such as team morale and cohesion. These constructs, long argued to be positively associated with trust, may or may not be negatively associated with distrust. For example, in our focus groups with members of infantry teams, we were somewhat surprised by the ease with which team members described the need to maintain constant vigilance even of well-established members of their teams (and about whom they appeared to have only positive evaluations). This apparent discrepancy and the need to maintain a somewhat distrustful stance did not appear to have undermined team morale and cohesion, but was argued to be a necessary part of their teams' ability to perform as a team. As

such, it is important not to assume that trust is positively associated with morale and cohesion and that distrust is negatively correlated.

The remainder of this chapter outlines the features of a research program, proposes a research approach with a prototype of a possible study, and offers research questions that might be addressed in the study of distrust within military contexts.

Table 4: Researching the nature of distrust in small teams.

Research goal: Determine the nature of distrust in small teams	
Research Issue	Example Research Questions
What is the nature of distrust in small teams?	<p>What is the relationship between trust and distrust?</p> <p>Is trust within teams best represented as a single bipolar trust/distrust construct or as trust and distrust separately?</p> <p>How are distrust summary judgements about other teammates formed?</p> <p>Is distrust in small teams determined by both cognitive and affective factors?</p> <p>How do person-based and category-based distrust interact in small teams?</p> <p>What is the optimal relationship between trust and distrust in military combat teams?</p>

Table 5: Researching the factors that promote and maintain distrust

Research goal: Determine the factors that promote and maintain distrust.	
Research Issue	Example Research Questions
Do individual differences affect distrust in teams?	<p>How does propensity to distrust effect trust in teams?</p> <p>How (if at all) is propensity to distrust related to propensity to trust?</p>
Do values affect distrust in teams?	How do differences in values affect distrust development?
What factors affect the development and maintenance of distrust?	<p>How do current goals affect the processing of distrust-relevant information?</p> <p>How do human errors and biases affect distrust?</p> <p>How do intentions predict distrust?</p> <p>How does reputation affect distrust?</p> <p>How does group membership affect distrust?</p>
How do violations impact on distrust?	<p>How does the centrality of the violation impact?</p> <p>How does the extremity of the violation impact?</p> <p>How does the perceived intentionality impact?</p> <p>How does the attribution of responsibility impact?</p>
What contextual factors affect distrust?	<p>How does organizational trust impact?</p> <p>How does team history impact?</p> <p>How do team norms impact?</p>

Table 6: Researching how distrust impacts on team performance.

Research goal: Determine how distrust impacts on team performance.	
Research Issue	Example Research Questions
How does distrust affect information processing?	How does distrust influence the generation of counterscenarios?
How is defensive monitoring affected by team distrust?	How does defensive monitoring as the result of distrust impact on team performance?
How is rumination affected by team distrust?	What factors might mitigate the need for rumination (e.g. communication)?
How is hypervigilance affected by team distrust?	How does hypervigilance impact on the ability to perform other tasks? What are the benefits and costs of hypervigilance?
How do human errors and biases impact on team distrust?	Can human errors and biases that promote distrust be undermined?
How does distrust impact on team performance impact on trust in teams?	By what mechanisms does distrust improve or hinder team performance?
Can team performance be predicted through knowledge of distrust?	Can measured increases in distrust be shown to impact incrementally on team performance?

8.2 Prototypical Study – Trust Violations

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to explore the conceptual relationship between distrust and trust. Following on from the work of Sitkin and Roth (1993), this study directly explores the relationship between failures of task competency and generalized value incongruencies on judgements of distrust and trust. We have argued that the Sitkin and Roth depiction of lessened trust as being driven by perceived task incompetence and distrust as being driven by perceived value incongruence is not entirely incorrect. Rather, we have argued that value incongruity impacts specifically because of its relationship to intentionality, and that task reliability that becomes linked with intentionality also has the potential to stimulate distrust rather than simply lower trust. Believing that another person has different values may not lead to distrusting them unless this discrepancy is seen to indicate deliberate or malevolent disrespect of an opposing value system.

Overview – This laboratory based study involves participants viewing one of 4 videotaped scenarios in which they witness a trust-relevant violation that occurs as the result of either intentional or unintentional task unreliability or as the result of an intentional or unintentional generalized value incongruence.

In Scenario 1, participants will view a team member who has been asked to perform a task for the rest of the team, but who does not have the requisite skills necessary to do so. In one variation of this scenario, the team member will be shown bragging about his having resisted training, even though his direct supervisor had mandated it. In the other variation of this scenario, the participant will be shown as having willingly undertaken extensive training. Despite this training, however, the person will be shown to still have a skill deficit.

Scenario 2 will show the same actor committing a generalized and value-based violation both intentionally and unintentionally. In both variations of the scenario, the “victim” will be a fellow teammate who espouses honesty as an important value. In the high intentionality variation of this scenario, the actor will be shown maliciously lying to his teammate about the completion of a given task, and later boasting about this to other teammates. In the low intentionality variation, the actor will be shown lying to the teammate but will show regret to other teammates at having done so.

We expect that task competency violations with low intentionality will influence trust judgments, whereas those with high intentionality will influence distrust. Perceived value discrepancies will influence distrust more when if they are associated with intentionality.

Method – Participants will first be shown a neutral clip of the primary actor, and will be asked to judge his trustworthiness and distrustworthiness on scales developed within the current research program. They will then watch one of 4 videotaped scenarios in which either a task competency or value-based discrepancy occurs, each containing either a high or low intentionality violation. Participants will again be asked to rate trust/distrust of the actor, as well as other personality characteristics such as likeability etc.¹⁰) and to provide ratings of the intentionality and type of violation evidenced in the videotape. They will then be asked to write an open-ended description of what happened in the videotape and why.

¹⁰ In order to anticipate possible alternative accounts, it will also be important to show that distrust rather than differential positive or negative attitudes toward the actor in the two scenarios will drive the expected effects.

Hypotheses – From the perspective of the Sitkin and Roth work, both instances of Scenario 1 show task incompetency, and both targets should be rated as less trustworthy, because they both failed at the same task. From our perspective, however, we would expect that the actor will be rated as somewhat less trustworthy after having undertaken extensive training (and failing), but as distrustworthy in the variation where he shows no true willingness to build his skill. In essence, then, even for task unreliability, we expect for the addition of intentionality to prime distrust rather than simply lower trust.

Similarly, from the perspective of Sitkin and Roth, both actors in Scenario 2 show the same form of value incongruence and commit the same act (i.e. lying). As such, their theory would predict that targets would rate the actors in both scenarios as being distrustworthy, and the addition of the intentionality of this action should not significantly affect distrustworthiness ratings. From our perspective, however, although we would expect that although both forms of value incongruence will lead to judgements of distrust, the actor with intentionality will be rated as more distrustworthy than will the actor who shows regret, as the value incongruence seems deliberate in the first case, but not in the second.

Anticipated Lessons Learned – This study has the potential to make an important contribution to the distrust research because (if successful), it will show the importance of judgements of intentionality and malevolent motivation as driving the move toward distrust.

Limitations – This study requires intricate staging and resources (e.g. videotaped resources). In addition, extensive pretesting of the underlying assumptions within the video scenarios will be necessary.

8.3 Pragmatic CF Recommendations

To this point, this review has considered the definition of distrust, and has discussed the factors and consequences of distrust in general, and in small military teams specifically. At a more pragmatic level, it is equally important to provide some insight into how best to manage issues of both distrust and trust within small military teams. In this section, we provide recommendations related to the full dimensionality of trust, and consider some ways in which the military can deal with the inevitability of both distrust and trust within small teams.

Create an environment that is amenable to trust. The ideal situation would be to create an environment in which trust in one's teammate or in one's leader at the summary judgement level is always the appropriate response. If leaders were always competent, and if fellow teammates were completely consistent, there would be less need for distrust, or it would be a product of situational and contextual rather than personal factors. Indeed, one might argue that the best strategy may be to create an environment in which both trust and distrust are active, but trust at the summary judgement level is the appropriate default response, and distrust (because of its potential adaptive qualities) is specific and contextualized. As we noted in the previous trust review (Adams et al., 2001), creating an environment maximally amenable to trust would consist of the following:

- Mitigating the negative effects of turnover.
- Promoting competence, benevolence, and integrity at all levels.
- Evaluating the ongoing status of trust within small teams and address any problems.
- Promoting trust through training and education.
- Building strong teams based on trust.
- Mitigating the negative effects of perceived differences among teammates, and between teammates and their leaders.
- Promoting clear and well-defined roles.
- Promoting clear and well-defined rules and procedures.
- Providing strong and positive leadership.
- Creating an environment with a strong, positive value base.
- Promote identification with a positive overarching military identity.

Summary judgements of distrust are problematic. Overall summary judgements about one's leader or one's teammate as a person who is to be distrusted at the core level present very real danger to the team. As our review suggests, this view is problematic because it is very resistive to change, as it precludes interactions that could offer disconfirming information. Any case wherein a leader or teammate is seen to be wholly distrustworthy is a critical issue that needs to be addressed. Perpetual dispositional attributions about distrust have the potential to damage effectiveness and efficiency throughout all related systems.

Promote multidimensional views of trust and distrust. Given that relationships in small military teams are characterized by link multiplexity, and people interact in a variety of domains, it is important to recognize the specificity and complexity of both trust and distrust judgements. It is also important to acknowledge the fact that there is, essentially, no coherent unit representing either trust or distrust and that summary judgements may contain both aspects without being problematic. The true adaptive value of trust and distrust depends on the suitability of these views to the actual behaviour of the person and the qualities of the environment. Moreover, we also argue that many of the correlates of distrust (e.g. defensive monitoring, hypervigilance) may be very adaptive in the context of small military teams, due to the riskiness of the situation and the potential for fellow teammates to behave in unexpected ways.

Acknowledge that trust and distrust may have different implications in varying military contexts. As much as we have argued that both trust and distrust have adaptive value in military domains, it is also important to emphasize that not all military contexts are likely to require an equal investment in promoting distrust. In some contexts, distrust might not be preferable. In combat teams, for example, this distinction might be critical, but this may well be less true in administrative teams within military systems. This suggests that the approach to distrust in the CF might not be unitary.

Training. An important part of being able to manage distrust within military teams relates to being able to identify its presence. Distrust can be recognized in many different ways. An excellent resource provided by Tomlinson and Lewicki (2004) presents some common indicators of distrust, including:

- Persistent suspicion about motives and intentions;
- Chronic denial of benefits from cooperation and continued interdependence;
- Presence of intentional defensive monitoring; and
- Unwillingness to engage in risks that might lead to opportunities for effective collaboration.

This suggests that it would be possible to train for distrust, in order to help people to recognize (and to respond to) signals that indicate the likelihood of undesirable behaviour in the future. One component of training in distrust might include teaching new arrivals to the military how to recognize indicators of the need for increased vigilance and distrust. Because new team members may be ill-prepared when other team members experience trouble coping during operations, for example, training in prudent paranoia may be desirable. Training as to the indicators that another teammate is likely to act out of character may be beneficial, as would helping people to distinguish between the dispositional and situational factors that influence distrust. Part of this training should focus on the features of the context that influence distrust and that should most likely give rise to distrust. Every context through which a military team moves puts the team at varying levels of risk, and thus facilitates and requires varying levels of active distrust. If the violations that are most likely to occur can be identified, this would help team members not only cultivate a higher level of suspicion during these times, but to also be better at the interpretation of behaviour.

Certainly, the issue of training people to be more adept at identifying teammates who are more in danger of ‘cracking under the pressure’ suggests the need to interface with expertise from the stress and coping domain. At the same time, however, there are obvious ethical issues with actively training and promulgating a distrustful stance within any context. However, it is also very clear that the kinds of attitudes and behaviours in one’s teammate that should promote distrust are worth studying and training for.

From a somewhat different perspective, the military system should also train mechanisms for coping with the maladaptive effects of distrust as well as in the adaptive properties of distrust (i.e., in the Kramerian sense). For example, in our trust, risk, and communication study we saw evidence that distrust (defensive monitoring) begets distrust (defensive monitoring). This could be both positive and negative. Defensively monitoring a teammate’s movements is time-consuming – time that could be better spent in other activities such as planning and navigating, particularly when the distrust is unjustified or misjudged. On the other hand, it does serve a protective function.

Lastly, training related to distrust should focus give specific attention to issues that are particularly likely to be problematic within the military environment. For example, as noted earlier, because distrust is influenced by the existence of hierarchical structure, and as the military is an extremely hierarchical structure, the military system will perpetually experience challenges in minimizing distrust. As distrust also hinges heavily on the ascription of intentionality, having strong and open communication and opportunities to interact with other leaders and teammates outside of the hierarchical structure may be of great value. Even this simple information provided in training has the potential to heighten awareness of distrust, and to make it easier to mitigate.

Promote continuous calibration of trust and distrust. As we have argued throughout this review, both trust and distrust have the potential to be problematic within military contexts when one’s impressions are not accurately calibrated. This suggests that rather than working toward building trust or avoiding distrust per say, it will be more helpful to promote flexible and adaptive styles of responding. The real issue, Kramer argues (2002) is about using all of the information that

is available regardless of its valence. This argues that more flexible styles of information processing will, by their very nature, promote more efficient and effective calibration to the actual target.

Promote healthy group/team identity. As noted throughout this work, one of the most likely contexts for the promulgation of distrust is when people feel that they are under the scrutiny of others. One of the ways to prevent this is to promote a culture in which there are healthy levels of identity, and appropriate ingroup dynamics.¹¹ As noted in other work, however, there are potential problems that could be associated with the unmonitored and undisciplined promotion of group identity that would need to be addressed. Giving people a goal can curtail their activation of negative stereotypes (Kunda & Sinclair, 1999). If this is true, even in environments in which distrust is perpetually high, it might be possible to lessen the impact of negative expectations and beliefs by promoting a superordinate goal such as organizational identity.

Avoid legalistic approaches to remedying trust violations. Some trust researchers (e.g., Sitkin & Roth, 1993) have argued that some efforts to right violations of trust fail because they involve escalating levels of formality and distance between the two parties, which actually exacerbates distrust. Sitkin and Roth's (1993) work also makes a distinction between the degree of distrust engendered by violations of task specific expectations from that which is engendered when one encounters competing values.

"...when fundamental values are violated, and perceived trustworthiness is undermined across contexts, then legalistic remedies are ill-suited to restoring lost distance. We will refer to the former situation as 'violated trust' and to the latter as 'distrust' - and we will examine this distinction as providing the foundation for explaining the limited effectiveness of legalistic remedies" (Sitkin & Roth, 1993, p. 370).

This work suggests that legalistic approaches are doomed to fail as they form barriers to true communication and fail to show evidence of good will and a common motivation to solve existing problems.

Promote strong relationships. It is clear from the literature that weak relationships are breeding grounds for distrust (Burt & Knez, 1996). This suggests that one way to counteract potentially negative ramifications of distrust is to promote strong interpersonal relationships. Collins and Jacobs (2002) also cite open 2-way communication, constructive criticism, greater responsiveness to soldiers' needs (e.g., time off, medical coverage, courses, support for stress, etc.), less frequent turnover from team-to-team, less micromanagement, recognizing generational differences in attitudes and values, and eliminating the zero-deficit mentality (i.e., that soldiers who make mistakes are unskilled), as a few of the many ways in which the CF as an organization can help promote levels of trust and distrust through strong interpersonal relationships.

Communicate often and effectively. Part of what promotes distrust is the spread of inaccurate information. Particularly within military contexts, rumours and gossip may put the pendulum in motion. The distrust literature hints that what is most likely to create negative distrust dynamics is not lack of predictability or competence, but the transformation of motivation that occurs when malevolent intentions are ascribed to other team members or leaders. In this sense, it is critical for

¹¹ This stands in contrast to other problems that can be created when ingroup identity spins out of control due to a lack of discipline and leadership (Winslow, 1996)

leaders, for example, to focus on ensuring transparency, and that their intentions are known to the highest possible degree.

Address systemic issues related to trust and distrust. We continue to be struck by the importance of the systemic issues of trust within the small teams that we have been studying, and for the ability of these systemic issues to impact greatly on trust at a micro and macro level. Certainly, issues of distrust within small teams are important, but it also critical to look at distrust within the CF as an entire organization. The extent to which soldiers feel the military system looks out for them and protects their interests (or not) needs to be better understood for a fuller depiction of the status of distrust and trust within CF.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Primary References

- ANDERSSON, L. M. (1996). Employee Cynicism: An Examination Using a Contract Violation Framework. *Human Relations*, 49(11), 1395-1418.
- BIES, R., & TRIPP, T. M. (1996). Beyond Distrust: "Getting Even" and the Need for Revenge. In R. Kramer & T. Tyler (Eds.), *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research* (pp. 246-260). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- BIGLEY, G., & PEARCE, J. (1998). Straining for Shared Meaning in Organization Science: Problems of Trust and Distrust. *Academy of Management Review*, 23(3), 405-421.
- BURGOON, J., BULLER, D. B., EBESU, A. S., & ROCKWELL, P. (1994). Interpersonal Deception: V. Accuracy in Deception Detection. *Communications Monographs*, 61(December), 303-325.
- BURT, R. S., & KNEZ, M. (1996). Trust and Third-Party Gossip. In R. Kramer & T. Tyler (Eds.), *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research* (pp. 68-89). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- DEUTSCH, M. (1958). Trust and Suspicion. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2(4), 265-279.
- EIDELSON, R., & EIDELSON, J. (2003). Dangerous Ideas: Five beliefs that propel groups toward conflict. *American Psychologist*, 58(3), 182-192.
- FEIN, S. (1996). Effects of Suspicion on Attributional Thinking and the Correspondence Bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(6), 1164-1184.
- FEIN, S., & HILTON, J. L. (1994). Judging Others in the Shadow of Suspicion. *Motivation and Emotion*, 18(2), 167-198.
- GURTMAN, M. B. (1992). Trust, Distrust and Interpersonal Problems: A Circumplex Analysis. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 62(6), 989-1002.
- HARDIN, R. (2003). *Distrust*. Russell Sage Foundation: New York.
- HERETICK, D. M. L. (1984). Trust-Suspicion and Gender Differences in Interpersonal Functioning. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 18, 27-40.
- INSKO, C. A., & SCHOPLER, J. (1997). Differential Distrust of Groups and Individuals, *Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior* (pp. 75-107): Erlbaum.
- INSKO, C. A., SCHOPLER, J., HOYLE, R. H., DARDIS, G. J., & GRAETZ, K. A. (1990). Individual-Group Discontinuity as a Function of Fear and Greed. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 58(1), 68-79.
- KEE, H. W., & KNOX, R. E. (1970). Conceptual and Methodological Considerations in the Study of Trust and Suspicion. *Conflict Resolution*, 14(3), 357-366.
- KRAMER, R. (1994). The Sinister Attribution Error: Paranoid Cognition and Collective Distrust in Organizations. *Motivation and Emotion*, 18(2), 199-230.
- KRAMER, R. (1996). Divergent Realities and Convergent Disappointments in the Hierarchic Relation: Trust and the Intuitive Auditor at Work. In R. Kramer & T. Tyler (Eds.), *Trust in*

Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research (pp. 216-245). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

KRAMER, R. (1998). Paranoid Cognition in Social Systems: Thinking and Acting in the Shadow of Doubt. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 2(4), 251-275.

KRAMER, R. (1999a). Stalking the Sinister Attribution Error: Paranoia Inside the Lab and Out. In R. J. Bies, Lewicki, R.J., et al. (Ed.), *Research in Negotiation in Organizations* (Vol. 7, pp. 59-97). Stamford, CT: JAI Press Inc.

KRAMER, R. (1999b). Social Uncertainty and Collective Paranoia in Knowledge Communities: Thinking and Acting in the Shadow of Doubt. In L. L. Thompson, Levine, J.M., et al. (Ed.), *Shared Cognition in Organizations: The Management of Knowledge* (pp. 163-191). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc.

KRAMER, R. (2002). When Paranoia Makes Sense. *Harvard Business Review* (July).

KRAMER, R., & MESSICK, D. M. (1997). Getting by With a Little Help From Our Enemies: Collective Paranoia and Its Role in Intergroup Relations. In C. Sedikides, Schopler, J., et al. (Ed.), *Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior* (pp. 233-255). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc.

LAGACE, R. R., & GASSENHEIMER, J. B. (1989). A Measure of Global Trust and Suspicion: Replication. *Psychological Reports*, 65, 473-474.

LEWICKI, R., MCALLISTER, D., & BIES, R. (1998). Trust and Distrust: New Relationships and Realities. *Academy of Management Review*, 23(3), 438-445.

OMODEI, M. M., & MCLENNAN, J. (2000). Conceptualizing and Measuring Global Interpersonal Mistrust-Trust. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 140(3), 279-294.

SCHUL, Y., MAYO, R., & BURNSTEIN, E. (2004). Encoding Under Trust and Distrust: The Spontaneous Activation of Incongruent Cognitions. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 86(5), 668-679.

SITKIN, S. B., & ROTH, N. L. (1993). Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic "Remedies" for Trust/Distrust. *Organization Science*, 4(3), 367-392.

SITKIN, S. B., & STICKEL, D. (1996). The Road to Hell: The Dynamics of Distrust in an Era of Quality. In R. Kramer & T. Tyler (Eds.), *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research* (pp. 196-215). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

STRICKLAND, L. H. (1958). Surveillance and Trust. *Journal of Personality*, 200-215.

STRICKLAND, L. H., BAREFOOT, J. C., & HOCKENSTEIN, P. (1976). Monitoring Behavior in the Surveillance and Trust Paradigm. *Representative Research in Social Psychology*, 7(1), 51-57.

ULLMANN-MARGALIT, E. M. (2004). Trust, distrust and in between. In R. Hardin (ed.). *Distrust*. Russell Sage Foundation: New York, pp. 60 - 82.

WELLS, C. V., & KIPNIS, D. (2001). Trust, Dependency, and Control in the Contemporary Organization. *Journal of Business and Psychology*, 15(4), 593-603.

Secondary References

- ADAMS, B.D. (2005). Trust vs. Confidence. *Draft report in preparation for Department of National Defence.*
- ADAMS, B.D. (2005). The Calibration of Trust and Distrust. *Draft report in preparation for Department of National Defence.*
- ADAMS, B.D., BRUYN, L.E., CHUYN-YAN, G. (2004). Creating Measures of Trust in Small Military Teams. *Report to Department of National Defence, DRDC No. CR-2004-077.*
- ADAMS, B.D., WEBB, R.D.G. (2003). Model of Trust Development in Small Teams. *Report to Department of National Defence. DRDC No. CR-2003-016.*
- ADAMS, B.D., BRYANT, D.J., WEBB, R.D.G. (2001). Trust in Teams Literature Review. Report to Department of National Defence. *Report No. CR-2001-042.*
- BAR-TAL, D. (1990). Causes and consequences of delegitimization: Models of conflict and ethnocentrism, *Journal of Social Issues*, 46(1), 65-81.
- BARTHOLOMEW, K., & HOROWITZ, L.M. (1991). Attachment styles among young adults: A test of the four-category model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61, 226-244.
- BREWER, M. (1981). Ethnocentrism and its role in interpersonal trust. In Brewer, M. (Ed.). *Scientific Inquiry and the Social Sciences*. (pp. 345-359). New York: Jossey-Bass.
- CATANO, V., KELLOWAY, E.K., ADAMS-ROY, J.E.M. (2000). *Defence Ethics Program: Baseline Assessment of Ethical Values in DND: Measuring Ethical Values in the Department of National Defence*. Results of the 1999 Research. Rep. Sponsor Research Report 00-1. Ottawa: National Defence Canada.
- COLLINS, J. J., & JACOBS, T. O. (2002). Trust in the Profession of Arms. In L. J. Matthews (Ed.), *The Future of the Army Profession*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- CURRALL, S.C., & JUDGE, T.A. (1995). Measuring trust between organizational boundary role persons. *Organization Behaviour and Human Decision Processes*, 64, 151-170.
- DAVIS, R.G. (2000). Establishing trust in peace support leadership. Canadian Forces College. Retrieved on June 12, 2004 from wps.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/amsc3/davisg2.doc.
- DEVINE, P. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56(1), 5-18.
- DIRKS, K. T. & D. L. FERRIN (2002). Trust in Leadership: Meta-Analytic Findings and Implications for Research and Practice. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87(4), 611-628.
- DSM-IV: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (1994). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- DEUTSCH, M. (1973). The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- ERIKSON, E.H. (1968). Identity: Youth & Crisis. New York: Norton.

- GILBERT, D., TAFARODI, R., MALONE, P. (1993). You can't not believe everything you read. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 65(2), 221-233.
- HOLMES, J.G., & REMPEL, J.K. (1989). Trust in close relationships. In C. Hendrick (Ed.). Close Relationships. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- JONES, G.R., & GEORGE, J.M. (1998). The evolution of trust and cooperation: Implications for teamwork and tacit knowledge.
- KASPERSON, R. E., D. GOLDING, & TULER, P.S. (1992). Social Distrust as a Factor in Siting Hazardous Facilities and Communicating Risks. *Journal of Social Issues*, 48(4): 161-187.
- KATZ, I., & HASS, R.G. (1988). Racial ambivalence and American value conflict: Correlational priming studies of dual cognitive structures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 893-905.
- KELLEY, H. (1973). Causal schema and the attribution process. *American Psychologist*, 28, 107 - 123.
- KIM, P. H., FERRIN, D. L., COOPER, C. D., & DIRKS, K. (2004). Removing the Shadow of Suspicion: The effects of apology versus denial for repairing competence- versus integrity-based trust violations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 89(1), 104-118.
- KREINER, S., SIMONSEN, E. AND MODENSEN, J. (1990). Validation of a personality inventory scale: The MCMI P-scale (paranoia). *Journal of Personality Disorders*, 4(3), 303-311.
- KRUGLANSKI, A.W. (1970). Attributing trustworthiness in supervisor-worker relations. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 6, 214-232.
- KUNDA, Z., SINCLAIR, L. (1999). Motivated reasoning with stereotypes: Activation, application, and inhibition. *Psychological Inquiry*, 10(1), 1999, 12-22.
- LARSON, D. (2004). Distrust: Prudent, if not always wise. In R. Hardin (ed.). *Distrust*. Russell Sage Foundation: New York, pp. 34-59.
- LEWICKI, R., & BUNKER, B. (1996). Developing and maintaining trust in work relationships. In Kramer, R. & Tyler, T. (Eds.). *Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research*. (pp. 114-139). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc.
- LEWICKI, R.J., & BUNKER, B.B. (1995). Trust in relationships: A model of development and decline. Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice: Essays Inspired by the Work of Morton Deutsch. B.B. Bunker et al. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers.
- LLINAS, J., BISANTZ, A., DRURY, C., SEONG, Y. & JIAN, J. (1998). Studies and analyses of aided adversarial decision making. Phase 2: Research of human trust in automation. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, Air Force Research Laboratory, Human Effectiveness Directorate: 117.
- LUHMANN, N. (1988). Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alternatives. Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations. D.G. (ed.). New York, Basil Blackwell.
- LARSON, D. (2004). Distrust: Prudent, if not always wise. In R. Hardin (ed.). *Distrust*. Russell Sage Foundation: New York, pp. 34-59.
- MCALLISTER, D. (1995). Affect- and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organizations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38(1), 24-59.

- MCKNIGHT, D. H., CUMMINGS, L. L., & CHERVANY, N. L. 1998. "Initial Trust Formation in New Organizational Relationships." *Academy of Management Review*, 23(3): 473-490.
- MEYERSON, D., WEICK, K.E., & KRAMER, R. (1996). Swift trust and temporary groups. Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research. R.M. Kramer et al. (Eds.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- ORBELL, J., DAWES, R. SCHWARTZ-SHEA, P. (1994). Trust, social categories, and individuals: The case of gender. Motivation & Emotion, 18, 109-128.
- PETTY, R.E., & CACIOPPO, J.T. (1996). Addressing disturbing and disturbed consumer behaviour: Is it necessary to change the way we conduct behaviour research? Journal of Marketing Research, 33, 1-8.
- REMPEL, J., HOLMES, J., & ZANNA, M. (1985). Trust in Close Relationships. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 49(1): 95-112.
- ROSS, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.). Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- ROTTER, J.B. (1967). A new scale for the measurement of interpersonal trust. Journal of Personality, 35, 651-665.
- SCHUL, Y., BURNSTEIN, E. & BARDI, A. (1996). Dealing with deceptions that are difficult to detect: Encoding and judgment as a function of preparing to receive invalid information. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 32, 228-253.
- SHERIF, M. (1958). Superordinate goals in the reduction of intergroup conflict. *American J. Sociology*, 63, 349-356.
- SLOVIC, P. (1993). Perceived risk, trust, and democracy. *Risk Analysis*, 13(6), 675-682.
- SPENCER, S., STEELE, C. & QUINN, D. (1999). Stereotype threat and women's math performance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 35(1), 4-28.
- STEELE, C., SPENCER, J., & ARONSON, J. (2002). Contending with group image: The psychology of stereotype and social identity threat. In Zanna, Mark P. (Ed). *Advances in experimental social psychology*, Vol. 34. (pp. 379-440). San Diego, CA, US: Academic Press, Inc.
- TOMLINSON AND LEWICKI (2004). Retrieved on February 3, 2005 from http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/trust_overview.jsp
- THOMPSON, M., ZANNA, M., & GRIFFIN, D. (1995). Let's not be indifferent about (attitudinal) ambivalence. In Petty, R. and Krosnick, J. (Eds.). *Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences*. Vol. 4. Hillsdale, NJ, England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., p. 361-386.
- VORAUER, J. & ROSS, M. (1993). Making mountains out of molehills: A diagnosticity bias in social perception. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19, 620-632.
- WATSON, D. & TELLEGEN, A. (1985). Toward a Consensual Structure of Mood. *Psychological Bulletin*, 98(2): 219-235.
- WATSON, D., CLARK, L., TELLEGEN, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 54(6), 1063-1070.



WATSON, D., WIESE, D., VAIDYA, J., & TELLEGEN, A. (1999). The two general activation systems of affect: Structural findings, evolutionary considerations, and psychobiological evidence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76(5), 820-838.

WINSLOW, D. (1998). Misplaced Loyalties: The role of military culture in the breakdown of discipline in peace operations. *Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology*, 35(3), 345-367.

ZAHEER, A., MCEVILY, B., & PERRONE, V. (1997). Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. *Organizational Science*, 8, 141-159.

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA (Security classification of the title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)		
1. ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document, Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in section 8.) Publishing: DRDC Toronto Performing: Humansystems Inc., 111 Farquhar St., 2nd floor, Guelph, ON N1H 3N4 Monitoring: Contracting: DRDC Toronto		2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Overall security classification of the document including special warning terms if applicable.) UNCLASSIFIED
3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification is indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C, R, or U) in parenthesis at the end of the title) The Dimensionality of Trust (U) La Dimension de la Confiance		
4. AUTHORS (First name, middle initial and last name. If military, show rank, e.g. Maj. John E. Doe.) Barbara D. Adams; Jessica A. Sartori		
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (Month and year of publication of document.) June 2005	6a NO. OF PAGES (Total containing information, including Annexes, Appendices, etc.) 104	6b. NO. OF REFS (Total cited in document.)
7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (The category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.) Contract Report		
8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The names of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development – include address.) Sponsoring: Tasking:		
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.) Contract no. W7711–017747/001/TOR		9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.)
10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document) DRDC Toronto CR 2005–204		10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers under which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.) Call-up no. 7747–20
11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (Any limitations on the dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.) Unlimited distribution		
12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (Any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, when further distribution (beyond the audience specified in (11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.)) Unlimited announcement		

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA

(Security classification of the title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)

13. **ABSTRACT** (A brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual.)

(U) This report reviews the literature relevant to the dimensionality of trust, and more specifically, considers the relationship between distrust and trust. The concept of distrust is first defined then the two prevailing views about the dimensionality of trust/distrust are considered. This review explores and endorses the view that distrust and trust are two distinct but related constructs, each with bipolar dimension. Following from this, the factors that influence distrust as well as the consequences of distrust are explored. The next section reviews relevant models of distrust and presents a preliminary model of distrust in military teams. Finally, this report offers specific recommendations about how trust dimensionality can be incorporated into our program of research, and provides practical recommendations about how best to manage issues of trust and distrust within the CF.

(U) Ce rapport passe en revue la littérature qui traite de la dimension de la confiance (trust), et plus précisément, du lien entre la méfiance (distrust) et la confiance. Il commence par définir le concept de la méfiance; après quoi, il examine les deux principales visions de la dimension de la confiance/la méfiance. Il explore et appuie l'idée selon laquelle la méfiance et la confiance sont deux notions distinctes mais connexes, comportant chacune une dimension bipolaire. À partir de là, il analyse les facteurs qui influent sur la méfiance ainsi que les conséquences de la méfiance. Il examine ensuite des modèles pertinents de la méfiance et présente un modèle préliminaire de la méfiance appliqué à des équipes de militaires. Enfin, il offre des recommandations sur la façon d'intégrer la dimension de la confiance à notre programme de recherche et des suggestions pragmatiques sur la meilleure façon de gérer les questions de confiance et de méfiance au sein des Forces canadiennes.

14. **KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS** (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

(U) literature review; trust; distrust; bipolar dimensionality; influences; consequences; models

UNCLASSIFIED